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Taking the war in Syria as a case study, this dissertation proposes an account of criminal 
accountability that merits the language that is expressed by calls for criminal accountability, 
even where physical punishment is not possible. Syria is, of course, a society that is in the 
midst of ongoing conflict – one where almost every party on the battlefield is committing 
atrocity crimes against civilians. In response, and – importantly – while the conflict continues, 
the international community, the United Nations, and the Syrian diaspora have made calls for 
holding war criminals accountable. But, what are values of these calls if there is a lack of 
institutional criminal accountability to punish perpetrators. The Syrian government, who is 
reportedly involved in atrocity crimes against its citizens, controls domestic criminal 
institutions in Syria. Syria is not a signatory to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, and there seems to be no international will to refer crimes committed during the conflict 
in Syria to it.  
 
This dissertation poses the question: given the significant unlikelihood of institutional criminal 
punishment, are there justifications for calls for criminal accountability in the midst of the 
ongoing Syrian war? 
 
The philosophy of criminal law provides several justifications as to why criminal justice 
institutions, in stable societies hold perpetrators to account and punish them. I suggest that 
calls for criminal accountability are important because they express willingness to punish. 
Calls are not punishment, but they aim to deliver the same values that punishment delivers. 
Therefore, the values that calls for criminal accountability express stem from the values of the 
criminal justice system itself, including those values stemming from fact-finding and trials. 
This dissertation advocates for calls that aim to create the possibility of punishment. The 
language that has been expressed by these calls for criminal accountability has value to 
societies in general, and to victims in particular. The values of calls might not be as important 
as the values of punishment but calls express willingness to hold criminals accountable. 
 
The Syrian case triggers some critical questions for international criminal law and policy. It 
challenges some established norms and doctrines, showing their inability to find solutions to 
cases where civilians are suffering heinous crimes, and where neither the law nor the 
international community has been able to act. This dissertation proposes that, even when there 
is no possibility of holding perpetrators accountable during ongoing conflicts, there is still 
value in the messages that such calls for criminal accountability express. It as well argues that 
using the language of criminal accountability is much stronger than using the language of 
human rights. Criminal law generates punitive responses as opposed to undefined responses 
that calls for human right violations generate. In the absence of a criminal justice system that 
has the ability, willingness, and authority to call perpetrators to account, it is our humanity that 
justifies such calls.  
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PART ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 What Is Criminal Accountability? 
For the purpose of this research, the term “criminal accountability” refers to individual 
punishment as a response to the egregious atrocity crimes that are listed in the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC).1 Individual criminal accountability is here 
distinguished from state, corporate, and institutional responsibility – these latter concepts are 
not the subject of this dissertation. 
Criminal accountability is one of the ways that societies use their criminal justice systems 
to hold perpetrators criminally accountable. The criminal justice system includes the following 
sequential steps: (1) fact-finding (i.e., investigation, collection of evidence, documentation, 
deposition of witnesses, and preparation of cases); (2) trial and possible conviction; (3) if 
defendants are found guilty during trial, they are punished. Punishment is a final step in the 
criminal justice system, but it is often the case that, when people call for criminal 
accountability, they are seeking a particular response, i.e., punishment. So, although the 
previous two steps are crucial to the criminal justice system, the criminal process is not 
complete unless perpetrators are punished. Moreover, although there are many ways to hold 
criminals accountable – such as civil responsibility, reparation, and truth commissions – the 
 
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, UN Doc A/CONF 183/9. 





term “criminal accountability” refers to criminal punishment. Throughout this dissertation, I 
will use the terms “criminal accountability” and “criminal justice” synonymously.  
 What Are Calls for Criminal Accountability? 
Calls for criminal accountability during the ongoing Syrian war have been loud and insistent. 
In one way or another, these calls have expressed censure of the international community’s 
silence regarding the war in Syria. They have come from Syrian citizens, foreign governments, 
intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international 
lawyers, scholars, politicians, human rights activists, and many others. Calls include all 
practices and discourses that aim to hold criminals accountable, starting with simple 
declarations by the United Nations (UN), politicians, diplomats, heads of states, and 
policymakers, including the process of documentation and investigation and trials in absentia. 
But they have not led to punishment, as we understand the concept in the criminal justice 
system, and they are unlikely to lead to punishment. 
 Contribution and Personal Motivation – Why Calls in Syria? 
It is often the case that societies seek to deal with the aftermath of a conflict either upon 
termination of the war, or when the particular society is on the cusp of transition from conflict 
to stability. Transitional justice philosophy provides justifications as to why societies hold 
criminals accountable after a conflict. The philosophy of criminal law as well provides 
justifications as to why stable societies endeavour to punish criminals during times of stability. 





of criminal justice institutions that are able and willing to punish perpetrators. It questions the 
justifications for calls for criminal accountability before the end of conflicts.  
The case of Syria provides an interesting example that is worth examining. In February 
2011, Syrians began what they thought then to be a revolution against an authoritarian regime, 
but the situation rapidly transformed into a bloody conflict, not only between the citizens and 
the government, but also involving many other states’ armies, non-states’ armies, and terrorist 
groups. The conflict continues, even at the time of writing in September 2020, and the 
international community has failed to bring the conflict to an end. The Syrian civil conflict has 
been singled out as the world’s largest crisis since World War II, with over six million displaced 
persons who have been forced to flee a war-torn country and more than half a million civilians 
who have been killed. People have lost their homes, security, and dignity, yet the international 
community has not contained the Syrian tragedy, nor has international law been able to provide 
legal solutions to complicated situations that the war has exposed. In this dissertation, I discuss 
one of these situations: the unlikelihood of punishment when atrocity crimes are ongoing.  
This dissertation aims to develop a new way of thinking in the philosophy of criminal 
law and international criminal law. There is a considerable amount of scholarship, studies, and 
statistics that address the Syrian case and the challenges it has created for international law. 
However, there has been little discussion of the justification of calls for criminal accountability 
in the midst of an ongoing war, particularly when punishment is unlikely to take place. 





demonstrated, i.e., that of trying to provide justifications for calls for criminal accountability 
in the midst of a civil war.  
The overarching aim of this dissertation is to open the debate to a new way of thinking 
that can contribute to the philosophy of criminal law in cases of instability. I am seeking to 
open the door for the establishment of an account in the philosophy of criminal law that merits 
that language of “criminal accountability,” but one that is divorced from punishment. I propose 
a concept that values the language of criminal accountability in cases where physical 
punishment is not possible. I argue that the Syrian case poses critical questions for international 
law and policy. It challenges some established norms and doctrines, showing their inability to 
find solutions to cases where civilians are subjected to heinous crimes, and where neither the 
law nor the international community have been able to resolve the situation. I have already 
spoken and written about some of these gaps in international law. In my master’s thesis at 
Osgoode Hall Law School, I explained that the doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P) has 
failed to respond to cases where mass atrocity crimes against civilians are escalating on a daily 
basis. I questioned whether, after the current and continuing failure of the R2P in Syria, R2P is 
still a viable doctrine. I have also argued that the Syrian case has shown that, contrary to its 
mission, humanitarian intervention materialized only because of the political interests of 
individual states, rather than to fulfill its intended goals, i.e., to save humanity from the scourge 
of war.2 The Syrian case has, as well, challenged the theory of transitional justice. I have said 
 
2 Ghuna Bdiwi, “The R2P Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: Analyzing Canada’s Response to the 
Syrian Conflict: Accountability for Responsibility” (2019) 1 The Canadian Journal on the 






elsewhere that Syria was able to “push the traditional paradigms of transitional justice further 
to cover situations in which transitions have not even begun to take place. The Syrian case has 
generated a new approach to how the concept of transitional justice can be applicable to face 
today’s political challenges.”3 The war in Syria has also challenged both human rights law and 
refugee law, which is why it represents a new phenomenon that will re-shape our understanding 
of the gaps in international law.4 
Finally, this dissertation is special for me, not only as a lawyer, a researcher, and a 
doctoral student, but also as a Syrian citizen who has been displaced outside of my homeland 
and who has had the opportunity, at Osgoode Hall Law School, to provide firsthand insight into 
the heinous conflict. I hope that this research will help scholars, lawyers, and policymakers to 
find ways of avoiding future similar tragedies. How should we develop international criminal 
law to fill the gaps that have been unveiled by the Syrian tragedy? What lessons can we pass 
on to future generations?  
Since beginning work on this dissertation with Professor François Tanguay-Renaud, I 
have become very attached to this project, not only as academic research, but also as a legal 
 
3 Ghuna Bdiwi, “Attempting Justice Within Conflict: How Has Syria Influenced the 
Contemporary Conceptions of Transitional Justice?” (November 2019) Tahrir Institute For 




4 See Michael P. Scharf, Milena Sterio & Paul R. Williams, The Syrian Conflict’s Impact on 
International Law (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2020). [Michael P. Scharf, Milena Sterio 
& Paul R. Williams]. Reese Erlich & Noam Chomsky, Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their 






activist. I have travelled to join many Syrian lawyers’ initiatives for criminal justice. I have met 
with officials in Europe, the US, and Canada, and I have raised awareness about the importance 
of justice during conflict in universities’ research centres and among the general public. In 
2019, I was nominated by the UN Special Envoy to Syria to serve on the Constitutional 
Committee that is tasked with drafting the Syrian constitution. At the opening session, I was 
invited to speak to the Committee about my vision for the Syrian constitution; my message was 
that, without criminal justice, peace cannot come to the Syrian people. With this dissertation, I 
hope that my academic, practical, and personal experiences will enable me to produce a genuine 
addition to existing scholarship in criminal law philosophy, as well as make a contribution to 
the Syrian people, who have suffered dreadful war crimes during the last 10 years.  
 Acknowledgement and Limitations of the Research 
One can rightly ask: who is the party (the criminal) that the “calling to account” is meant to 
target? Although I acknowledge that concentrating on one party would narrow the dissertation 
and thus work to its advantage, concentrating on one party was not possible for two reasons. 
The first reason is a personal one; for my personal security, it would be unsafe to concentrate 
on one party. But, moreover, I am quite convinced that there are no innocent parties on the 
battlefield; it would be immoral to take a stand against one party when all parties are involved 
in war crimes. I am using Syria as a case study to demonstrate that there are situations when 
the language of the calls is intrinsically valuable, regardless of whom the perpetrator is. 
The second reason is a pragmatic one. The major states parties to the conflict, which I 





Statute. This provides for a jurisdictional issue for the international justice system, which I will 
address. And, given that the Syrian government itself stands accused of war crimes, it’s 
obviously extremely unlikely that the state’s own domestic criminal justice system will hold 
criminals accountable. As for the non-state actors – i.e., rebel groups – the Syrian government 
is unlikely to refer them to the ICC, and would instead try them domestically, that is, in Syrian 
criminal justice institutions. However, if that happens, defendants will deny the legitimacy of 
the courts, arguing that they are neither impartial nor objective. In other words, rebels will not 
accept the legitimacy of trial by al-Assad’s government. 
The only party to the conflict that can be held accountable is the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) (also known as Dae’sh or ISIL) and other terrorist groups, like al-Nusra Front that 
is affiliated with al-Qaeda. ISIS and other terrorist groups can be tried domestically and 
internationally, but the process of holding them to account is very difficult. There are rumours 
that the United States might ask the Kurdish militias to try ISIS fighters. Many questions could 
be asked about the legitimacy of such trials, and whole dissertations written about it. Do the 
Kurds form a state? Are they impartial? Kurdish militias were the armed group that defeated 
ISIS on the ground, with the assistance of the US. Nonetheless, concentrating on ISIS as the 
subject of calls for criminal accountability is possible; however, it is not the focus of this 
dissertation. Instead, my focus is to highlight a case where criminal accountability is not 
possible; hence, calling ISIS to account is not my focus. That said, in the future, I do intend to 
write about ISIS trials. I therefore ask readers to accept the structure of this the dissertation; I 





 Research Design – Timeline and Methodology 
Using doctrinal and analytical approaches, this dissertation will take the ongoing war in Syria 
as a case study to investigate the values that a society gains by calling for criminal 
accountability in the absence of criminal justice institutions. The chosen timeframe for the data 
collection is limited to the period between February 2011, the date the Syrian uprising started, 
and September 2020, the time when I felt confident that the information I had about the case 
study was sufficient to assess the questions under investigation. This dissertation conducts an 
in-depth analysis on both primary and secondary sources. It often uses the criminal law, 
international human rights law, international humanitarian law (IHL), international criminal 
law, and Syrian domestic law as primary sources. The research also considers relevant 
instruments, such as reports and studies by credible governmental and NGOs. 
The main question that this dissertation aims to address is: given the significant 
unlikelihood of institutional criminal punishment, are there justifications for calls for criminal 
accountability in the midst of the ongoing Syrian war? The question will be unpacked through 
a series of sub-questions that will be posed in each chapter. 
The dissertation is organized into three chapters, and each of the first two chapters is 
divided into two parts, where the third chapter provides the conclusion. This chapter, Chapter 
One, is titled “Introduction and a Possible Alternative.” Part One introduces in its first section 
the methodological approach of the dissertation. It defines the meaning of “criminal 
accountability” and what is meant by calls for criminal accountability. It explains how this 





motivation for the project. Finally, the section explains the research design, as well as the 
limitations of the project. The second section of Part One deals with the Syrian case study. It 
provides background information about the conflict: how it started, and the circumstances of 
its transformation from a revolution to a civil war. It also explains the geographical and 
demographic dimensions of the country, which are very much related to elements of the 
conflict. 
To call for criminal accountability is to point out those suspected of crimes, but the 
complicated nature of the Syrian conflict makes it difficult to identify all parties to it. Therefore, 
the second section of Part One separates the parties to the conflict into three categories: the 
government, non-state armed groups, and states parties. I provide reports to show that all parties 
on the battlefield are involved in atrocity crimes. The section provides some figures compiled 
by international organizations that show the number of civilians killed by each party from 
February 2011 to September 2020; the aim is to give some sense of the intensity and 
involvement of each party. Moreover, since 2011, reports have provided evidence of conduct 
that constitutes war crimes and crimes against humanity against civilians.5 I address some of 
the crimes that have been reported by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on 
the Syrian Arab Republic (COI). The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) established the 
COI on 22 August 2011, with a mandate to investigate all alleged atrocity crimes in Syria from 
the beginning of the conflict. Finally, the section introduces the consequences of the Syrian 
 
5 UNHRC, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic (5 February 2015) 27th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/28/69, online: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session28/Documents/A.HRC.28.





conflict on civilians, such as the loss of life, the dire humanitarian conditions, the health 
impacts, and the negative impacts on Syria’s heritage – all consequences that have led to the 
Syrian crisis being deemed to be the worst humanitarian refugee crisis since World War II. 
Although all of the previously mentioned crimes are categorized and defined under 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute, the Rome Statute is applicable only to states parties, and 
Syria is not a party to it. The ICC has neither the authority to investigate allegations of crime, 
nor the authority to punish criminals if they were to be found guilty. 
The following section classifies the conflict for each of the warring parties and analyzes 
the international law that applies to each of them. It further identifies the treaties and customary 
laws that are applicable to the Syrian case. Of course, treaties apply only to the states that have 
ratified them. Syria is a signatory to and has ratified the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. It 
signed and ratified the Additional Protocol (I) to Geneva Conventions 1977, which applies to 
international armed conflicts, but it did not sign the Additional Protocol (II) to Geneva 
Conventions 1977 that applies to non-international armed conflicts. However, in non-
international armed conflicts, Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions remains applicable. 
Moreover, international human rights law obliges Syria to implement universally agreed human 
rights standards. 
As a response to vicious atrocity crimes in Syria, calls to hold criminals to account have 
been loud and insistent, even as the conflict continues. Calls for criminal accountability during 
the ongoing war have come from almost all actors – Syrian citizens, foreign governments, 





rights activists, and many others. However, the problem is that there is no criminal justice 
institution to hold criminals to account; therefore, the following section explains the question 
of this dissertation and why I argue that there is an unlikelihood of institutional criminal 
punishment for perpetrators of crimes in Syria. 
Normally, it is the case that societies tend to call criminals to account in times of stability, 
or at a point following the termination of conflict. Only at that point, when the political and 
legal situations permit, will suspects be brought to justice and punished. Only then will it be 
possible to hold them accountable. In the case of the Syrian conflict, however, calls are 
happening while the conflict is ongoing, even before any kind of political settlement is 
achieved. Although justice during conflicts would be difficult to achieve, with a strong enough 
political will, it may be possible. However, in the case of the conflict in Syria, the international 
community has not yet demonstrated the requisite political will. Moreover, a credible criminal 
accountability system that could handle the justice process and hold those responsible to 
account does not exist in Syria; and, of course, the existence of such a system is a necessary 
component. Legally speaking, there are two ways to prosecute defendants – via the Syrian 
domestic criminal justice institutions, or via international criminal justice institutions. 
Unfortunately, neither option is available in the Syrian case. In this section, I explain the 
constraints on the Syrian domestic criminal justice system, which would otherwise be the ideal 
institution to hold perpetrators accountable. Syrian domestic criminal justice institutions lack 
the major characteristics that are necessary under the rule of law, i.e., those that distinguish any 





would be appropriate to claim that Syrian domestic criminal justice institutions are unable and 
unwilling to perform the task of criminal justice. 
Simultaneously, the international criminal justice system has no role to play over crimes 
in Syria because it lacks the jurisdiction that is legally required. The ICC would have an 
important role to play in holding perpetrators of crimes in Syria accountable; however, the ICC 
is unlikely to play any role in Syria, at least not currently, because it doesn’t have jurisdiction 
over those crimes. There are two options for overcoming this jurisdictional problem, but neither 
is viable in Syria. The first option – for the Syrian government to self-refer these crimes to the 
ICC – is extremely unlikely, given that the al-Assad government is heavily complicit in them. 
In addition, the Syrian government has continuously claimed that its national criminal justice 
institutions are in the process of investigating serious crimes, arguing that, since the national 
proceedings are taking place, the ICC has no role to play. Furthermore, the political and 
regional situation of the Syrian conflict at the time of writing (fall of 2020) shows the 
advancement of the al-Assad government’s armed forces over its opposition, and victors don’t 
usually refer their own crimes to international courts. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that 
the al-Assad government would refer cases to the ICC. 
The second option is under the power of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations.6 The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) can refer alleged atrocity crimes that 
are within the jurisdiction of the Court’s prosecutor. However, due to the political divisions 
 





between members of the UNSC, Russia and/or China have repeatedly vetoed all resolutions 
that sought to refer the situation in Syria to justice. 
In response to calls for criminal accountability, some institutions in Europe has taken 
measures to try to bring about justice, particularly by establishing trials based on the principle 
of universal jurisdiction. The principle is defined as “a criminal jurisdiction based solely on the 
nature of the crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the 
alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the 
state exercising such jurisdiction.”7 Two reasons explain why it is necessary to apply the 
principle of universal jurisdiction. First, it deals with crimes that infringe peremptory norms of 
international law (jus cogens). A peremptory norm of general international law is “a norm 
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character.”8 Second, these crimes affect international 
security.9 The principle of universal jurisdiction is relatively new to international criminal 
justice, but has been used to convict war criminals, starting with the Nazis in post-World War 
II trials, and later in the 1961 International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, used to convict 
 
7 Stephen Macedo et al., The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction. Program in Law 
and Public Affairs (New Jersey: Princeton University, 2001) at 28 [Macedo, 2001]. Also see 
Stephen Macedo, ed., Universal jurisdiction: national courts and the prosecution of serious 
crimes under international law (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006) at 21. 
[Macedo, 2006]. 
8 United Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969. Online: 
<https://www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.law.of.treaties.convention.1969/53.html>. 
9 A. Hays Butler, “The doctrine of universal jurisdiction: a review of the literature.” (2000) 11:3 





Adolf Eichmann, and later still in the 1999 trial of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet.10 
Some European states hope to apply the principle to criminalize perpetrators of war crimes in 
Syria, and thereby bring justice to victims and prevent impunity. Despite past successes, there 
are limits to the extent that the principle can be used; the main obstacle is that most Syrian 
regime personnel who have been accused of committing war crimes are in Syria, and they are 
unlikely to travel outside of the country. 
Returning to this dissertation’s main question, and considering the absence of a reliable 
and credible criminal justice system in Syria, are there any justifications to call for criminal 
accountability in the midst of war? In Chapter Three, I will suggest there are important values 
that have been expressed by calls for criminal accountability. But here in Part Two of Chapter 
One, I will suggest a possible alternative – one that I will ultimately reject – to calls for criminal 
accountability: using human rights law. 
Given that criminal accountability –more precisely, punishment – is unlikely to happen, 
why should we continue to call for it when there is another viable alternative, i.e., human rights 
law? Rather than using the language of criminal law, why not look to the language of human 
rights and call for the application of human rights law? While legal avenues are currently 
unavailable for holding criminals accountable, there might be an opportunity to instead apply 
human rights law. The idea is that there is room to use the relevant human rights treaties and 
conventions to condemn perpetrators for their wrongdoings. Syria has ratified many human 
 
10 See Kenneth C. Randall, “Universal Jurisdiction under International Law” (1988) 66 Tex. L. 





rights conventions and treaties, and by referencing them, it might be possible to hold violators 
of human rights law accountable for breaching the intentions and provisions of human rights 
law. Therefore, in Part Two, I offer a normative evaluation of an alternative to calls for criminal 
accountability in the midst of Syria’s civil war. I ask two sub-questions. First, is human rights 
law applicable in armed conflict situations? Generally speaking, it is assumed that IHL is the 
applicable law in times of war, and human rights law is applicable during times of peace. But 
does this mean that human rights law has no role to play in armed conflicts or war situations? 
There is controversy among scholarly opinions; therefore, I briefly examine the relationship 
between human rights law and IHL, and argue that it is indeed acceptable to call for the 
application of human rights law in the midst of ongoing war situations. However, given that I 
do not rely overly on this argument, I do not undertake an in-depth discussion on how each 
type of law, and under which circumstances, should be applied. 
The second sub-question is: what remedies or justifications might human rights law 
offer? To answer this question, I conduct an analysis on human rights law and international 
criminal law. I suggest that, in general, human rights law does not provide the same responses 
as does criminal law. François Tanguay-Renaud says, “there is nothing in the idea of human 
rights that specifically calls for, or is intrinsically connected to, a punitive response. If sound, 
as I think it is, this further objection entails that the category of human rights is not only under-
inclusive, but also over-inclusive, in terms of the wrongs it singles out.”11 Of course, there are 
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many possible responses to human rights violations. Such responses might include, among 
other things, the use of declarations from different international committees – say, for example, 
a condemnation from the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) or the UNSC. Such 
condemnations express a language of resentment, and they may encourage further remedies, 
such as allowing for compensational measures. And, while there may be other remedies, they 
will not be punishment, at least not punishment in the same sense that criminal law offers. 
Similarly, criminal law is not associated with the ideas of declaration and compensation. When 
people call for the imposition of criminal sanctions, generally, they are thinking of punishment. 
Similarly, if there is no option for punishment, then we tend to think of different types of law, 
say, civil law. If we instead concentrate on compensation, then we tend to think of different 
kinds of law as a remedy to our calls, but not of the criminal law. There are certain values and 
justifications in criminal law that are not the same as in human rights law. When people call 
for criminal accountability, they are calling for neither compensation nor for declaration; they 
are calling for punishment, and human rights law does not provide the same remedies as does 
criminal law. The difference between calls for findings of human rights violations and findings 
of criminal accountability is punishment. Criminal law brings more to the table; hence, in our 
case, human rights law does not fill the void. 
However, the question remains: given the unlikelihood of institutional criminal 
accountability in Syria, what is the point of calling to account? Should we go with human rights 
law and accept whatever limited remedies it may be able to provide, or should we pursue 
criminal accountability, regardless of the unlikelihood of success on that front? As I will 





expressive value that the language of calls for human rights violations lacks. Calls for criminal 
accountability express a message that says, ‘if we could, we would hold criminals accountable, 
and we would punish them,’ and that is valuable in and of itself. When perpetrators are called 
to account, they are not called only to censure them for their wrongdoings; rather, the purpose 
of such calls is both censure and punishment. There is intrinsic value in using the language of 
criminal law versus human rights law. Human rights law simply does not function in the same 
way as does the criminal law. 
Chapter Two will explain why the criminal law is, and has traditionally been perceived 
to be, important. The chapter is divided to two parts. Part One starts by highlighting a critical 
issue that is directly related to the argument in the chapter. It asks whether the justifications of 
criminal accountability in domestic criminal law are felicitous to international criminal justice. 
In other words, can theories that justify punishment in domestic criminal law also justify 
punishment in international criminal law? Many scholars take it for granted that whatever 
justifies criminal accountability on the domestic level also applies to the international level.12 
International criminal justice, as William A. Schabas describes it, is often considered to be 
“little more than an afterthought.”13 We tend not to think about it as a distinct system that stands 
by itself, but rather as a supplemental system that corresponds to society’s willingness to 
criminalize perpetrators only when the domestic system is unable to do so. Others disagree, 
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however, claiming that the nature of international crimes is fundamentally different than 
domestic crimes. In the following section, I rely on literature in both domestic and international 
criminal law to demonstrate why criminal law is important, and the value of speaking in terms 
of it. I outline the justifications of the system itself when all of its components – fact-finding, 
trials, and punishment – are functional. I first seek to establish the nexus between punishment 
and criminal accountability. Punishment is perceived of as the characteristic that differentiates 
criminal law from other types of law. Citizens tend to focus on punishment as an end goal and 
as a distinctive feature of the criminal justice system; it is the end goal of their calls for criminal 
accountability. In using the language of the criminal law, we highlight a precise response to the 
calls – that is, punishment. While there are many theories that justify punishment, I will limit 
my discussion to three of the major ones: consequentialism, retributivism, and expressivism. 
The first two theories are traditionally understood as providing justifications for inflicting 
punishment. Each provides its own unique understanding as to why societies punish 
perpetrators. While consequentialists think of punishment as a deterrence to future crimes 
(among other justifications that the theory provides), retributivists think of punishment as the 
just response to perpetrators, who must be punished for the wrongs they have committed. The 
third theory, expressivism, however, is considered to be the main justification for international 
criminal punishment. 
While it is perhaps true that people tend to focus on punishment as the end goal of the 
criminal justice system and a distinctive feature of it, the criminal justice system is not only 
about punishment. The criminal justice system has other important components that must be 





embody values over and above punishment. In trials, wrongdoers are called to account – to 
explain themselves – to the polity. Sometimes, trials are more meaningful to society than 
punishment itself. Trials give wrongdoers an opportunity to explain themselves; because they 
have done something that society thinks is wrong, society wants an explanation as to why they 
did that particular wrong. Trials are more than a process that seeks the truth. Trials are a 
communicative process between defendants, victims, witnesses, and society.14 Therefore, trials 
have a valuable rationale beyond punishment. Fact-finding is the process of investigating and 
documenting what has happened during a certain event. We want to have records of what we 
think are crimes, and fact-finding potentially helps in the prosecution process. Once the truth 
is known, society has knowledge of what happened. Fact-finding provides a historical archive, 
and educates future generations so as to lessen inhumane and immoral wrongs from occurring 
in the future. 
In the second part of Chapter Two, Part Two, I consider the problem of authority: 
specifically, who has the authority to call to account? The absence of criminal justice 
institutions is one of the major obstacles facing societies in ongoing war situations, and by the 
Syrian case in particular. Criminal justice institutions are one of the crucial characteristics of a 
stable society. Where such stability does not exist, and crimes are ongoing, the issue of which 
institution can take on that role will surely be triggered. Immanuel Kant prioritizes justice even 
if a society decides to abolish itself. He says, “Even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself 
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with the consent of all its members – as might be supposed in the case of a People inhabiting 
an island resolving to separate and scatter themselves throughout the whole world – the last 
Murderer lying in the prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out.”15 In 
international criminal justice, the question of who may call wrongdoers to account, and the 
legitimacy of international criminal institutions, is always under the spotlight. States must 
invite or accept the authority of international tribunals in order for those tribunals to take over 
the criminal justice role. Or, the request for international court intervention might be possible 
through a resolution from the UNSC, which intrinsically stems from a political decision. The 
state usually monitors a special justice apparatus, and the state has standing to call alleged 
wrongdoers to account. However, Syria has no apparatus by which to hold criminals 
accountable in the ongoing war. Therefore, in this part, I review theories that deal with the 
assumption of what might happen if there is no criminal justice system in place. Is there still 
the means to call for criminal accountability? And does it matter who makes these calls? Should 
criminal accountability necessarily be a function of the state, or can other entities initiate it? In 
situations where there are ongoing war crimes against civilians, does it really matter who makes 
the call for criminal accountability? One argument says that criminal accountability must be 
carried out by a legitimate authority that has the standing to impose punishment – usually the 
state, since it is considered deliberative and impartial and is able to do so in a cost-effective 
way. Another argument, however, assesses the principle of legality. David Luban argues that 
the legitimacy of international tribunals stems from their ability to practice fair procedures and 
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impose fair punishments. In other words, it is the quality of the implemented justice that defines 
the tribunal’s legitimacy. The legitimacy of criminal justice institutions comes from their 
fairness, not from the political authority that establishes them; justice should exist regardless 
of any political interests. Moreover, he points out that “the centre of gravity in international 
tribunals lies in the trial, not the punishment, punishment following conviction remains an 
essential part of any criminal process that aims to project a no-impunity norm.”16 International 
trials aim to send a message that mass atrocities are taking place and that we must respond to 
them. In Luban’s opinion, in cases where the state is absent, unable, or unwilling to take on the 
role, then the natural justice approach may justify alternative institutions taking it on. If the 
state is unable to call wrongdoers to account, then whoever can do it, must do it, because it 
fulfills the requirement of justice.  
Antony Duff has suggested that international tribunals act “in the name of humanity.”17 
Our collective humanity is what gives those who call suspects to account for their crimes their 
standing; when domestic criminal justice institutions fail, international criminal justice 
institutions must act in their stead. 
Chapter Three is the assessment. It uses the arguments from the previous two chapters to 
answer the question of the dissertation: given the significant unlikelihood of institutional 
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criminal punishment, are there justifications for calls for criminal accountability in the midst 
of the ongoing Syrian war? In Chapter Three, I suggest that calls for criminal accountability 
are important because they express a willingness to punish. Although calls do not do the same 
job that punishment does, they aim to address values that otherwise justify punishment in stable 
societies. Calls do not punish, but they aim to deliver the values that punishment delivers. 
Therefore, the values that calls for criminal accountability express mirror the values of the 
criminal justice system itself. I argue that these calls allow the possibility of punishment. The 
language in calls for criminal accountability expresses a willingness to hold criminals 
accountable. 
I divide the chapter into three sections. The first section provides what I argue are the 
justifications for calls for criminal accountability in the midst of the ongoing Syrian war. It lists 
the reasons why messages expressed by calls are valuable. The second section suggests the 
kind of messages that calls send, and identifies who has standing to call criminals to account 
in the absence of criminal institutions prosecuting crimes in Syria. Using the proper message 
is essential, and I argue for using the language of criminal law, as opposed to the language of 
human rights law. By calling the violation a “crime” and the violator a “criminal,” we change 
the message from one that condemns human rights violations, to another that expresses the 
willingness to punish perpetrators. Calls send messages to criminals, victims, local societies, 
and to the international community that, if we could, we would punish perpetrators for their 
criminal behaviour, and, moreover, that the time will come when perpetrators of atrocity crimes 
in Syria will be held accountable. Crimes hurt us and they violate the values that we all share 





our shared humanity is what provides the standing for our calls for criminal accountability. In 
the absence of a criminal justice system that has standing to hold criminals accountable, calls 
for accountability might provide legitimacy to some institution to pursue justice in Syria. 
Changes in the discourse also put pressure on the international community – pressure to take 
immediate action to stop the ongoing crimes in Syria. Calls for criminal accountability might 
provide legitimacy to some criminal institutional practices, thereby avoiding the authority 
problem of holding war criminals accountable. Criminals in the Syrian case are answerable to 
humanity and, in the absence of a legitimate Syrian institution, they are answerable to any 
institution that can take on the criminalization role. Using the language of criminal law might 
satisfy those who are calling for criminal accountability. 
In the third section of this part, I highlight what has been achieved as a result of calls for 
criminal accountability in Syria; I argue that, in the absence of institutional criminal 
accountability, calls for criminal accountability have put pressure on individual states and on 
the international community to take positive steps toward achieving justice. Unfortunately, 
however, these efforts have not led to punishment in the same sense as what would be 
achievable in stable societies, and punishment might not happen for the crimes that have 
happened in Syria. In this section, I outline the three levels where efforts toward justice in Syria 
have been made: (1) there has been a preliminary investigation by the ICC; (2) – although it is 
not a criminal court, the efforts of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have increased the 
possibility of criminal prosecution for war perpetrators; and (3) there are national criminal 
proceedings going on in some states in Europe. Notably, when I started my doctoral research, 





been able to observe how calls for accountability have encouraged the international community 
to respond. Today, in 2020, three important justice-like efforts have become a reality, proving 
that calls for criminal accountability are indeed valuable. I believe that calls are able to deliver 
some form of alternative justice. 
 SYRIA – THE CASE STUDY 
Since 2011, the beginning of the Syrian uprising, scholars have directed their attention to the 
challenges that the Syrian conflict presents for both established legal norms and international 
policy. Some scholars have analyzed the root causes of the conflict, while others have assessed 
its consequences, as well as its impact on international law. In the following, I will discuss 
recent scholarship that concentrates on how scholars understand the conflict, and how the 
Syrian file has impacted international law.  
Reese Erlich and Noam Chomsky explain the conflict from a historical and geopolitical 
perspective, directing our attention to the colonization era in the Middle East. They argue that 
the British and French colonies and other international powers have long been interested in the 
Middle East. They also point to the Iranian domination of the region, explaining that Iran has 
an ideological interest in expanding the Shai’a Crescent in the Middle East. Moreover, they 
claim that, contrary to US propaganda that extols the virtues of the principles of international 
human rights, security, and democracy, the US (and Western powers in general) cares primarily 
about its own interests. While Erlich and Chomsky are opposed to humanitarian intervention 
in Syria, they nonetheless admit that Syria is in a dreadful humanitarian crisis. However, they 





Their claim is that, due to lack of media attention, those crises have not led to demands for 
humanitarian intervention.18 They assert that the Syrian conflict will have impact not only on 
Syria but also on the whole region. 
Amichai Cohen takes a less conservative approach, arguing that the Syrian conflict has 
shone a light on the gaps in international law, and the need for change: “The current conflict is 
Syria reflects everything that is problematic about the current state of affairs in international 
relations (and to some extent also in international law?) … International law needs to be 
rethought. … Of course, altering international law would probably not change a whole lot on 
the ground, but it is a first step in the correct direction.”19 In 2020, in response to the gaps in 
international law that the Syrian case has highlighted, scholars are now suggesting tools and 
principles in several areas of international law – tools and principles that address some of 
international law’s controversial norms, and that look to replace them with new norms. Relying 
on their observation that the Syrian conflict has impacted international law, Michael P. Scharf, 
Milena Sterio, and Paul R. Williams argue that the Syrian case is something of a “Grotian 
moment” – a paradigm shift in international law, a time when new rules will come into being. 
They discuss “the principles and process of customary international law formation and the 
phenomenon of accelerated formation of customary international law known as Grotian 
moments.”20 They note that the use of chemical weapons against innocent civilians has changed 
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the way we understand humanitarian intervention. Contrary to Erlich and Chomsky, they 
suggest that limits to well-established doctrines in international law, such as the principle of 
humanitarian intervention, began as early as the 1999 NATO strikes on Serbia to prevent the 
killing of Kosovar Albanians, but only became fruitful in 2018 at the distinctive moment when 
chemical weapons were used against civilians in Syria. Participating countries claimed its 
legality and “embraced a common justification – humanitarian intervention – rather than cite 
only factual considerations that render use of force morally defensible.”21 Moreover, the 
authors argue that US intervention in Syria against ISIS are “lawful acts collective of self-
defences”22 that are changing the traditional understanding of the legality of using self-defence 
against non-state actors in the territory of a third state without its consent. As well, the authors 
view Syria as being in a time of change as it pertains to “the negotiation of the Global Compact 
of Refugees and the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,” adopted in 
2018.23 Moreover, the authors direct our attention to how the Syrian conflict has caused the 
transformation of the traditional accountability paradigm, as a response to the need and as a 
way of putting pressure on the international community to hold perpetrators of atrocity crimes 
accountable. The authors’ thesis is that, “As a result, after falling out of favor …, countries 
around the world are expanding the use of the global enforcer approach to universal jurisdiction 
to prosecute Syrian officials and rebels for war crimes and crimes against humanity.”24 They 
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suggest that the need to hold perpetrators of war crimes in Syria responsible for their crimes 
has rekindled use of the principle of universal jurisdiction after lack of use.25  
In this dissertation, I contribute to the ongoing conversation by showing how calls for 
criminal accountability were the cause of that transformation in the accountability paradigm. 
Nonetheless, I present a challenge to the effectiveness of the principle of universal jurisdiction: 
even though states in Europe are taking steps toward criminalizing perpetrators of Syrian war 
crimes, that does not mean that those states will be able to establish a full criminal justice 
system equivalent to the Syrian domestic criminal justice system or even equivalent to the ICC. 
That is, even if courts in Europe issue arrest warrants, they cannot prosecute perpetrators unless 
they are present in the territory of the state; that is, such cases can only go so far. It is 
tremendously unlikely that perpetrators who know that they are involved in war crimes will 
travel to Europe. I will expand on this in two chapters, particularly in Chapter Three. 
Meanwhile, in this section, I will provide a sketch of the ongoing scholarly discussion by 
relying on primary sources. In this section, I will also create a picture of the Syrian conflict by 
describing its origins, the warring parties on the battlefield, the kinds of heinous atrocity crimes 
that are being committed against civilians, the conflict’s legal classification, and the legal 
framework that applies to it. I will then describe the different calls for criminal accountability, 
and the question that is the focus of this dissertation, which shows that, despite there being no 
credible domestic criminal justice system that can hold perpetrators criminal accountable, there 
is nonetheless value in such calls. 
 





 Understanding the Syrian Situation 
In 2020, the Syrian crisis is approaching its tenth year of vicious and ugly conflict. Many 
Syrians mark February 2011 as the starting point, although the root cause goes back in history 
to the time of President Hafez al-Assad (hereafter referred to as “President Hafez”), the father 
of President Bashar al-Assad (hereafter referred to as “al-Assad”). President Hafez came to 
power in a coupe d’état, appointing himself as the leader of Syria.26 He remained in power 
until he died in 2000 when his son inherited power via a constitutional amendment.27 Since 
understanding the root cause is important for any legal analysis, this section will start with a 
brief overview of the Syrian situation; it will explain the geographical and demographical 
dimensions, to the extent needed for the purpose of this dissertation. It will explain how the 
Syrian crisis escalated from a revolution to an armed conflict, and it will then identify the 
major warring parties on the battlefield, and explain the consequences of their conduct on 
civilians. I classify the conflict as a non-international armed conflict and accordingly identify 
the laws applicable to it. As a result of the ongoing war, many individuals and organizations 
have called for holding criminals accountable; hence, I give examples of these calls.  
Syria is located in a very sensitive location in the Middle East: it borders on Lebanon, 
Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey. It is in a continuous war situation with Israel and, politically, has 
Russia as its main ally. The country has been ruled by a sole political party, that is, the Ba’ath 
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party, since the time of President Hafez. A multi-party system has only come into being since 
the uprising. 
Syria is one of the world’s oldest civilizations, which is reflected in the diversity of its 
people. Ethnically, the majority of Syrians are Arabs (90.3%), while Kurds, Armenians, and 
other minorities constitute the rest of the general population (9.7%).28 Historically, Kurds have 
been repressed since the time of President Hafez. Despite the fact that Syria is their homeland, 
before 2011, approximately three million Kurds were prohibited from acquiring Syrian 
citizenship. The uprising provided them with the opportunity to establish a Kurdish state in 
northern Syria. 
The religion of the majority of Syrians is Islam (87%), of which 74% are Sunni, and 13% 
belong to other sects of Islam, including Shia, Druze, Alawi, and Ismaili. Syria is also home to 
a sizeable Christian population (9%) and to Jews (4%).29 al-Assad belongs to the minority 
Alawi sect, a fact used to ignite sectarianism among Syrians. He has claimed to be the guardian 
of minorities, but politicizing religious identities has contributed to fragmentation in the society 
and has subsequently fuelled a civil war.30 
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In 1971, President Hafez came to power and he maintained a tight grip on state 
institutions, repressed the rights of citizens, and abolished opposition parties.31 To do that, he 
used the power of the State Emergency Law (SEL), which was established in 1962, before his 
presidency, during the war with Israel and has remained active and open-ended.32 The SEL 
enabled the government to nullify the power of the constitution and to undertake all exceptional 
measures with no limits.33 A special court was established to try citizens who opposed the 
government, but the court’s legitimacy was highly questionable, as it neither followed any legal 
process nor respected the due process of law.34 A security apparatus system reporting directly 
to President Hafez was established. The system continues to this day and is composed of several 
security branches that have absolute power over citizens’ rights and freedoms, with no legal 
limits. Its officers operate with impunity, and its detention centres are hidden and far from the 
supervision of the Ministry of Justice.35 This, in part, explains how President Hafez was able 
to maintain power until his son took over. 
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Although citizens were not pleased with the way al-Assad came to power, they were 
generally optimistic that the young president might bring real change to the country. Indeed, 
early on, he allowed for some political pluralism and democratization. Social and political 
groups start publicizing their activities, hoping that decades of political repression had ended. 
But, the government quickly realized that such changes would jeopardize its grip on power, 
and so security forces arrested opposition leaders and cracked down on civil society groups, 
thereby ending any hope of change under the al-Assad government.36 
In February 2011, the flame of the uprising was sparked by a critical incident. A few 
children in a city in southern Syria, Dara’a, were caught painting anti-government graffiti on 
street walls. Apparently, they were inspired by the wave of democratization that started in 
Tunisia and spread to other countries in the region – a wave that is often referred to as the “Arab 
Spring.” The children were subsequently detained and tortured to death by the Syrian 
government’s security forces. This incident marks the beginning of a long period of unrest, 
following more than 40 years of political repression under the authoritarian regime of the al-
Assad family. Not surprisingly, al-Assad thought that his government would be immune from 
the Arab Spring. In an interview in The Wall Street Journal, prior to the Syrian uprising but 
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revolt against him, to which he responded that he did not think they would.37 When the people 
did revolt, his reaction was one of brutality. 
Ordinary citizens took to the streets, chanting fundamental human rights principles, such 
as “freedom, equality, and democracy.” Soon after, the uprising spread all over the country. At 
the beginning, citizens wanted reforms, such as eliminating government corruption, improving 
living conditions, respecting human rights, implementing the rule of law, reforming state 
institutions, the separation of power, political pluralism, and democratic elections. In response, 
the government initially took some measures, and proposed some reforms in order to try to 
quell the revolution.38 al-Assad rescinded the SEL, amended the constitution, and allowed for 
political pluralism, but these reforms where inadequate.39 The reforms were criticized by the 
opposition, as they gave additional power and autocracy to his government rather than to the 
people. While the new constitution of 2012 recognized political pluralism, in practice, political 
parties were nonetheless required to align with al-Assad’s ideology if they were to be allowed 
to continue to exist in Syria. The SEL was nullified, but the state replaced it with the Terrorist 
Act, so those opposing the government could be convicted as terrorists. Security branches were 
 
37 “Interview with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,” The Wall Street Journal (31 January 2011) 
The Wall Street Journal, online: 
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703833204576114712441122894>. 
38 Human Rights Watch, No Room to Breathe: State Repression of Human Rights Activism in 
Syria, Vol. 19, No. 6 (E), (16 October 2007) at 9. Human Rights Watch Publications, online: 
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/10/16/no-room-breathe/state-repression-human-rights-
activism-syria>. See also, UNHRC, Report of the Fact-Finding Mission on Syria pursuant to 
Human Rights Council, resolution S-16/1 (August 2011) at 18, online: 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/4e4e2ba72.html>. 
39 See “Syria to hold referendum on new constitution,” BBC News (12 February 2011), online: 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-17040392>. Also, “Syria protests: Assad to lift 






(and still are) in power, with increasing control over citizens’ rights. Worse still, while these 
reforms were taking place, al-Assad continued to exercise violence against his people, killing 
and detaining them. 
In order to conceal his attacks against protesters, al-Assad claimed that there were foreign 
conspiracies against the country, and he used the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and state institutions 
to support his position.40 Local populations affected by the violent repression tried to resist the 
brutality, using peaceful protests, but as the level of violence increased, many people began 
carrying weapons.41 In July 2012, military officers and government officials began to defect 
from the SAA to form what was at the time called the Free Syrian Army (FSA).42 The greater 
the level of violence the government used against civilians, the more the number of defectors 
increased. Many armed groups began to establish themselves and join the battle, but they were 
not a coherent group. The FSA was not one entity, but, in fact, a number of different fighting 
groups. Within a few months, the revolution became an armed conflict. 
Amid an increasingly violent and chaotic landscape, jihadist and radical extremist 
groups, strongly committed to global military operations, began to infiltrate Syria and mobilize 
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the already unstable country. Soon after, in 2013, ISIS, the worst terrorist group of our time, 
began to grow in influence.43 Later on, different states intervened in the battlefield, using 
different excuses, but none with the goal of helping Syrians in their struggle for freedom, but 
instead for their own strategic and political interests. 
 Parties to the Conflict 
The complicated nature of the Syrian war makes it difficult to identify all parties to it. In a 
state of war, it is hard to have definite and fully accurate information and numbers; however, 
in this section, I rely on reports by internationally recognized organizations that aim to provide 
some idea of who is on the battlefield and the intensity of each party’s involvement. 
In general, there are no innocent parties on the battlefield; reports have shown that all 
parties are involved in atrocity crimes. Table 1 below provides figures from the Syrian Network 
for Human Rights (SNHR), a pro-opposition organization, that show the number of civilians 
killed by each party during the civil war, from February 2011 to September 2020. The numbers 
might not be completely accurate, because there is no official governmental body to compile 
the statistics. According to the SNHR, 226,247 civilians were killed between March 2011 and 
March 2020.44 Figure 1 below portrays the numbers as a graph. 
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Table 1: The number of civilians that each party killed.  
 
Parties  Number of killed civilians 
Syrian government forces 199,854 
Russian forces 6,851 
ISIS 5,019 
Other unnamed parties 5,663 
Other rebel forces 4,136 
International Coalition Forces 3,039 
Syrian Democratic Forces 1,211 
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham 470 































Who are the main parties on the battlefield? The following gives a general idea of the main 
actors. 
  The Government 
The al-Assad regime is the party that presents itself as the authority in Syria and it controls the 
SAA and uses it to counter civilians, rebel groups, Kurdish armed groups, and state parties. 
 Non-State Armed Groups 
Opposition Rebel Forces 
Comprised of numerous diverse groups, many opposition rebel forces claim to fight under the 
umbrella of the FSA. The intensity of violence makes it difficult to identify who is fighting 
against al-Assad and who is fighting for completely different reasons. Many of these groups 
are involved in conduct that is in violation of international law.45 
Kurdish Militias 
Kurdish militias operate in the northern region of Syria. Their prominent military group is 
known as the People’s Protection Units (YPG). They fight whoever stands against their 
autonomy, including the Syrian government, ISIS, and various rebel groups. The YPG also 
controls the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a militia supported by the US, and the 
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international coalition against ISIS. Reports claim that Kurdish militias have been involved in 
atrocity crimes and that they have been known to provide arms to children.46 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
In April 2013, ISIS began its operations in Syria, proclaiming the establishment of an Islamic 
caliphate that would extend from Aleppo in Syria to Diyala in Iraq.47 ISIS is considered to be 
an offshoot of the al-Qaeda terrorist group.48 ISIS has targeted civilians and attacked the Syrian 
government, Syrian rebel forces, and Kurdish militias. In 2015, the US weaponized the Kurds 
and some Syrian rebel groups to defeat ISIS, and in 2019, announced that it has seized all ISIS 
territories. The group continues to operate as sleeping cells in the country.49 
Salafist and Jihadist Groups 
The main organization used to be al-Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra), but, in 2017, it merged with 
a number of other Salafi groups to form one group, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) (although the 
leaders are commanders from the former al-Nusra Front). They mostly operate in Idlib, 
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southern Syria. According to analysis from Chatham House, “HTS’ approach has evolved from 
believing in the principle of global jihad and drawing on the Salafist jihadist ideology of Al-
Qaeda to a paradigm framed by Syria’s borders as a particular theatre of combat with a reliance 
on local cadres, albeit with an Islamist jihadist character that motivates its members and 
stimulates continued fighting.”50 HTS has committed, and continues to commit, crimes against 
civilians in areas under its control. 
Lebanese Hezbollah 
Hezbollah is a non-Syrian, pro-government militia that has been supporting al-Assad well 
before 2011. It is directly backed by Iran. In 2013, when al-Assad started losing control over 
Syria, Hezbollah officially announced its intention to support and fight alongside the Syrian 
government.51 
  State Parties 
Iran 
Iran has a historical alignment with Syria. When the war started, it “conducted an extensive, 
expensive, and integrated effort to keep President Bashar al-Assad in power as long as possible 
while setting conditions to retain its ability to use Syrian territory and assets to pursue its 
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regional interests should Assad fall.”52 Iran provided advice and assistance to al-Assad’s forces 
to maintain power and to fight rebel group forces. It established the National Defense Forces – 
a coalition of Iranian-backed local militias that operate in Syria. 
Russia 
In September 2015, and based on al-Assad’s request, the Russian military forces officially 
started their military operations in Syria.53 On several occasions, Russian President Vladimir 
Putin has announced that Russia supports Syria “to stabilize the legitimate power in Syria, and 
to create conditions for the search for political compromise.”54 Reports indicate that Russian 
forces have committed serious crimes against civilians in Syria.55 
Turkey 
In January 2018, Turkish armed forces physically entered the Syrian battlefield.56 Turkish 
authorities claimed to target both ISIS and Kurdish militias (YPG and SDF) inside Syria. In 
2019, in north-eastern Syria, Turkish armed forces launched “Operation Peace Spring.” 
According to the Turkish government, the operation seeks to depose the SDF because of its 
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tight connection with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which is categorized as a terrorist group 
by Turkey. Reports indicate that Turkish forces carried out several violations of human rights 
against civilians, such as summary killings, looting, and confiscation of property.57 
International Coalition Forces Led by the US 
On 10 September 2014, US President Barack Obama announced the establishment of the 
international coalition forces to “degrade and ultimately destroy the terrorist group known as 
ISIL.”58 Sixty states joined the coalition.59 Participating states with ground troops in Syria 
include the US, Australia, Belgium, Germany, France, Jordan, Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates.60 It is often reported that the coalition targets innocent 
civilians.61 In March 2019, the US claimed that it had defeated ISIS and won the battle.62 
As a result of the ongoing multiple battles between warring parties, mass atrocity crimes 
are ongoing against innocent civilians. Unfortunately, as I mentioned earlier, there are no 
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entirely accurate statistics on the number of casualties in Syria. In January 2014, the UN 
declared its inability to confirm the death toll, because of the lack of access to affected 
communities inside Syria.63 However, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a monitoring 
group based in the UK, suggested that by the end of 2019 the death toll had exceeded 586,100 
people, a number that includes both civilians and fighters.64 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) announced that, in 
2017, more than 11.7 million civilians inside Syria are in dire need of humanitarian assistance.65 
By the end of 2017, the number of internally displaced people was 6.2 million, including 2.5 
million children; this is considered to be the largest number of displaced people worldwide.66 
In 2018, the number of refugees was estimated at 5.6 million, mostly located in neighbouring 
countries and living under very difficult humanitarian conditions. Only 45% of UNHCR’s 
appeal for the regional refugee response is funded.67 In 2015, more than 440,000 refugees 
risked their lives trying to reach Europe by sea. 
The war has destroyed the Syrian cultural heritage. According to the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “[w]orld heritage sites have been 
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turned into battlefields and archaeological sites, looted.”68 Finally, because of the war, many 
innocent civilians, particularly children, are vulnerable to unknown diseases and deteriorating 
health conditions.69 
 Atrocity Crimes 
Since 2011, reports have provided evidence of conduct that constitutes war crimes and crimes 
against humanity against civilians.70 I list some of these crimes, but the list is by no means 
exhaustive. In identifying the crimes, I use reports from multiple credible organizations, but I 
mostly rely on the reports and documents of the COI, whose reports are comprehensive about 
all parties on the battlefield. The COI was established on 22 August 2011, by the UNHRC, with 
a mandate to investigate all alleged atrocity crimes in Syria since the beginning of the conflict 
in 2011. 
  Killing and Widespread Attacks against Civilians  
Since the beginning of the conflict, killing and unlawful widespread and indiscriminate attacks 
on civilians, their homes, medical facilities, schools, and religious places have been systematic. 
For example, for only a short period in 2018, from 18 February to 21 March, the attacks of the 
Syrian-Russian military alliance resulted in the killing of 1,600 civilians and the destruction of 
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25 medical facilities, 11 schools, and countless residences of civilians.71 In 2019, within only 
five months, between January and June, at least 416 civilians have been killed in US-led 
coalition airstrikes, and approximately 630 major sites have been damaged in the coalition’s 
widespread destruction of buildings. Also in 2019, between September and October, the 
coalition’s widespread and indiscriminate attacks in eastern Aleppo resulted in the killing of 
446 civilians,72 as well as the killing of 84 civilians, including 30 children in the city of Raqqa. 
As previously mentioned, in 2019, Turkey launched a military operation in north-eastern Syria, 
and according to Amnesty International, the operation resulted in the killing of 70 civilians and 
the displacement of over 300,000 civilians.73 
 Sexual Violence  
In its report, “I lost my dignity,” the COI demonstrates that sexual and gender-based violence 
against women, girls, men, and boys has been a continual concern since the beginning of the 
conflict. All of the parties to the conflict use sexual violence as a method of gradually 
establishing fear, humiliation, and “in the case of terrorist groups, as part of their enforced 
social order.” While these practices affect all citizens, regardless of their gender, women and 
girls have been the main victims, regardless of their geographical locations. “Government 
forces and associated militias have perpetrated rape and sexual abuse of women and girls and 
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occasionally men during ground operations, house raids to arrest protesters and perceived 
opposition supporters, and at checkpoints.”74 In detention centres, women and girls have 
suffered aggressive and demeaning searches and have been raped, sometimes suffering 
multiple perpetrator rape. Men detainees have been subjected to genital mutilation and rape 
with objects. The practices of some Salafi armed groups, such as HTS, have brought 
psychological and physical harm to women, girls, men, and boys by enforcing certain religious 
dress codes and behaviour. Women, girls, and sexual minorities, detained by ISIS, have been 
charged with crimes, such as adultery and homosexuality, and have been stoned to death and 
punished with lashings. Muslim Sunni women have been forced to marry ISIS fighters, who 
control them, and limit their freedom and their engagement in public life. According to the 
COI, sexual crimes in Syria might constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity, which 
include murder, executions, torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, outrages upon personal dignity 
against women, and denial of the right to life and the right to be free from discrimination. The 
reported crimes form part of a systematic attack directed against a civilian population. 
  Enforced Disappearance, Torture, Inhuman Treatment, Imprisonment, and Death in 
Detention Centres 
In 2013, Caesar – a pseudonym of a Syrian military officer – was tasked with taking photos of 
corpses of detainees at the Syrian regime detention centres. Caesar smuggled out of Syria about 
55,000 photos of 11,000 dead detainees. The photos document the torture and inhumane 
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treatment detainees suffered before death. A committee that included three former prosecutors 
of international tribunals investigated the authenticity of the photos. In their 2014 report, the 
committee indicated that there is evidence of “systematic torture and killing of detained persons 
by the agents of the Syrian government [and that] such evidence would support findings of 
crimes against humanity against the current Syrian regime.”75 As a result, 60 states of the 
international community have called the UNSC to refer criminals to the ICC; six years later, in 
2020, this still has not happened. Moreover, in February 2016, the UNHRC issued a report that 
investigated the human rights situation in Syrian government detention centres during the 
period of 10 March 2011 to 30 November 2015. The report relies on various documents and 
621 interviews with former detainees and witnesses. The report confirms evidence of serious 
injury causing great suffering to detainees, inhumane treatment, torture, and killings committed 
by the government.76 
In its report “Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic: A Way Forward,” the COI 
ascertained that several non-governmental groups also secured makeshift places of detention 
where arrested government officers and fighters have been tortured, ill-treated, and, in some 
cases, summarily executed. These groups not only targeted government soldiers, but they also 
held civilians “for a variety of reasons including as punishment for suspected loyalty, to extract 
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ransom, or as bargaining chips to initiate prisoner swaps with Government forces and affiliated 
militias.”77 According to the COI, these acts constitute the war crimes of murder, torture, and 
other forms of ill treatment, and amount to violations of the rules of due process. Similarly, 
HTS – the Salafi group – has arbitrarily arrested several civilians in areas under its control. In 
January 2019, reports surfaced that 11 civilians were seemingly tortured.78 
  Use of Unlawful Weapons, including Chemical Weapons 
According to the report of the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), in August 2013, 3,500 civilians 
experienced neurotoxic symptoms in the Ghouta area, a suburb of Damascus, the capital of 
Syria, and as a result 355 of them died.79 The United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations 
of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic was established to investigate 
the allegations. In its report, the Mission confirmed that “chemical weapons have been used in 
the ongoing conflict between the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic, also against civilians, 
including children, on a relatively large scale.”80 Although, the report did not directly accuse 
the al-Assad regime for these attacks, since 2013, many reports have confirmed the continued 
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use of chemical weapons by al-Assad’s forces against civilians.81 Note that the regime is a 
signatory to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling 
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC).82 Moreover, the regime agreed 
to destroy the chemical weapons it owned.83  
  Siege and Denial of Humanitarian Access 
In February 2016, an estimated one million civilians were under siege, mainly blocked by al-
Assad’s forces. al-Assad practised a well-known strategy, i.e., putting civilians under siege, 
starving them until they are ready to surrender, forcing them to leave their geographical areas, 
and then seizing their land.84 Such acts constitute war crimes. The UNSC demands that all 
parties to the battlefield “enable the rapid, safe and unhindered evacuation of all civilians who 
wished to leave … [and] that all parties respect the principle of medical neutrality and facilitate 
free passage to all areas for medical personnel, equipment and transport.”85 
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 Displacement of Civilians 
According to the 2019 COI report, the war in Syria has displaced approximately 13 million 
civilians, internally and externally. “Uprooted from their homes and forced to leave everything 
behind, many continue to endure serious violations of their basic human rights. Attacks against 
medical and educational facilities, in addition to constraints on humanitarian access and the 
destruction of food supplies, have further compounded the plight of those fleeing and 
exacerbated their vulnerabilities.”86 While displaced people include, without discrimination, 
people of all backgrounds and genders, women and children make up the majority those so 
affected. 
These are only a few examples that show the kind of vicious crimes that have been 
committed – and are ongoing – against civilians. These crimes are not those of just one party; 
according to the previously cited reports, all parties on the battlefield are involved in war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. All parties have played a part in the suffering of the Syrian people. 
All of the previously mentioned crimes are categorized and defined under Articles 7 and 8 of 
the Rome Statute. Article 7 acknowledges the following as constituting crimes against 
humanity: 
Any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread 
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
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Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in 
violation of fundamental rules of international law; 
Torture; 
Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of 
comparable gravity; 
Persecution against any identifiable group or collective on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as 
defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection 
with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court; 





The crime of apartheid; 
Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing 
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical 
health. 
Article 8 (2) defines war crimes as:  
Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
namely, any of the following acts against persons or property 
protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention: 
Wilful killing; 
Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; 
Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or 
health; 
Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified 
by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; 
Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in 
the forces of a hostile Power; 
Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of 





Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement; 
Taking of hostages.87 
Although some might argue that the ICC should have universal jurisdiction over atrocity 
crimes, the Rome Statute is applicable only to state parties, and Syria is not a party to it. The 
Statute, however, remains the main reference for defining international crimes. I will explain 
later in this chapter the conditions under which the ICC would have jurisdiction over crimes, 
but for present purposes, the ICC has neither the authority to investigate allegations of crimes, 
nor the authority to try defendants or to punish them if they were to be found guilty.  
The following section will classify the conflict in Syria, say whether it meets the 
definition of an international or a non-international armed conflict, and then list the applicable 
laws. 
 Applicable International Law 
Since 2012, the Syrian government has continued to proclaim that the country is in a “state of 
war.”88 The Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts project, at the Geneva Academy of International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, suggests that there are, in fact, multiple ongoing armed 
conflicts going on in Syria. So, what is an armed conflict, on what basis should a conflict be 
categorized as such, and what set of international laws apply to each category? 
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The term “armed conflict” assumes “the existence of hostilities between armed forces 
organized to a greater or lesser extent; there must be the opposition of armed forces and a 
certain intensity of the fighting.”89 The Chamber of Appeals at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has advised that an armed conflict exists in cases 
where “there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a 
State.”90 Categorizing a conflict as an international or non-international armed conflict is not 
subject to the judgement of the parties to the conflict; rather, it is established based on verified 
criteria set out for that purpose. 
In relation to classifying non-international armed conflicts, international tribunals – such 
as the ICTY, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL),91 and the ICC92 – have identified two 
indicative factors to assess whether a certain disturbance or hostility meets the threshold. These 
factors are: (1) that the intensity of the violence has increased, and (2) that at least one 
organized, non-governmental armed group is involved in the conflict. To assess the intensity 
of the violence, the ICTY has suggested certain elements that are set out below, but they are by 
no means exhaustive: 
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[T]he seriousness of attacks and whether there has been an 
increase in armed clashes, the spread of clashes over territory and 
over a period of time, any increase in the number of government 
forces and mobilisation and the distribution of weapons among 
both parties to the conflict, as well as whether the conflict has 
attracted the attention of the United Nations Security Council, and, 
whether any resolutions on the matter have been passed. With 
respect to the organisation of the parties to the conflict Chambers 
of the Tribunal have taken into account factors including the 
existence of headquarters, designated zones of operation, and the 
ability to procure, transport, and distribute arms.93 
As previously noted, there are multiple non-governmental armed groups fighting in the Syrian 
combat zone. I have also emphasized the intensity of the ongoing violence by, and between, 
the parties to the conflict. Applying the previously identified two indicative factors, the Syrian 
conflict clearly qualifies as a non-international armed conflict. The COI has confirmed that 
categorization, saying that the conflict in Syria has “met the threshold for a non-international 
armed conflict.”94 Hence, the Syrian government and its allies are involved in a non-
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international armed conflict against the wide array of rebel forces. The same categorization 
applies to the fighting between the different armed forces.95 
An international armed conflict takes place when one or more states wage war against 
another. Unlike non-international armed conflicts, to be recognized as an international armed 
conflict, the violence needs not reach a certain threshold, nor is a formal declaration of war 
required. Article 2(1) of the I-IV Geneva Conventions affirms that “all cases of declared war 
or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting 
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them” are international armed 
conflicts.96 In Syria, there are multiple international conflicts. The fight of the US-led 
international coalition forces against ISIS, without the permission of the Syrian government, is 
an international armed conflict. The use of force by Turkish armed forces against ISIS and 
against the Kurdish militias, without the permission of the Syrian government, is also an 
international armed conflict.97 
International law is a combination of treaty law (international conventions) and 
customary law. Each law imposes certain rules and obligations on the warring parties. Some 
treaties apply to all armed conflict categories, whether international or non-international, and 
others are exclusive to only one category. Of course, in order to be obliged to comply with a 
treaty’s provisions, states must have first ratified them, i.e., they must be a party to them. Parties 
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that are involved in international armed conflicts are bound by a number of treaties, including 
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the Additional Protocol (I) to Geneva Conventions 
of 1977, in addition to others. 
Parties involved in non-international armed conflicts are bound by the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocol (II) to Geneva Conventions of 1977. 
However, regardless of whether a state has ratified any of these treaties, all parties to non-
international armed conflicts are bound by the common Article 3 to the four Geneva 
Conventions, which reads: 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, 
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, 
the following provisions: 
 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including 
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those 
placed “hors de combat” by sickness, wounds, detention, or any 
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, 
without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion 
or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at 






(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted 
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties 
to the conflict. 
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into 
force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other 
provisions of the present Convention. 
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the 
legal status of the Parties to the conflict.98 
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Syria is a party to a number of treaties that apply to non-international armed conflicts,99 
including the following: 
 The four Geneva Conventions, since 1953, 
 Additional Protocol (I), since 1983; however, it did not ratify Additional Protocol (II), 
 Convention Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, since 
2003, 
 CAT, since 2004,100 
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide, since 1955,101 
 CWC, since 2013,102 
 Geneva Protocol on Asphyxiating or Poisonous Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods, 
since 1968, 
 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, since 1958, 
 Hague Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property, since 1958, 
 Convention on Mercenaries, since 2008. 
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Even though Syria has not ratified all of the treaties listed above, customary IHL is 
applicable.103 IHL includes rules that have been generated from states’ repetitive practice and 
they are recognized as law. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
the importance of IHL in today’s conflicts comes from its ability to fill “gaps left by treaty law 
in both international and non-international conflicts.”104 Finally, the international human rights 
law requires states to give due regard to the minimum respect of human rights standards, to 
protect civilians from the violation of human rights, and to investigate alleged violations. Syria 
signed the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights – the key instrument of international 
human rights law – and therefore is bound by it; Syria has a legal obligation to protect its 
citizens from any conduct that is prohibited by the Declaration. 
 Calls for Criminal Accountability 
As a response to vicious atrocity crimes in Syria, calls for criminal accountability have been 
loud and insistent, even as the conflict continues. As explained, the word “calls” in this 
dissertation is used to direct our attention to the discourses that encourage criminal 
accountability. Calls for criminal accountability during the ongoing war have been heard from 
almost all actors – Syrian citizens, governments, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, 
international lawyers, scholars, politicians, human rights activists, and many others. 
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Syrian individuals, professionals, and civil society organizations have been the main 
sources of information, reporting on ongoing and mass crimes in Syria. They have had the 
courage to unveil the reality of the ugly conflict, exposing violations of human rights and mass 
atrocity crimes, and calling for criminal accountability. Civil society organizations have 
documented ongoing crimes, collected evidence, and kept records about suspected perpetrators. 
Some of these organizations include Syrians for Truth and Justice,105 Syria Justice and 
Accountability Centre,106 SNHR,107 The Day After Project (United States Institute of Peace),108 
and the Violations Documentation Center.109 
By unveiling the truth, these organizations and others have given the UN knowledge 
about the situation in Syria. As a result, initiatives to hold perpetrators to account have taken 
place. In 2011, the UNHRC, in its Resolution S-17/1 dated 22 August 2011, established the 
COI, whose mandate is to investigate alleged human rights violations and to report them to the 
UNHRC so that it can take action against wrongdoers.110 The COI investigates the “facts and 
circumstances that may amount to such violations and of the crimes perpetrated and, where 
possible, … identif[ies] those responsible with a view of ensuring that perpetrators of 
violations, including those that may constitute crimes against humanity, are held 
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accountable.”111 The COI has several times called for international criminal accountability. In 
its 21st report for 2012, it called on the international community to “ensure that those 
responsible are held to account, in accordance with due process, and that victims are afforded 
access to justice and reparation.”112 
The UN has also established several other commissions to investigate alleged crimes in 
Syria. In 2015, the UNSC adopted Resolution Nr. 2235 dated 7 August 2015 to establish a joint 
mission between the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the UN Joint 
Investigative Mechanism, with the aim of identifying to the “greatest extent feasible 
individuals, entities, groups, or governments who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or 
otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic 
chemical.”113 
The UNGA, in its Resolution A/71/L.48 dated 19 December 2016, also established the 
International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) to: 
Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Those Responsible 
for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed 
in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 under the auspices 
of the United Nations to closely cooperate with the Independent 
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International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic 
to collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of violations 
of international humanitarian law and human rights violations and 
abuses and to prepare files in order to facilitate and expedite fair 
and independent criminal proceedings, in accordance with 
international law standards, in national, regional or international 
courts or tribunals that have or may in the future have jurisdiction 
over these crimes, in accordance with international law.114 
The work of the IIIM overlaps with the mandate of the COI. While the latter focuses on fact-
finding in relation to violations of human rights, the IIIM is mandated to collect data, 
investigate it, and prepare for future trials – although, the IIIM has not yet identified what it 
means by the “national, regional or international courts or tribunals.”115 Nevertheless, a glimpse 
at the development of accountability issues for crimes in Syria from 2011 to today clearly 
demonstrates that there are serious efforts generated by calls for criminal justice that are taking 
place at the international level. 
The significant amount of evidence continues to suggest the involvement of almost all 
parties on the battlefield in atrocity crimes against civilians. Officials have called for 
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accountability. For example, UN Secretary-General António Guterres asserted that criminal 
accountability is a responsibility of the international community, and that “the threat to seek or 
apply international legal sanctions has in recent years become a major new weapon in the 
international preventive armory. … [It] will concentrate the minds of potential perpetrators of 
crimes against humanity on the risks they run of international retribution.”116 Guterres has 
urged the UNSC to refer perpetrators of Syrian war crimes to the ICC.117 International advisers 
have called for accountability. Adama Dieng, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser for 
the Prevention of Genocide, called the UNSC to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC, saying, 
“the international community should step up its commitment to end impunity for the 
perpetrators of the most serious crimes in Syria and thus contribute to preventing new atrocities 
from being committed.”118 Navi Pillay, the UN Human Rights Chief, has suggested that the 
COI has found considerable evidence of grave human rights violations that may establish the 
responsibility of government personnel at the highest level.119 
International NGOs have devoted a considerable number of initiatives to address issues 
of criminal accountability in Syria. These NGOs have frequently called upon the international 
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community to refer the Syrian situation to the ICC. Several reports have been published by 
organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, MSF, International Crisis 
Group, No Peace Without Justice, and others. David Crane, former chief prosecutor of the 
SCSL, and now head of the Syria Accountability Project, has prepared a list of names of alleged 
perpetrators of war crimes in Syria. The list is said to include the names of officials in the 
Syrian government, along with those from the Islamic rebel groups al-Nusra Front and ISIS.120 
William Wiley, a Canadian war crimes investigator who has worked on a number of 
sophisticated international tribunals, in 2012, founded the Commission for International Justice 
and Accountability, an independent investigative organization for crimes in Syria.121 Wiley and 
his team have collected more than 600,000 official government documents, which they have 
managed to smuggle out of Syria. He says that they now have enough evidence to prosecute 
senior figures from parties to the conflict.122 That evidence is now hidden in a high-security 
location in Europe in the hopes that it will one day be presented to a special court that will deal 
with war crimes in Syria. 
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Prominent scholars in the international criminal law arena have called for criminal 
accountability in Syria. Michael P. Scharf, M. Cherif Bassiouni, and William A. Schabas, along 
with a prestigious committee of high-profile chief prosecutors, have prepared “The Chautauqua 
Blueprint for a Statute for a Syrian Extraordinary Tribunal to Prosecute Atrocity Crimes,”123 in 
order to help in the accountability process, as soon as the political situation permits. 
Individual states have called for criminal accountability, endeavouring to makes some 
efforts toward criminal justice. In September 2015, based on the evidence smuggled out of 
Syria by Caesar, France took the initiative, conducting “the world’s first criminal inquiry into 
torture.”124 In 2016, Germany took referred war perpetrators to its national courts, relying on 
the principle of universal jurisdiction (I will explore these efforts further, later in this 
chapter).125 In December 2019, the US passed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which 
aims “[t]o halt the wholesale slaughter of the Syrian people, encourage a negotiated political 
settlement, and hold Syrian human rights abusers accountable for their crimes.”126 The 
legislation is named after the Syrian officer “Caesar,” who smuggled out 55,000 photos of 
prisoners’ corpses – prisoners who were tortured and killed in Syrian government detention 
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centres. The Act includes 47 names of people who are responsible for or complicit in certain 
human rights violations in Syria. The Act also aims to establish robust mechanisms that will 
support the US government’s economic sanctions against the Syrian government, prevent 
access to international financial transactions, strengthen the peace negotiations process, and 
name and shame criminals.127 
I have noted in this section a small amount of the extensive discourse and the various 
initiatives that seek to hold those responsible for various crimes accountable. While one might 
expect a response to these calls, that is unlikely to happen, at least not currently. But, if holding 
criminals to account is not a viable option, why bother calling for accountability? This is, of 
course, the main question with which this dissertation grapples, and I turn to it in the following 
section. 
 EXPLANATION OF THE QUESTION 
Up to this point, I have provided an overview of the Syrian situation and its surrounding 
circumstances. I have named some of the parties to the conflict and the consequences of their 
actions on civilians, actions that include atrocity crimes. I have assessed the legal framework 
that applies to armed conflicts. I have also noted the calls for criminal accountability by 
different actors. 
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Societies tend to call criminals to account in times of stability or after the termination of 
conflict. Only at that point, when the political and legal situation permits, are suspects brought 
to justice. Only then is it imaginable to hold them accountable. In the case of Syria, however, 
calls are happening while the conflict continues, before any kind of political settlement has 
been achieved. Although justice during conflicts has not been the norm, it is not impossible, 
given a strong enough political will and the legal capability to pursue it. Unfortunately, Syria 
is a case of a state in conflict where there is a lack of political will by the international 
community to refer suspects to justice, as well as a lack of a credible domestic criminal 
accountability system that could handle the justice process. Both the Syrian domestic criminal 
justice institutions and the international criminal justice institutions have their own obstacles, 
which I will explain shortly. Given the lack of political will, and the lack of a credible criminal 
justice institution in Syria, I argue that there is a significant unlikelihood of criminal 
accountability during the ongoing war. So, why should we call for criminal accountability? 
What would the justifications for such calls be in the midst of the ongoing war? 
In this section, I will explain why I think there is a significant unlikelihood of institutional 
criminal punishment during the ongoing conflict, and why I claim that war perpetrators cannot 
be institutionally punished during the ongoing war. I will discuss the constraints of the Syrian 
domestic criminal justice system, which would otherwise be the ideal institution to hold 
perpetrators accountable. Internationally, there is also a lack of legal avenues. The ICC would 
have an important role to play in holding perpetrators accountable of crimes in Syria, but the 
ICC is unlikely to play any role, at least not currently. For these crimes to be addressed in front 





Statute, and it is extremely unlikely that the Syrian government will refer itself to the ICC, 
given that many government officials are suspected of serious crimes. To close the impunity 
gap, some European states have taken steps toward criminal accountability, relying on the 
doctrine of universal jurisdiction and initiating national trials. The doctrine allows states to 
have jurisdiction over crimes, even if their courts lack the traditional connection with the 
crimes, the suspects, or the victims. As I will explain, however, universal jurisdiction has its 
own limitations. I should note that this dissertation will not concentrate on the possibility of 
establishing a hybrid tribunal for Syria, and particularly for ISIS, because this terrorist group 
is not the concentration of this dissertation.  The following sub-sections will then address this 
dissertation’s claim of “the significant unlikelihood of institutional criminal punishment” 
during the war in Syria. 
 Syria’s Domestic Criminal Justice System 
Holding perpetrators to account at domestic criminal justice institutions is the ideal scenario 
that any society would prefer. Where domestic courts are trustworthy, they generally are able 
to have greater impact than are international institutions, are better able to access evidence, and 
are less expensive.128 Moreover, international institutions are sometimes perceived as 
intervening on a state’s sovereignty. People tend to have more faith in domestic institutions 
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than international institutions, over which they have no control. Also, international courts 
cannot take the serious actions of arresting and punishing criminals of serious crimes.129 
A case cannot be referred to international criminal justice institutions unless the 
possibility of criminal accountability at the domestic level has been exhausted. The Rome 
Statute advances the principle of complementarity, which means that the ICC should be the 
court of last resort and cannot look at cases unless domestic courts are unwilling or unable to 
handle the task. Article 17 on issues of admissibility reads: 
the Court [ICC] shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: 
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which 
has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable 
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.130 
It is, in fact, one of the ICC’s missions to promote justice at the domestic level. The principle 
of complementarity is important insofar as it plays a role in the advancement of national 
sovereignty, and it encourages states to comply with their international obligations. Moreover, 
Article 17 lists some conditions that determine the unwillingness of domestic states to hold 
criminals accountable. These are: 
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national 
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decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person 
concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes …; 
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings …; 
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted 
independently or impartially, and they were or are being conducted 
in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an 
intent to bring the person concerned to justice.131 
As stated, Syrian domestic criminal justice institutions would be the ideal place to address 
war crimes that have been committed on its own territory. They have access to the evidence, 
the ability to depose witnesses, and it would be less costly than if addressed by international 
institutions. In its 2012 report, the COI stated that the Syrian government, based on the 
principles of state responsibility in international law, “bears the duty to ensure that individual 
perpetrators are punished and that victims receive reparation.”132 It further indicated that this 
duty stems from Syria’s treaty obligations and customary international law.133 The problem is 
that it is beyond unlikely that Syria’s criminal justice institutions would be credible and 
impartial while they remain under the control of the al-Assad government – a fact that was 
reflected in the 2013 COI report, which noted that accountability at the domestic level is 
currently unlikely to happen, and explaining that there is “not only a lack of willingness to 
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institute proceedings, a country torn by … years of bloody and destructive conflict is also 
unlikely to be capable of such an effort.”134 The COI thus indicated the unwillingness and 
inability of the Syrian domestic system to try criminals, at least not while the war continues. 
There are many reasons to believe that the Syrian justice system is incapable of handling 
these crimes. First and foremost, the Syrian government is, according to reports provided 
earlier, suspected of atrocity crimes, and probably to a greater extent than any other party to 
the conflict. The COI has indicted that there are sufficient grounds to believe that government 
armed forces have committed atrocity crimes, and “[t]here are also reasonable grounds to 
believe that anti-Government armed groups committed war crimes and abuses of international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law.”135 There is no separation of power in 
Syria, and all governmental institutions are controlled by the al-Assad regime, including the 
judicial system. Criminal justice institutions cannot be presumed independent or impartial. So, 
practically speaking, the al-Assad regime is extremely unlikely to punish the country’s 
institutions – its own military sergeants – or even its allies.136 
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Second, there are many reasons to believe that the al-Assad government does not respect 
the rule of law, and that there is no real separation of power between the executive and the 
judiciary branches of government. Despite the fact that the Syrian constitution(s) confirm the 
separation of powers – executive, legislative, and judicial – judges do not enjoy autonomy.137 
Of course, there are many highly qualified and credible judges, but the government enjoys full 
authority over the Higher Council of the judiciary, and has the capacity to appoint and dismiss 
any judge who does not obey its orders.138 The government even controls bar associations and 
other professional institutions.139 In fact, al-Assad has the power to appoint and dismiss 
officials in both civilian and military institutions.140 
In its 2015 report, the COI concluded that “after monitoring national proceedings for 
more than three years, the Commission has determined that Syrian national courts are not, at 
this time, an effective mechanism through which to pursue justice.”141 And the situation has 
not improved since that time; in fact, arguably, the system is even more dominated by vicious 
conflict and violent repression at the hands of the government. 
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It is unfortunate that the Syrian domestic criminal system is unable to bring perpetrators 
of war to justice. There is no doubt that the national courts are more efficient and often more 
credible in the eyes of citizens than are international courts. But if the Syrian criminal justice 
system were to try to hold suspects to account, its impartiality would be under suspicion, and 
it would surely be accused of bias, not only by the international community, but also by the 
Syrian society. Therefore, it is significantly unlikely that domestic criminal justice institutions 
will criminalize perpetrators during the ongoing Syrian war. So, that option has been all but 
eliminated, and I have already mentioned that Article 17 of the Rome Statute indicates certain 
conditions that determine the unwillingness of a domestic state to hold criminals accountable. 
These conditions have been met in relation to the Syrian criminal justice system. That allows 
the ICC to react to the ongoing crimes, but as we will see in what follows, even the international 
criminal justice system has no jurisdiction over the Syria file. 
 International Criminal Court 
The Rome Statute was adopted on 17 July 1998 and came into force on 1 July 2000 to establish 
a permanent and autonomous court located in the Netherlands. The ICC is tasked with 
investigating and prosecuting individuals who are responsible for certain serious crimes: war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and crimes of aggression.142 The establishment of 
the ICC brought with it several changes to international criminal law and practice First, the 
individual criminal accountability model emerged to close the impunity gap on state officials. 
According to Kathryn Sikkink, “the emergence of the individual criminal accountability model 
 





for basic human rights violations means that the huge disjuncture between the treatment of 
crime in the domestic and the international realms has started to narrow.”143  
Second, justice has transformed from “victory justice” to an international justice 
paradigm. The ICC is perceived as representing a “dramatic shift in the global accountability 
regime.”144 
Third, attention has started to be paid to criminal accountability during ongoing conflicts. 
As mentioned, traditionally, courts were established after the termination of conflicts, but that 
has changed with the contemporary war model, as war has become intra-state rather than inter-
state.145 Par Engstrom argues, “there has been a discernible shift from the pursuit of 
accountability strategies after the cessation of armed hostilities on the one hand, and in the 
aftermath of political transitions on the other, to attempts to achieve accountability for atrocities 
even before a political settlement of armed conflict has been reached.”146 The difficulties of 
creating domestic courts during ongoing wars have created the need for international courts. 
Luis Moreno Ocampo, former prosecutor of the ICC, explains that the court is “engage[d] in 
judicial proceedings in relation to conflicts even before they have ended. Working in these 
circumstances can mean conducting investigations in situations where physical access is 
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sometimes impossible or where there is a total collapse of functioning institutions.”147 
Nevertheless, many have argued that the pursuit of justice during ongoing conflict might delay 
the return to stability. For example, Jack Goldsmith and Stephen Krasner claim that the ICC 
“initiate[s] prosecutions that aggravate bloody political conflicts and prolong political 
instability in the affected regions.”148 
The ICC is challenged by political will. Some scholars view the ICC as “a mainstream 
approach of diplomats, without taking the political delicacy of such an intervention seriously 
enough.”149 Others criticize it for its political nature, considering it as “a renewed commitment 
to international idealism.”150 The ICC has been seen as justice imposed by outsiders, in the 
sense that it is viewed as an alternative to military intervention, which gives foreign occupiers 
legitimacy to violate the sovereignty of states. However, probably the more challenging 
criticism of the ICC is that it lacks the power to enforce arrest warrants insofar as it does not 
have the same power of policing, as do domestic courts. These shortcomings were obvious in 
the case of Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir, who was accused of war crimes. The ICC failed 
to seize him, although at the time, he was travelling freely among the territories of state parties 
to the ICC.151 
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In the case of Syrian perpetrators, the ICC would have been a possible venue in which to 
hold criminals accountable, given that the domestic state is both unable and unwilling to try 
those responsible for mass atrocity crimes. However, the ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to those 
states that have ratified the Rome Statute, which Syria did not do. Hence, the ICC has no 
jurisdiction over crimes in Syria. There are two options for overcoming this jurisdictional 
problem: self-referral or UNSC referral. However, neither are viable options in Syria. 
  Self-Referral 
For the ICC to have jurisdiction over crimes in Syria, the government would have to self-refer 
or accept the jurisdiction of the Court, neither of which is likely. Article 12(3) of the Rome 
Statute states that: 
If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is 
required under paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged 
with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court 
with respect to the crime in question. The accepting State shall 
cooperate with the Court without any delay.152 
Self-referral is an exceptional route that states can take if they wish the ICC to put its 
hands on their cases. According to Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, this exception “makes the ICC 
accessible to States that, for one reason or another, may not be able to become party to the 
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Statute.”153 Many countries have used the power of Article 12(3) to self-refer their cases to the 
ICC. For example, Côte d’Ivoire in May 2011 self-referred its situation to the ICC to investigate 
the alleged crimes against humanity committed after presidential elections.154 Nonetheless, it 
is unlikely that the Syrian government would self-refer its crimes to the ICC. The al-Assad 
government has continuously proclaimed the capability of its domestic criminal justice 
institutions to investigate the atrocity crimes in its conflicts. The government has, moreover, 
claimed complementarity, arguing that, since national proceedings can take place, the ICC has 
no role to play. Bashar Jaafari, Syria’s permanent representative at the UN, asserts that: 
The international legal system is based on fundamental pillars, of 
which the most important is the fact that States have primary and 
exclusive responsibility for establishing accountability and justice 
in their territories. … [T]he Syrian Government has taken a series 
of steps designed to hold accountable the people involved in these 
events and to take appropriate legal action against them. Our 
national investigation committee continues to work alongside the 
Syrian judiciary, which since the crisis began has investigated 
30,000 cases, issued rulings on those involved and settled the 
conditions of others, confirming the Syrian Government’s desire 
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and ability to have justice and negating the possibilities of pretext 
aimed at involving any international judicial body that might 
contradict our national judiciary’s power.155 
The Syrian government asserts its ability to pursue criminal justice. Moreover, the political and 
regional situation of the conflict at the time of writing (fall of 2020) shows the advancement of 
the al-Assad government’s armed forces over its opposition, and victors are unlikely to refer 
their own crimes to foreign courts – that would be illogical. Therefore, self-referral is not an 
option in this case. 
 United Nations Security Council 
The second option to overcome the ICC’s jurisdictional problem over crimes in Syria is through 
a referral by the UNSC. The Rome Statute offers the UNSC an exceptional jurisdictional task. 
Under the power of Chapter VII, the UNSC can refer alleged atrocity crimes that are within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC’s prosecutor. Under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, the ICC can 
exercise its jurisdiction if a “situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have 
been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII 
of the Charter of the United Nations.”156 Moreover, Article 16 of the Statute gives the UNSC 
the right to postpone the investigation or prosecution for 12 months.157 
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The most recent case of UNSC referral to the ICC occurred in February 2011 – an 
investigation of alleged atrocity crimes in Libya.158 Although the Syrian situation occurred 
simultaneously to that in Libya, the UNSC did not take the decision to refer the situation in 
Syria to the ICC. al-Assad’s allies, mainly Russia, have – since 2012 – vetoed 13 draft 
resolutions aimed at finding a solution to the Syrian situation,159 including draft Resolution 
S/2014/348 dated May 22, 2014, in which 60 states called for criminals to be held accountable. 
Thirteen members of the UNSC voted in favour of the draft resolution, while two permanent 
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members – Russia and China – vetoed it.160 Accordingly, the draft resolution was not adopted, 
leaving the perpetrators of crimes against humanity unpunished. 
Some scholars have criticized the limited jurisdiction of the ICC to bring justice to 
victims in cases where atrocity crimes are happening on a daily basis, suggesting that the ICC 
should have universal jurisdiction to hold perpetrators to account, regardless of the 
perpetrators’ nationality or the issue of territorial jurisdiction. Nsereko describes it as “a 
particularly severe handicap for the Court. It will not be able to try dictators whose countries, 
for obvious reasons, may not accede to the Statute. These dictators will be able to roam the 
globe assured that the arm of international justice will not be long enough to reach them.”161 
Although the ICC does not enjoy universal jurisdiction, a few states in Europe, such as 
Germany and France, have attempted to use the principle of universal jurisdiction to investigate 
crimes and issue arrest warrants against suspects of atrocity crimes in Syria. It remains unclear 
whether Europe can take these initiatives further. So far, the principle of universal jurisdiction 
has its own obstacles, which I will address in the following section. 
 Universal Jurisdiction 
Thus far, I have explained that, while the war continues, neither the domestic nor the 
international criminal justice system will likely be able to hold perpetrators of war crimes in 
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Syria accountable. As a result, victims have submitted their claims against perpetrators to 
European courts, relying on the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, as the best available 
alternative. 
Universal jurisdiction is a “criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime, 
without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted 
perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such 
jurisdiction.”162 International law sets out five scenarios where states might exercise priority of 
jurisdiction. These are: (1) when there is a nexus to its territory (territoriality principle); (2) 
when the suspect is one of its citizens (nationality principle); (3) when the victim is one of its 
nationals (passive personality principle); (4) when the conduct itself threatens the state’s 
security (protective principle); and (5) universal jurisdiction, allowing the state to investigate, 
prosecute, and punish offenders of serious crimes in its domestic courts without being limited 
to a territorial, nationality, personal, or protective nexus to the crime, the suspect, or the 
victim.163 
Universal jurisdiction is a human rights doctrine that operates under treaty law and 
customary international law.164 The courts developed the doctrine to tackle the piracy problem 
that faced international trade, and it was defended based on the reasoning that pirates are “the 
enemy of all people.”165 Universal jurisdiction was advanced in post-World War II trials; the 
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International Military Tribunal applied it in its judgements at the time, and, in 1961, it was used 
in the case against Adolf Eichmann.166 And a more recent example is that of the case of former 
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet in 1999. Today, the principle is still defended according to 
the reasoning that atrocity crimes are the enemy of humanity – they breach our values as human 
beings. Crimes that are subject to universal jurisdiction include piracy, slavery, war crimes, 
crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, genocide, and torture. 
There are two bases for the explanation that universal jurisdiction is necessary in some 
cases of atrocity crimes: first, it deals with crimes that infringe jus cogens peremptory norms 
of international law, which are the norms that have been recognized by the international 
community. These are norms from which “no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”167 
Second, these crimes affect international peace and security.168 In the words of Kenneth C. 
Randall, universal jurisdiction deals with “those offenses [that] endanger values to which the 
global community is committed, the legal force of any nation’s challenge to the prosecution of 
universal crimes also is weakened.”169 In a case before the Court of Appeal in the US, the Court 
decided that “neither the nationality of the accused or the victim(s), nor the location of the 
crime is significant. The underlying assumption is that the crimes are offenses against the law 
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of nations or against humanity and that the prosecuting nation is acting for all nations.”170 
Universal jurisdiction is said to bring justice to victims, end impunity gaps, and eliminate 
opportunities for perpetrators to escape justice.171  
It is contested among scholars whether the presence of the perpetrator (or the suspect) is 
an essential condition for a state to exercise universal jurisdiction. Theories tend to distinguish 
between two terms, which are: universal jurisdiction in absentia and conditional universal 
jurisdiction. The latter, as it seems for its name, is conditional on the physical presence of the 
perpetrator on the territory of the country that is to practice jurisdiction (judex loci 
deprehensionis).172 But, according to some scholars, “even that requirement is not absolute 
and might be questionable.”173 The second term, universal jurisdiction in absentia, implies that 
states can exercise universal jurisdiction without the presence of the prosecutor. Some scholars 
argue that this type is a different type of universal jurisdiction that distinguishes itself from 
conditional universal jurisdiction, which necessitates the presence of the prosecutor to start 
criminal process.174 Other scholars understand universal jurisdiction to imply the possibility 
and the capability of the state to investigate and arrest perpetrators without conditions.175 The 
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latest view is reliant upon the UN resolution, which includes the G.A. Res., U.N. GADR 2840 
(XXVI), adopted in 1971, and stipulates that: “refusal by States to co-operate in the arrest, 
extradition, trial and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity 
is contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and to generally 
recognized norms of international law.”176 Some countries, such a Germany, Belgium and 
Spain had a type of jurisdiction that could be exercised without any connection between the 
country and the perpetrator; this type is titled by many scholars as universal jurisdiction in 
absentia.177 In practice, virtually all countries today, including those three mentioned above, 
only allow universal jurisdiction under the condition that the perpetrator is present in its 
territory.  
In the Syrian case, Europe was the right place for victims to seek to have their perpetrators 
tried. The application of universal jurisdiction in a few European states allows the domestic 
courts to initiate investigations in cases of mass crimes, even if defendants are not present. The 
prosecutor still requires them to be present in order to hold trials and to punish them, but what 
distinguishes the application of universal jurisdiction in Europe from its application in other 
countries, say, Canada, is that prosecutors in Europe tend to accept claims, regardless of the 
prerequisite that the suspect be present in the territory of the state trying the suspected 
perpetrator. They accept the claim if they find credible evidence, they then undertake further 
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investigation, they depose witnesses, and they can issue arrest warrants. This is what happened 
in regard to crimes in Syria: European courts conducted investigations and sometimes issued 
arrest warrants against suspects of war crimes.178 There are currently a number of criminal 
cases under investigation in seven European states – Italy, Belgium, Spain, German, Sweden, 
and Austria – and I will discuss them further in Chapter Three, but these efforts certainly prove 
the nobility of the justice systems in these states and their adherence to justice. In Chapter 
Three, I demonstrate that these cases only came to be as a result of calls for criminal 
accountability. However, these criminal cases in Europe are not equivalent to a full criminal 
justice system; they are not parallel to a domestic criminal justice system or even to the ICC. 
In reality, even if courts in Europe issued arrest warrants, and they did, they cannot prosecute 
perpetrators unless they are present in the territory of the state; in other words, the cases can 
only go far. It is tremendously unlikely that perpetrators who know that they are involved in 
war crimes will travel to Europe; so, unless these states arrest perpetrators, such as what 
happened in the Israeli case against Eichmann, Syrian war criminals are unlikely to be arrested. 
It is also doubtful that the Syrian government will extradite accused persons to other 
jurisdictions. Moreover, there is no collaborative law-enforcement procedure or any other kind 
of legal arrangements between the Syrian and European jurisdictions. In other words, criminal 
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accountability is unlikely, which proves my claim: it is significantly unlikely that there will be 
institutional criminal accountability for war crimes in Syria during the ongoing conflict. 
To conclude, in this section, I have explained the significant unlikelihood of institutional 
criminal punishment for crimes in Syria, and why I argue that there are no institutions to hold 
suspects of these crimes to account during the ongoing conflict. Using international reports, I 
explained the constraints on using the Syrian domestic criminal justice system, which would 
otherwise have been the ideal institution to hold perpetrators accountable; unfortunately, it is 
unlikely to be able or willing to handle the criminal justice task, because the system currently 
lacks the fundamental principles of any healthy and credible judicial institution – that is, it 
lacks impartiality, independence, and neutrality. Internationally, the ICC would have had an 
important role to play in holding perpetrators of crimes in Syria accountable, however, the ICC 
has no jurisdiction to deal with ongoing crimes in Syria, and apparently the UNSC does not 
have the political will to refer Syrian war crimes to the ICC. Finally, I explained that some 
European states have established national trials relying on the principle of universal 
jurisdiction; however, their efforts might not exceed issuing arrest warrants for suspects who 
are unlikely to be present at trials. So, I have built the case that there is an absence of domestic 
and international criminal justice institutions to hold criminals of war crimes accountable 
during the ongoing war. If this is the case, then the question is again: what are the justifications 
for calls for criminal accountability if there are no criminal justice institutions that can hold 
perpetrators to account? Before answering this question in Chapter Three, in the next part, I 
will address a different question: if criminal accountability is not currently a viable option, why 





PART TWO: A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE 
 INTRODUCTION 
Given the significant unlikelihood of institutional criminal punishment, is there an alternative 
for holding wrongdoers accountable? Is there another set of laws that can help, aside from the 
criminal law? Given the current lack of criminal law institutions that have the authority to hold 
war perpetrators accountable, is there another possible legal avenue that can be used? Is human 
rights law able to provide a response to calls for criminal accountability? In this Part, I will 
consider – and ultimately reject – a possible alternative to criminal law, i.e., human rights law. 
Given that legal avenues for holding criminals accountable are currently unavailable in Syria, 
instead, let’s consider using human rights law. The relevant human rights treaties and 
customary international law provide the capacity to condemn perpetrators for their 
wrongdoings. So, instead of calling for criminal accountability and leaning toward taking the 
criminal law path, why not call human rights law into play? As explained, Syria has ratified a 
number of human rights treaties, and by making reference to them, we might be able to hold 
violators of human rights law accountable for breaching the rules and provisions of human 
rights law. 
I will argue that human rights law provides a range of responses to those who violate 
internationally agreed human rights norms, but those responses are not punitive responses. 
Although calls for accountability for human rights violations and calls for criminal 
accountability both generate legal responses, calls for criminal accountability are much 





Punishment as we understand it (and as I will explain in Chapter Two) is solely a feature of 
criminal law; in fact, it is the feature that distinguishes criminal law from other kind of laws. 
Since 2011, Syrian civilians have been subjected to heinous crimes, and the international 
community has provided an array of responses, but not punishment. Generally, victims look 
for punishment as the right response to their suffering. Imagine a mother who has lost her 
children, husband, and her own dignity; quite naturally, she would ask that her wrongdoers be 
punished. Calls for accountability for human rights violations generate undefined responses, 
while calls for criminal accountability generate more specific responses, i.e., punishment for 
wrongdoers. Responses to calls for accountability for human rights violations are calls that wait 
for some kind of legal response – an undefined legal response that will not be punitive. 
To establish this argument, I ask two sub-questions. First, is human rights law applicable 
in armed conflict situations? Generally speaking, it is assumed that IHL is applicable in times 
of war, and human rights law is applicable in times of peace; but does human rights law have 
no role to play during armed conflicts or war situations? Scholarly opinions are quite divided, 
as Judge Christopher Greenwood demonstrates: 
To one group, human rights law is simply unsuited to the waging of warfare in 
any age but, particularly, the one that we have today. To them human rights law 
is designed for the quite different environment of a normal state in the condition 
of peace and are therefore hopelessly unsuited to regulating conditions on or 





modern international law and the laws of war are being invoked by 
governments.179 
Hence, I will briefly explain the interconnected and complicated relationship between 
human rights law and IHL by explaining the circumstances behind the creation of each, the aim 
of each, and the reasons that states decide to apply them. Consequently, I will find that it is 
quite acceptable to call for the application of human rights law in the midst of ongoing war 
situations. I will not pursue an in-depth discussion on how, and under what circumstances, each 
law should operate; that is not a major argument of this dissertation. The aim is to simply 
provide some sense as to whether human rights law can or cannot operate during armed 
conflicts. 
The second sub-question is: what are the remedies that human rights law offers to calls 
for accountability for human rights violations? In other words, if we resort to human rights law, 
what are the possible responses to such calls? To answer this question, I assess the remedies 
that international communities have offered Syria and other similar situations, like Libya, 
which include the following: condemnation (by the international community); declarations 
(from international bodies, such as the UNGA and the UNSC); imposition of political, 
diplomatic, economic, and legal measures; encouragement of humanitarian intervention, often 
as a last resort. But these remedies are not the same as punishment; they do not provide a 
punitive response. I then explain that calls for accountability for human rights violations are 
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calls that then wait for some kind of legal response – an undefined legal response that will not 
result in punishing violators. Calls for criminal accountability, however, are calls that do indeed 
wait for a punitive response – they are narrower and more precise. Therefore, I will consider 
the value of the language of calls for accountability for human rights violations versus the value 
of the language of calls for criminal accountability. This argument is critical because of the 
crisscrossing and the complicated relationship between international human rights law and 
international criminal law, which makes it difficult to distinguish the responses that each law 
provides. I suggest that human rights law, in general, relies on moral and ethical principles. 
Human rights law provides certain remedies in response to calls for accountability for human 
rights violations, but it is unable to hold perpetrators of war crimes criminally accountable – 
that would require calls that require a criminal response. 
Calls for accountability for human rights violations express a language of resentment, 
and they encourage compensational measures, but they are not punishment, at least not in the 
sense offered by the criminal law. Similarly, criminal law is not really associated with the idea 
of compensation. When people call for criminal accountability, they are typically envisioning 
punishment, and more specifically, incarceration.180 So, the question is whether the focus is on 
punishment or compensation, as the two types of law and the corresponding calls deliver 
different remedies: punishment for criminal law, and compensation for human rights law. I 
suggest that, when people call for criminal accountability, they are calling for neither 
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compensation nor declaration, but rather for punishment. The debate is then between the 
responses that each of the two types of laws provide. Calls for criminal accountability are more 
specific and precise, as they provide for punishment as the response, while calls for 
accountability for human rights violations are a broader category that delivers unspecified 
responses. I argue that, insofar as calls for criminal accountability bring the possibility of 
punishment, they are superior to calls for accountability for human rights violations.  
 International Human Rights Law in Armed Conflicts 
It is often claimed that international human rights law is the law of peace and IHL is the law of 
war. While I do not doubt this, does it imply that human rights law cannot apply in situations 
of armed conflict? I see no reason that that should be the case. Rather, there is a very 
interconnected and complicated relationship between the two types of law. In fact, scholars 
have argued that there is an overlapping relationship between them and that both types of law 
can apply in a cumulative fashion. Some would even argue that human rights law applies during 
times of war in a similar manner as it does in times of peace.181 
I will begin by looking at the nature of each of the types of law. International human 
rights law and IHL are both branches of public international law. Both are customary 
international laws that are governed by international treaties. However, each type of law has its 
own objectives that are incorporated into articles, legal principles, and obligations that trigger 
differently, depending on the time and circumstances. The key instruments of IHL are the four 
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Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the two Additional Protocols of 1977, while the key 
documents of human rights law are the 1945 Declaration of Human Rights and its two 
Covenants of 1966: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), in addition to a 
number of other treaties that follow the rights established in the ICESCR.182 
Much of the interaction between the branches of law can be understood by looking at the 
history and circumstances of their creation. The tendency to protect human rights during armed 
conflict is not a new phenomenon; rather, there are a number of historical treaties that were 
designed for this purpose.183 One of the oldest is the 1864 Geneva Convention, which was 
initiated to ensure that human rights would be safeguarded in a manner whereby rights are 
inviolably attached to human dignity, even during hostility.184 The Geneva Convention of 27 
July 1929 followed, which safeguarded the treatment of prisoners of war, in which, according 
to René Provost, the word “rights” was first used.185 The grave atrocity crimes committed 
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during World War II brought about a change in international law; consequently, a number of 
treaties came to life to guarantee certain principles, and human rights was a major principle. In 
1948, the international community established the Charter of the United Nations, which 
affirmed in its preamble the “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.”186 
Moreover, the Charter “establish[es] conditions under which justice and respect for the 
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.”187 
The focus on human rights during war was again mentioned in the 1949 four Geneva 
Conventions, particularly in their two Additional Protocols of 1977. The reference in 
Additional Protocol I regulates the conduct of hostilities and protection of civilian populations 
during international armed conflicts, and Additional Protocol II regulates the conduct of 
hostilities and protection of civilian populations during non-international armed conflicts, 
namely in cases of inter-state armed conflict, national liberation armed conflict, and non-
international armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions and the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights were established around the same time, in the aftermath of World War II. While 
they have a shared intention, i.e., to safeguard humanity, they do so in different ways. 
The codification of the Geneva Conventions was deemed necessary to protect innocent 
civilians from war, but the intention was not to embark upon a law to regulate the conduct of 
war; that was not the intention of the founders. That was, in a way, in contrast to their noble 
 






mission at the time after a long period of war.188 Provost analyzes both laws and points out the 
areas of commonality and differences between them, finding a mutual relationship between the 
two branches. Although he clarifies that each law performs differently, he finds a “cross-
pollination and better integration of human rights and humanitarian law.”189 The ICRC also 
notes the overlapping relationship between them, explaining that the laws of war and the law 
of peace, respectively, are, nowadays, often simultaneously applicable, as opposed to having 
clear, distinct boundaries. Since the two laws are often seen as a pair, they can also be applied 
simultaneously.190 
Scholars have emphasized applying human rights law in war situations, arguing that 
humanitarian law contains far too many opportunities for states to justify military necessity. 
Human rights, in that sense, help to prevent fighters from committing outlawed conduct. 
Regional human rights conventions also apply human rights in the time of war. According to 
Article 27 of the American Convention on Human Rights, rights cannot be derogated or 
suspended in time of war. Such rights include the right to life, the right to be free from torture, 
and the right to be free from servitude. 
In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the 
independence or security of a State Party, it may take measures derogating from 
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its obligations under the present Convention to the extent and for the period of 
time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such 
measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law 
and do not involve discrimination on the ground of race, color, sex, language, 
religion, or social origin.191 
Sometimes, there are political reasons behind the division between the two laws. 
Andrew Clapham explains that the founders of the two laws aimed to separate the work of the 
ICRC and, more broadly, humanitarian law from intergovernmental organizations and the 
politics that are perceived to influence the work of the UN. Clapham further explains that the 
bodies – whether regional or international – that have jurisdiction over each of the laws are 
different. Often, case law is limited to a particular body, and it is rare to find case law that leads 
to interaction between both laws.192 
Much of the controversy in the application of both branches is a result of states’ practices. 
Some states reject the application of some human rights treaties or prefer certain interpretations 
of them; for example, the US denies the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR in the time of 
war. Article 2(1) of the ICCPR confirms that rights enlisted and recognized apply to any 
individual present within its territory.193 Therefore, if the US is involved in a war outside its 
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territory or with non-US citizens, the provisions of the ICCPR would not be enforced. That is 
a clear example of how the applicability of human rights conventions might rely on the state 
itself; however, it is worth noting that both the UN Human Rights Committee and the ICJ reject 
the US’ approach, and instead have confirmed the applicability of the ICCPR during armed 
conflict.194 In its Advisory Opinion on 8 July 1996, the ICJ advised that: 
the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does 
not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant 
whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national 
emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such a provision. In 
principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies also in 
hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls 
to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in 
armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.195 
The ICJ, however, did not distinguish between nationals of the state and individuals of 
other nationalities; all humans enjoy the minimum standards of human rights, even in times of 
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hostilities. In fact, the ICJ, in its various decisions, emphasised on the application of IHL and 
IHRL in a consecutive manner. In the 2014 report on the human rights situation in Palestine 
pursuant to the Israeli Wall case, the independent commission of inquiry stated that parties to 
conflict are obligated by the provisions and principles of international humanitarian and 
international human rights treaty and customary law. The report contemplates that, “in 
situations of armed conflict or occupation, international humanitarian law and international 
human rights law apply concurrently, and shares the position of United Nations human rights 
treaty bodies and the International Court of Justice.”196 The commission advised that both Israel 
and the Palestinian Authority should take adequate measures in the direction of their full 
realization of human rights agreements and treaties they have acceded, despite being in a 
conflict situation. 197  The report emphasizes that parties to the conflict situation might only 
attack soldiers and their objects, but not civilians and their objects. Furthermore, the warring 
parties should consider the principles of proportionality and precautions in their attacks and 
thus, avoid and lessen loss of civilian lives and impairment to their properties.   
 Another example of the overlap between general international human rights and the lex 
specialis of international humanitarian law are the judgments by the ICJ on the Congo v 
Uganda case of 2015, where the commission urged the international community to hold 
accountable those responsible for human rights and international humanitarian law violations. 
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Violation of human rights norms has been understood as to be reason for criminal prosecution. 
The reports indicated that: “human rights and humanitarian law violations that were committed 
… can be considered as crimes according to Congolese and international criminal law, in 
particular murder and deliberate physical attacks, whereby each constitute a crime punishable 
by imprisonment.”198 
In its 2018 report to the UNSC on the protection of civilians during the armed conflict in 
Syria, the UN Secretary-General noted that respect of both international instruments – IHL and 
international human rights law – is essential to protect civilians in armed conflict. The 
Secretary-General has further urged the UNSC to ensure that violations of these instruments 
be addressed.199 
Again, it is not my intention to conduct an in-depth analysis of how each type of law 
applies and under what circumstances; instead, my point is to clarify that some rights cannot 
be violated, even during times of war. Examples of such rights include the rights to life, dignity, 
and freedom – rights that are important to all human beings. It is, hence, unacceptable to kill, 
torture, detain, or enslave civilians without reasonable justification, even in times of conflict. 
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To that end, I argue that it is acceptable to call for the applicability of human rights law during 
ongoing conflict. 
 Remedies of Human Rights Law 
The question is: what remedies can human rights law offer as responses to calls for 
accountability for human rights violations, and are they enforceable? Typically, such remedies 
involve condemnation (by the international community) and declarations (from international 
bodies, such as the UNGA and the UNSC). Other remedies might be preventive and 
compensational in nature, for example, when the international community encouraged the 
imposition of political, diplomatic, economic, and legal measures in response to the Syrian file. 
Calls might also prompt other remedies; in Libya, for example, the escalation of human rights 
violations led to humanitarian intervention. Notably, however, none of these remedies include 
punishment per se. 
The crisscrossing and the complicated relationship between international human rights 
law and international criminal law make it difficult to distinguish the responses that each type 
of law provides. Human rights law provides a range of responses to calls for accountability for 
human rights violations, but notably they are not punitive responses. For punitive responses, 
the criminal law must be used. Human rights law is a broader category than criminal law, but 
only the criminal law can provide punishment as a response. While calls for criminal 
accountability and calls for accountability for human rights violations both generate legal 





Human rights rely on moral and ethical principles. While the language of human rights 
allows for naming and shaming, and it expresses condemnation, censure, blame, and 
resentment, and it provides the remedies previously discussed, it does not specifically and 
necessarily offer punitive responses, at least not punishment in the same way that criminal law 
does. Similarly, criminal law is not generally associated with the idea of compensation. That 
said, people looking for justice typically envision punishment for wrongdoers. I argue that 
human rights law does not provide the same important remedies as criminal law does, and when 
people call others to account, they are calling for punishment. 
The modern understanding of human rights can be traced back to two founding 
philosophies: natural law theory and political theory. Advocates of natural law theory assert 
that human rights are those natural and moral rights that all humankind enjoys.200 Political 
theory claims that human rights trigger a response, i.e., they point toward roles that must be 
filled by the state as a “necessary condition of the decency of a society’s political institution 
and its legal order.”201 Political theory does not refute the importance of human rights, but it 
goes further to insist that the state protect its citizens by establishing necessary minimum 
standards.202 
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The problem with human rights law is that it lacks the mechanism that is needed for its 
enforcement, and its implementation is heavily reliant upon a state being a signatory to it. 
Violations of human rights involve treaties violations and atrocity crimes.203 Treaties violations 
are breaches of the provisions of certain international human rights agreements. It is the 
responsibility of individual states to incorporate its international obligations into its domestic 
laws, and to take adequate steps to comply with them and prevent their violations. However, 
enforcement of human rights law is heavily reliant on individual states, with the international 
community having little control beyond the ability to offer condemnation. Some human rights 
treaties are dependent on whether a given state is a signatory, which means that some 
wrongdoing is prohibited for member states, but not for non-member states, for example, the 
rights provided for certain vulnerable people – women, Indigenous peoples, persons of different 
religions, and children. Furthermore, some treaties give signatory states the option to apply 
provisions gradually; for example, Article 2 of the ICESCR accepts the principle of progressive 
recognition of its provisions.204 Although states still remain under a moral (and perhaps legal) 
obligation to apply it when possible, if a state chooses not to apply it, then enforcement is 
problematic. Of course, the international community would condemn such a choice, and it may 
take positive measures to encourage the state to comply with its obligations, or it might take 
negative measures to sanction the state, but that may well be the extent of its response. 
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Human rights violations might involve atrocity crimes, which include war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, genocide, and crimes of aggression. These kinds of human rights violations 
are criminally punishable, either by domestic courts or international courts and tribunals.205 It 
is here that we see the intersection between human rights law and criminal law. Atrocity crimes 
are wrongdoings that, because of their seriousness, require a response that is punitive in nature, 
i.e., punishment. That response became available upon the creation of international criminal 
law.  In 1991, the International Law Commission adopted the Draft Code of Crimes Against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind – the title was later changed to Crimes Against Humanity 
– which listed the conduct that is considered to be crimes against humanity; that conduct 
included the “systematic or mass violations of human rights.”206 Scholars suggest that, with the 
inclusion of mass violations of human rights, international criminal law became more relevant. 
Andrew Clapham argues that international criminal law is largely an expansion of human rights 
law, and is celebrated as a major progression in the efforts to hold human rights violators 
accountable. The roots of international criminal law can be traced back to the Nuremburg trials, 
which dealt with the grave violations of human rights during World War II. However, 
international criminal law only morphed into its current shape with the inception of the Rome 
Statute, which regulates provisions to criminalize grave human rights violations – i.e., 
international crimes as listed in the Statute. Hence, human rights law, as we know it in the 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights and many other conventions (though not all), does not 
suggest penal responses, but international criminal law does. 
Human rights law can come into conflict with criminal law – whether domestic or 
international – and it might sometimes stand against punishing perpetrators. Human rights law 
is “a double-edged sword”207 – one that protects victims whose rights have been violated, as 
well as the rights of suspects. This debate raged heavily in relation to the Nuremburg trials, 
where the legitimacy of some judgements was questioned.208 For example, German war 
criminals rejected their sentences, arguing that they were obligated to follow the orders of their 
Nazi commanders, and that disobedience would have cost them their lives and their families’ 
lives. The International Military Tribunal eventually denied that defence, arguing that the 
officers must have known that their conduct was contrary to law. 
The Nuremburg trials are an exceptional example and one that is unlikely to happen 
again; during the trials, almost all prosecution of international crimes were perceived as being 
the fundamental enforcement of the criminalization of violations pertaining to human rights. 
With the advancement of human rights discourse, this notion changed.209 Take, for example, 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The Court was obligated to comply 
with its legal obligations to protect the rights of the accused. Accordingly, the Court dismissed 
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the charges with prejudice where it found that proceeding with the charges would negatively 
affect the integrity of the judicial process.210 Nowadays, during the ICC era, protecting the 
rights of the accused has become imperative to the due process of law and is interwoven into 
trial procedures. This is a clear example of how human rights law can undermine prosecution 
and threaten established human rights protections.211 Hence, sometimes human rights law can 
be a burden on the criminal punishment process. It might advantage criminals, despite there 
being available evidence against them of grave human rights violations. So, while human rights 
law and criminal law can be in harmony, each is tasked differently, and they can sometimes 
come into conflict with one another. 
Returning to the question of what remedies human rights law can offer as responses to 
calls for accountability for human rights violations and their enforceability, as mentioned, they 
include preventive and compensational measures. These remedies might include sanction; 
normally economic and political sanctions, in addition, such calls might increase the possibility 
of humanitarian intervention as a last resort to protect civilians and avert human rights 
violations. But these measures are either unenforceable or their legality might be questioned.  
The purpose of economic sanctions is to put pressure on other states to halt human rights 
violations through withdrawal of customary trade and financial relations for foreign- and 
security-policy purposes. According to the report of the responsibility to protect, submitted in 
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2000 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, the application 
or threat of economic sanctions “is a significant one and should never be undertaken lightly. 
Such actions may result in the application of very high levels of political and economic … 
pressure, and to that extent will require a relatively high level of political commitment on the 
part of the external actors.”212 Sanctions could involve political sanctions, diplomatic isolation, 
suspension of organizational membership, travel and asset restrictions on targeted persons, the 
threats of trade and financial sanctions, the withdrawal of investment, the withdrawal of 
International Monetary Fund or World Bank support, and the curtailment of aid and other 
assistance. 
In 2011, the beginning of the Syrian conflict, many governments imposed sanctions, 
whether political representation or economic cooperation, to put pressure on the Syrian 
government hoping to halt human rights violations against civilians. It, per instance, enforced 
travel bans and froze assets of personnel of the Syrian government.213 It also suspended Syria 
as a permanent chair of the Arab League.214 The EU banned crude oil imports from Syria, and 
it blocked trade in gold and precious metals and diamonds with Syrian public bodies and the 
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Syrian Central Bank. Furthermore, Arab governments halted investment in projects in Syria.215 
Canada, as one example, under the Special Economic Measures Act, since 2011 took special 
economic measures to prohibit their diplomatic representation, trade and business from 
operating in the Syrian market,216 but of course, these measures did not generate any adequate 
responses to victims of human rights violations; al-Assad government continues its violations 
to date.     
Violations of human rights are often internationally castigated, which prompts the 
international community to take corrective steps to deal with wrongdoing if it finds that the 
national state is not fulfilling its obligations. As Judge Greenwood explains: 
[I]international law is not confined to treaty texts. It includes customary 
international law. That law is not static but develops through a process of State 
practice, of actions and the reaction to those actions. Since 1945, that process 
has seen a growing importance attached to the preservation of human rights. 
Where the threat to human rights has been of an extreme character, States have 
been prepared to assert a right of humanitarian intervention as a matter of last 
resort.217 
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Although Greenwood considers humanitarian intervention to be legitimate, its legality is 
nonetheless an open question. Greenwood advises that international law is still developing, it 
stands on a number of foundational principles that are considered to be the pillars of 
international relations: sovereignty, equality, and independence. According to Article 7 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, states should refrain from intervening in one another’s internal 
affairs,218 and according to Article 2(4), states are prohibited from using force in their relations 
with one another.219 Of course, these restrictions are not absolute; international law includes 
two exceptions. The first exception is found in Article 51 of the Charter, which allows states 
to use force in cases of “self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations.”220 The second exception falls under Chapter VII, and it allows the Security Council 
to authorize intervention if the human rights violations intensify such that they threaten 
international peace and security. Humanitarian intervention as a response to calls for human 
rights violations might not be the best response, because it violates the principle of state 
sovereignty; also, state practices shows that states are hesitant to intervene. 
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Scholars argue that human rights law limits state sovereignty. John Rawls says, “[h]uman 
rights are a class of rights that play a special role in a reasonable Law of Peoples: they restrict 
the justifying reasons for war and its conduct, and they specify limits to a regime’s internal 
autonomy.”221 Joseph Raz does not reject Rawls’ statement but suggests that action should be 
in response to violations. He explains that, while we can take recourse in human rights in a 
variety of contexts and purposes, human rights practice often follows the trend of using a 
human right as a sufficient ground to take action against violators in the international realm.222 
Therefore, the action – to trespass on a state’s sovereignty – is permissible and that action is 
what distinguishes the importance of human rights as fundamental rights that trigger a 
response.223 Raz says that human rights are not rights that we all have in virtue of our humanity, 
but rather, they are universal rights that all humans share. He says that human rights are a 
political concept that paves the way for political measures; they are inherently moral rights that 
require legal-political protection.224 When we use the discourse of human rights, we are calling 
for intervention, and we are giving legitimacy to such actions. Human rights that are not backed 
by legal enforcement are not rights. In Raz’s view, if human rights do not generate action, then 
they have no power. He explains that moral rights cannot be considered human rights if legal 
processes lack the ability to fairly and effectively protect them. In my view, Raz’s statement is 
an exaggeration; human rights are moral rights and they are effectively protected by the value 
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they carry, not by the legal process that enforces them; otherwise, they would not be human 
rights – that’s how we understand human rights. The legal process that protects human rights 
comes from the power of the criminal law, not from human rights law. Human rights are ethical 
teachings that inform us about what is right and what is wrong for a given society, but – unlike 
criminal law – they do not provide for punishment. The remedies that can result from calls for 
accountability for human rights violations are precarious; they rely on the points of view of 
scholars and practitioners, while the remedies that can result from calls for criminal 
accountability are more significant. 
It has been argued that, in looking at the new trend of states’ practices, it is correct to say 
that intervention in state sovereignty is to be understood as an exception that states should be 
careful to take. In fact, statistics show that the international community refrains from using 
punitive language; instead, it leans more toward the use of preventive language. Gabriella Blum 
argues that, for the sake of peace over justice, UNSC-imposed sanctions against rogue countries 
are not considered to be a form of punishment, but rather, the sanctions are seen as preventive 
or regulatory actions.225 Indeed, if we look back at many of the UNSC resolutions on the Syrian 
file, we find that preventive language is what has been used; whenever punitive language has 
been used, the permanent members of the UNSC have vetoed the resolution; see, for example, 
the previously mentioned draft resolution to refer crimes in Syria to the ICC. 
 





Many scholars speak about the duty to obey the law as a prima facie duty.226 Let us 
examine how Christopher Heath Wellman perceives human rights in the context of 
humanitarian intervention: he says that we have the onus to “obey only the just laws.”227 Laws 
impose negative (and limited positive) duties on us; they require us to refrain from acting in 
ways we otherwise might. If we apply that to human rights, and if human rights are obligatory, 
then states should have no choice as to whether to intervene. If human rights are neither 
mandatory nor forbidden, and we have the freedom to choose, then “those acts that are required 
by justice are a subset of just (i.e., permissible) acts. Given this, insisting that there is no 
obligation to obey an unjust law is perfectly compatible with there being content-independent 
reasons to obey the law.”228 But, in comparison, criminal law does not give us the same 
flexibility. Instead, criminal law outlines which conducts are wrong and therefore require 
condemnation, and it provides conditions for perpetrators to be punished and called to 
account.229 Thus, calls for criminal accountability are more compelling than are calls for 
accountability for human rights violations. According to Clapham, the most practical reason to 
advocate for calls for criminal accountability is that the expression “crimes against humanity” 
facilitates a more meaningful response, especially from journalists and policymakers. The 
magnitude of the term and what it represents inspires action, rather than indifference or 
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inaction.230 When we use the language of the criminal law, we expect an account that responds 
to the wrong, as opposed to the harm; but, as Tanguay-Renaud says, “there is nothing in the 
idea of human rights that specifically calls for, or is intrinsically connected to, a punitive 
response. If sound, as I think it is, this further objection entails that the category of human 
rights is not only under-inclusive, but also over-inclusive, in terms of the wrongs it singles 
out.”231 Tanguay-Renaud explains that the difference between calls for criminal accountability 
and calls for accountability for human rights violations is punishment. Human rights might 
conjure parallels with the realm of criminalization. Given the illegality of human rights 
violations, the most significant missing variable that separates them from crimes is the notion 
of punishment. The message that criminal law gives is stronger because it holds a firm 
agreement among us (ordinary citizens, scholars, practitioners, and others), that some conducts 
are illegal and deserve punishment. When we use the language of criminal law, we highlight 
the fact that we will punish perpetrators at some point – if not now, then when circumstances 
allow. Tanguay-Renaud suggests that an important reason for this critical demarcation is that 
defining a wrongdoing as a crime is often understood to include a specific set of responses, 
including condemnation and punishment for the perpetrator, whereas human rights are moral 
norms and principles that embody values that describe standards of human behaviour – 
standards that we all share by virtue of our morals and by virtue of our membership in a polity. 
International human rights are important to every human being because they ground the 
standards that we all share. The main problem involved in using the language of human rights 
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is that human rights norms are moral claims. Human rights law does not, so far, provide 
penalties for violators in the same way that criminal law does. “[V]iolations of human rights 
are also generally thought to warrant collective marking and condemnation of their 
wrongfulness, as well as related, yet under-specified, interferences with the perpetrator’s 
affairs.”232 The language of human rights does not tell us what should be done if someone 
violates human rights, while criminal law does. Tanguay-Renaud suggests that the missing 
component is a central focus on punishment, a key response that is warranted when a criminal 
act is committed. Tanguay-Renaud’s analysis does indeed speak to the situation in Syria. Many 
people have called for the international community to respond to grave human rights violations. 
The international community has responded by taking some measures – such as condemnation, 
denunciation, sanctions, and boycotts – but the war continues nonetheless, and the crisis is not 
lessening. In fact, it is increasing by the day, although it is taking a slightly a different form. In 
March 2020, another wave of refugees fled Syria, riding death boats to other continents. 
Condemnation, denunciation, sanctions, and boycotts have not done much during the last nine 
years of the conflict. The message has not gone beyond that, and it has not helped. I argue that 
the situation may have been different if criminal measures were taken, instead of those of 
human rights. Calls for criminal accountability are calls waiting for a response, and that 
response is punishment.  
 
 






The first part of this chapter drew an overall picture of the ongoing Syrian conflict, explained 
its root causes, identified the parties on the battlefield, exposed the crimes that have been 
committed and continue to be committed, and assessed the consequences of those crimes on 
civilians, the refuge crisis, heritage, and health. Further, it categorized the conflict for the 
different parties and introduced the legal framework applicable to the conflict. The chapter 
established that, due to the current political and legal situation, holding perpetrators criminally 
accountable is unlikely to happen, because there are jurisdictional limits on domestic and 
international criminal institutions that would, otherwise, exercise criminal justice over crimes 
in Syria. I also explained that, although criminal accountability is unlikely to happen, Syrian 
citizens, governments, NGOs, scholars, politicians, human rights activists, and others are 
calling for it loudly. 
The second part of this chapter offered a normative evaluation of what might be an 
alternative to calls for criminal accountability in the midst of the civil war in Syria. It 
challenged the assumption that, if criminal accountability is not currently an option for holding 
criminals accountable, instead we might apply the human rights treaties to which Syria is party, 
and whose provisions imply certain measures that would respond to those who violate human 
rights. I evaluated this possible alternative to criminal accountability. I explained that calls for 
accountability for human rights violations have a declarative potential; they stress that there 
are grave violations of human rights taking place and that the international community must 





regard might include denunciation, condemnation, declaration, and even humanitarian 
intervention, but they do not include punishment. While human rights law provides a broader 
array of responses, criminal law provides punishment, which arguably is the appropriate 
response. 
However, this does not answer the question of this dissertation. The question remains: 
due to the unlikelihood of institutional criminal punishment, what is the point of calling 
wrongdoers to account? Should we stick with human rights law, and accept whatever remedies 
it can provide? I argue that we should not, that the language of calls for criminal accountability 
has a specific expressive value; namely, calls for criminal accountability express a message 
that says that, if we could, we would hold criminals accountable and we would punish them. I 
will argue that there is intrinsic value in calls for criminal accountability. 
The answer to this dissertation’s question will become clear in Chapter Three. But, before 
that, there are a number of critical arguments to which I turn next. These arguments are related 
to the ongoing debates among scholars about why societies punish, whether punishment is 
necessary, and what justifies the practice. Criminal accountability is not punishment per se, 
although punishment is, typically, the end goal of it. There are, however, other components to 
the criminal law system: fact-finding and trials, which also have key values. I will also discuss 
the authority problem, which asks: in the absence of willing and able domestic criminal justice 
institutions that can call wrongdoers to account, who else has the authority or the standing to 
do that? In a situation of war, when people are suffering from ongoing heinous crimes, is the 





much as it does in the domestic criminal justice system that exists in stable societies? I will 
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PART ONE: JUSTIFICATIONS OF CRIMINAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I explained the central question of this dissertation: given the 
significant unlikelihood of institutional criminal punishment, are there justifications for calls 
for criminal accountability in the midst of the ongoing Syrian war? In order to demonstrate the 
value of such calls, in this chapter, I will explain why criminal law is important. I have already 
claimed that human rights law does not function the same way as does criminal law, and here 
I will explain why criminal law is important and why, traditionally, criminal law has been 
perceived as important. 
Before delving into the justification for criminal accountability, I will deal with a critical 
issue that is directly related to the argument in this chapter, that is: whether the justifications 
for criminal accountability in the domestic criminal law are similar to those that justify 
international criminal law. That is: to what degree are justifications of criminal accountability 
in domestic criminal law felicitous to international criminal justice? 
I then begin with a discussion of the third component of the criminal justice system, 
i.e., punishment, where I first establish the nexus between it and criminal accountability. 
Punishment is feature that differentiates criminal law from other types of law. Citizens tend to 
focus on punishment as an end goal and as the defining feature of the criminal justice system; 





criminal accountability, they expect a criminal justice system to hold perpetrators accountable 
and punish them.  
While there are many theories that justify punishment, I will limit my discussion to three 
of the major theories: consequentialism, retributivism, and expressivism. The first two theories 
are traditionally understood as providing justifications for inflicting punishment. Each of them 
provides its own unique understanding as to why societies punish perpetrators. So, while 
consequentialists think of punishment as deterrence to future crimes (among other justifications 
that the theory provides), retributivists think of punishment as the just response to perpetrators, 
who must be punished for the wrongs they have committed. The third theory, expressivism, 
however, is considered to be the main justification for international criminal punishment. 
While punishment is a key element and the defining feature of criminal law, there are 
two other integral components that must be dealt with before anyone can be said to be 
legitimately punished. These components are fact-finding and trials. The general public tends 
not to focus on these components in relation to calls for criminal accountability because calls 
tend to focus on punishment, but they are part of any legitimate criminal justice system. As I 
will explain, the initiatives that have been taking place in absentia are limited to fact-finding 
and trials; they do not include the third component: punishment. And, as I have argued, while 
the war continues, there is no criminal justice institution in Syria that is both willing and able 
to perform the task of ensuring criminal accountability; in other words, there can be no 
impartial and fair trials at this time in Syria. In this chapter, I will explain the importance of 





In Part Two of this chapter, I will consider the problem of authority; namely, who has the 
authority to call others to account? Criminal justice institutions are one of the characteristics of 
stable societies, but where such stability does not exist and crimes are ongoing, the issue of 
which institution can take on the role of criminal accountability will be triggered. However, the 
question is: in situations of ongoing atrocity crimes, does it really matter who makes the call 
for criminal accountability? I will suggest that, if the state is unable to call wrongdoers to 
account, then whoever can do it, must do it, because justice requires it. After I have considered 
these issues in this chapter, I will turn, in the next chapter, to the components of the criminal 
justice system – fact-finding, trials, and punishment – to evaluate the justifications for calls for 
criminal accountability in the midst of the ongoing Syrian war. 
 Criminal Accountability on Domestic versus International Levels 
While the justifications for punishment at the level of international criminal law are similar to 
those at the domestic level, not all justifications that apply domestically, apply internationally. 
For example, individual (sometimes referred to as “specific”) deterrence and rehabilitation 
serve as justifications for domestic punishment; however, they do not apply internationally.  
The philosophy of international criminal law is borne from domestic criminal law. Many 
scholars take it for granted that whatever justifies criminal accountability at the domestic level 
also applies at the international level.233 But, as William A. Schabas says, international criminal 
law is often “little more than an afterthought.”234 We tend not to think about it as a distinct 
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system that stands by itself, but rather as a supplemental system that corresponds to society’s 
willingness to criminalize perpetrators only when the domestic system is unable or unwilling 
to do so. The ICC’s principle of complementarity – which aims to promote national 
proceedings, and insists that international proceedings will not intervene unless in the event of 
unwillingness or inability by the domestic justice system – well reflects that understanding.235 
However, there are certain justifications for domestic criminal law that cannot be understood 
in the same way for international criminal law. According to Robert D. Sloane, the ferocity of 
atrocity crimes makes any philosophical analysis “invite ‘intuitive-moralistic answers,’ making 
debate about the rationales for punishing serious human rights atrocities seem pejoratively 
academic.”236 So, one could argue that we should understand punishment at the international 
level within the general philosophical framework of domestic criminal law, but we should keep 
in mind the particularities and the circumstances under which international criminal law 
operates. That said, it is important to acknowledge the major differences between the two 
systems, i.e., the society to which each law speaks, the circumstances under which each 
operates, the nature of the crimes, the intentions of perpetrators, and the goals that each law 
seeks to achieve. 
Domestic criminal justice systems typically operate in monolithic societies, where 
citizens have shared moral values, history, political systems, and laws that guide and govern 
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them. Citizens may come from different ethnicities, religions, and origins, but arguably they 
have explicitly or tacitly agreed – by joining or remaining in the given society – to a social 
contract that defines their rights and obligations. So, arguably, whoever breaches the contract 
deserves the proper response. Women’s rights in Saudi Arabia, for example, are not similar to 
those in Canada, and although not all women in Saudi Arabia are happy about their society’s 
laws, they comply with them, having been raised to respect them. The international criminal 
justice system, in contrast, speaks to a metaphorical, heterogeneous society; those subject to it 
do not necessarily share a similar social contract, but rather have various understandings of 
certain values that might not suit other societies around the world. For example, what concerns 
me as a Syrian is not exactly the same as what concerns me as a Canadian. What is largely 
agreed upon, however, is our humanity; it is the common thing that unites us. No reasonable 
person, for example, disagrees that genocide is a heinous crime and that we must respond to it. 
Whereas societies might disagree on whether polygamy is a crime, reasonable people will not 
disagree about the criminality of genocide. International criminal law, then, plays the role of 
mediator between multiple societies. Sloane says that international criminal law “emerges as a 
system of proxy justice for the disenfranchised local community victimized by the widespread 
human rights atrocities. … At other times, we emphasize the interests and values of the 
figurative international community, either as a community of states or in terms of the more 
elusive, somewhat mystical, notion of a community of mankind, a civitas maxima.”237 
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International criminal law seeks to reconcile the interests and goals of both the international 
and domestic societies. It is a system that is put in place for the benefit of deprived local 
communities that have been subjected to rampant human rights atrocities. 
Another notable difference between the international and domestic justice systems is the 
types of the perpetrators with which each system must contend. In the domestic system, it is 
generally easier to identify those responsible for crimes. The international system recognizes 
that the collective nature of atrocity crimes is a major factor with respect to mitigating 
responsibility. It cannot punish every perpetrator; the difficulties of identifying and bringing 
perpetrators to justice are major challenges. Collective responsibility is “thought to diffuse 
moral responsibility, mitigating each perpetrator’s guilt in some proportion to that of the 
collective.”238 International criminal law cannot function exactly as does the domestic system. 
Punishment at the international level, while it serves public goals, is “a mere means to an 
end.”239 It should not be understood as achieving the same goals as does domestic law. In other 
words, at the international level, there will be no punishment that corresponds to the kind of 
wrong that war can cause. Cesare Bonesana di Beccaria, in his essay on crimes and 
punishments, provides the right nuance: 
If the passions, or necessity of war, have taught men to shed the 
blood of their fellow creatures, the laws which are intended to 
moderate the ferocity of mankind, should not increase it by 
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examples of barbarity …. Is it not absurd, that the laws, which 
detect and punish homicide, should, in order to prevent murder, 
publicly commit murder themselves? What are the true and most 
useful laws? Those compacts and conditions which all would 
propose and observe, in those moments when private interest is 
silent, or combined with that of the public.240 
The nature of international crimes is different from that in the domestic sphere. 
Punishment at the domestic level deals with a different set of circumstances than those that 
operate at the international level. For example, war crimes are associated with exceptional 
circumstances, i.e., war, and they are unlikely to be repeated.241 Moreover, the nature of the 
crimes with which each legal system deals is different. It would be extremely unusual for the 
domestic legal system to have to deal with war crimes. It offers different kinds of penalties that 
depend on the gravity of the crimes, while, so far, the penal response to international crimes 
has been incarceration.242 
Therefore, because the international criminal justice system operates and functions in a 
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different manner than does the domestic criminal law system, the values that justify it should 
be tailored to it. Although traditional values, such as deterrence and retribution are also 
justifications for international criminal accountability, one should understand them in the 
context of international crimes. Intentional criminal accountability aims as well to achieve 
several other values, including: preventing impunity, especially for high-ranking officials; 
addressing the rule of law and promoting justice; maintaining archives for historical purposes; 
compensating the wrongs of the past; maintaining international security; and encouraging 
peace. 
Finally, the international criminal justice system is, to a large extent, reliant upon politics. 
It is often the case that the ICC and international criminal tribunals do not have the legal 
jurisdiction to deal with international criminal cases without referral by the UNSC, which 
requires political will. And, of course, the Syrian file is an example where that political will 
has thus far been missing.  
 Punishment – The Nexus between Criminal Accountability and 
Punishment 
It is often thought that the rationale behind calling wrongdoers to account for criminal acts is 
ultimately the desire to punish them. People assume that the criminal justice system is designed 
to penalize wrongdoers and to remedy specific wrongs. And, while the criminal justice system 
is not solely about punishment, it is the end goal of the system, and it often represents the desire 





Some of the reasons for calling wrongdoers to account include communicating with 
them, listening to them, hearing their defence, and allowing a form of communication with 
their victims and witnesses. Communication generally happens through the process of a trial. 
Trials give wrongdoers an opportunity to confront the general polity as well, to explain 
themselves, and to say why they have contravened society’s values. Antony Duff explains that 
trials are more than a process that seeks the truth. Trials are a communicative process between 
(alleged) criminals, victims, witnesses, and society.243 Trials and investigations may, in fact, 
mean more to society than does punishment, and they might have values over and beyond 
punishment. While I do not deny the important of trials, I assert that, when people call for 
criminal accountability, their focus is on punishment, as the end goal of the criminal justice 
system and as a distinctive feature of it. The criminal justice system is concerned with the 
implementation of justice, and for most people, justice requires punishment. 
Imagine an old Syrian woman who loses her children. Her son is arrested, tortured, and 
killed, her daughter is raped, and her grandchild is kidnaped for trafficking purposes. This 
woman would feel resentment and would call for punishment. She might want to know the 
truth and she may want to listen to perpetrator’s defence, but her ultimate goal would that the 
defendant be punished; for her, punishment represents justice, and it’s the right response to her 
suffering. Sloane suggests that punishment is indeed a pronounced feature of criminal law, and 
it is through punishment that the system pursues and articulates both its practical and moral 
objectives.244 But, what is punishment? 
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Punishment has been defined as the “intentional incapacitation or infliction of pain by an 
authoritative institution on one who has been deemed liable to such treatment.”245 It is when a 
body, which claims authority, imposes something on an offender for a committed crime, and 
that something is intended to be both “burdensome and reprobative.”246 HLA Hart enumerates 
the following criteria to distinguish punishment: (i) Pain must be a component in the act of 
punishment. (ii) It must be related to an offence that breaks legal rules. (iii) “It must be of an 
actual or supposed offender for his offence.” (iv) It must be carried out by individuals who are 
not the offender, with an intention to cause suffering. (v) “It must be imposed and administered 
by an authority constituted by a legal system against which the offence is committed.”247 If 
punishment does not involve these criteria, then it is simply pain without purpose.248 
Punishment requires justifications in order to promote the purpose of imposing it. 
According to Duff, punishment is “morally problematic” and, unless it is justified, it is “morally 
wrong.”249 Criminal law philosophers often focus on the reasons that permit state punishment. 
Two major theories in the philosophy of law are retributivism and consequentialism 
(utilitarianism), and each, in their own way, advances punishment as a response to wrongdoing. 
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Consequentialism, advanced by John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, argues that 
punishment entails a mischievous and evil quality, and that it should only be used if it ensures 
the exclusion of a greater evil.250 Consequentialism takes a forward-looking approach, which 
means it considers that the aim of punishment is, in part, to prevent future crimes. Punishment 
must provide a “net social gain.”251 In that, consequentialism brings together moral and 
political values – “the arriving at a definition of ‘the good’ and with establishing a foundation 
for the role of government and the basis of political obligation in the modern state.”252 For 
consequentialists, punishment must do good for society overall, and must prevent evil. 
Retributivism, on the other hand, punishes offenders for the harm they have inflicted. It 
takes a backward-looking approach that focuses on offenders’ past actions, which means that 
punishment is inflicted in return for the wrong done. Retributivism justifies punishment 
inflicted upon offenders simply because they deserve it – it is the principle of just deserts.253 
Retributivists hold that the severity of punishment should be equal to the gravity of the offence, 
and they argue that it ensures justice and fairness better than do other theories, “because of 
predictions of future offending, predictions which may possibly be wrong and which are 
generally unverifiable.”254 Retributivism, assuring the reduction in “the scope of judicial 
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discretion, [is] used to punish people for their personal or social characteristics rather than for 
their crime, [which is appealing] to those who were concerned about race, gender or class bias 
in criminal justice.”255 While retributivists believe that punishment nullifies the wrong,256 their 
opponents deny that claim. 
The justifications that each of these two sophisticated schools of thought provide can be 
better achieved by merging them to reach a different understanding of why punishment is to be 
inflicted. In the “Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment,” Hart attempts to reconcile 
consequentialism and retributivism: 
On the one hand, the old Benthamite confidence in fear of the 
penalties threatened by the law as a powerful deterrent, has waned 
with the growing realisation that the part played by calculation of 
any sort in anti-social behaviour has been exaggerated. On the 
other hand a cloud of doubt has settled over the keystone of 
“Retributive” theory. Its advocates can no longer speak with the 
old confidence that statements of the form “This man who has 
broken the law could have kept it” had a univocal or agreed 
meaning; or where scepticism does not attach to the meaning of 
this form of statement, it has shaken the confidence that we are 
generally able to distinguish the cases where a statement of this 
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form is true from those where it is not.257 
Hart – noticing the distinct objectives of each theory of punishment – asserts that there is no 
single objective. Each justification’s objectives are pertinent at different times, explaining how, 
why, and who the state ought to punish.258 
Criminal law philosophy informs us of the different justifications for punishment. The 
following addresses only three major philosophies that justify punishment: consequentialism, 
retributivism, and expressivism. These are the philosophies relevant to domestic and 
international criminal justice. As I suggested earlier, I selected these three in particular for three 
reasons: these theories have made a major contribution to scholarly debates, they are the most 
citied justifications for international punishment, and they are relevant to both the domestic 
and international criminal justice systems.259  
 CONSEQUENTIALISM 
As stated, consequentialists understand punishment based on the good it produces and the evil 
that it wards off, hence the act of punishment should be contingent on doing good.260 
Consequentialists argue that punishment is in itself an evil, and so we must impose it in a way 
that promotes good, rather than simply adding to the evil of the wrongdoing.261 Punishment is 
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the instrument that promotes doing good, i.e., deterring future crimes.262 Punishment should 
deter on two levels: individual and general. Individual deterrence aims to prevent a specific 
offender from re-offending in the future, while general deterrence aims to dissuade a possible 
offender in society from committing a wrong in the first place. 
Consequentialists also recognize other justifications for punishment, such as 
rehabilitation and reformation. According to these values, punishment is meant to cause 
criminals to reform their behaviour, change their values, and prevent them from repeating their 
offences; these changes are thought to come about because wrongdoers come to understand 
that their behaviour was wrong. Rehabilitation is understood as a way to facilitate the 
reintegration of criminals back into society. One of the major differences between rehabilitation 
and reformation processes, on the one hand, and deterrence, on the other, can be assessed by 
the outcome; that is, if wrongdoers abstain from committing criminal acts due to fear of 
punishment, then punishment has served as a deterrent, but otherwise not.263 
Do these consequentialist justifications apply to international criminal justice? It is hard 
to make sense of rehabilitation and reformation as justifications for international criminal 
punishment. People tend not to care about reintegrating war criminals back into society; that is 
not the concern of a war-torn society. Rather, these two values pertain to domestic society, 
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which is concerned with reforming criminals and reintegrating them back into society.264 
However, whether international criminal justice has the power to deter is a controversial 
question. Punishment at the international level does not have the same preventive utility as it 
does at the domestic level. At best, the deterrence effect of international criminal law is 
uncertain. It is important to note that the preamble of the Rome Statute reflects states’ 
willingness to dissuade future crimes. “The States Parties to this Statute, … Affirming that the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go 
unpunished … Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and 
thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.”265 While the intention of the founding 
members when they established the ICC was clearly to deter future crimes, there is limited 
cause for optimism. Scholars are divided in their opinions, and supporters believe that the mere 
presence and the existence of a criminal justice institution plays a role in deterring would-be 
offenders. Larry May and Shannon Fyfe argue that, “the existence of [a] judicial system with 
the support of [the] international community and the legal authority to punish as an institution 
[is] capable of deterring future crimes.”266 For them, the wording, “to put an end to impunity” 
is the deterring aspect of the ICC. But, they themselves acknowledge the counter-argument 
that, while the Rome Statute refers to ending impunity, it does not specifically mention the 
deterrent effect of international punishment. 
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Since its inception, the ICC’s practices have not fostered the sense that it is capable of 
deterring wrongdoers. Looking at the recent case of Sudan’s former president, Omar al-Bashar, 
one comes away with the impression that there is little opportunity for criminals to be punished. 
al-Bashir remained in power for almost 10 years following accusations, after which the ICC 
finally issued an arrest warrant against him.267 While it is true that in 2019 al-Bashir was 
arrested and put on trial in the domestic courts in Sudan, and later the authorities handed him 
over to international justice to face charges of alleged crimes,268 the prolonged period between 
the time of accusation and the issuance of an arrest warrant in 2009 and his arrest for trial in 
2019 does not serve the Court’s intention of deterring others. If fact, it may have the opposite 
effect on leaders who are involved in heinous acts against their own citizens. After all, al-Bashir 
served as president during the 10-year period of the arrest warrant. He was able to travel freely 
to other states, many of which are signatories to the Rome Statute, and who had legal 
obligations to arrest him but did not due to their own political interests. It might not be the case 
that the ICC is unable to deter, but rather that the Court is politicized. As Immi Tallgren points 
out, given the special circumstances surrounding international criminal justice, it is hard to say 
that punishment has a deterrent effect.269 
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Apart from the political circumstances surrounding the institution of the ICC, there are 
obstacles in measuring the deterrent impact of the international criminal justice system. The 
“collective nature of most international crime [… makes] it hard to assess the specific deterrent 
effect on … [an] individual upon his/her release from prison.”270 Recent empirical studies 
suggest that deterrence varies among different groups. Hyeran Jo and Beth A. Simmons argue 
that calls for international criminal accountability promote the possibility of punishment. They 
found that punishment might deter some people from carrying out violations, particularly when 
the ICC flags its willingness to prosecute perpetrators. Jo and Simmons measured the ability 
of the ICC to deter, and they found that, when actors were susceptible to social pressure, they 
were more likely to be deterred. When actors are concerned for their legitimacy from the 
perspective of the domestic public and/or international community, the fear of an ICC 
prosecution will, more likely than not, deter them from committing crimes. According to Jo 
and Simmons, the ICC can hinder state actors, and it can also deter non-state actors who solicit 
for authenticity.271 Michael Patrick Broach measured the long-term deterrence effect of the 
ICC’s prosecution of non-state armed groups, and found that (i) ICC preliminary actions that 
take place prior to the issuance of indictments have insignificant effects on atrocities,272 while 
(ii) pending indictments have a propensity to exasperate atrocities, and (iii) indictments that 
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have been executed play a part in the prevention of atrocities.273 Mark Kersten studied the effect 
of the ICC on actors who are not targeted by the Court’s prosecution. He suggests that, 
“contrary to the criticism that the ICC leaves its targets with little to no incentive to negotiate 
a peaceful resolution to war, it is the non-targets of ICC interventions that often refuse to 
negotiate a peace agreement and who, in turn, commit to military solutions to the wars in which 
they are engaged.”274 In his study, he addressed the cases of Uganda and Libya, where he found 
that the ICC may have had a negative impact on non-targeted groups that will probably 
continue to be violent in the wars they fight. These studies suggest that the ICC’s deterrent 
effect appears to be “negligible,”275 and I would argue that, at best, it does not meet 
expectations. I believe that international criminal justice is capable of deterring crime, but only 
if politics allows it to work properly, a point I will develop more fully in Chapter Three. There, 
I argue that calls for the criminal accountability of high-ranking officials who are still in power 
do have a general deterrent effect. But, they are only calls for criminal accountability – they 
are not actual punishment. 
Consequentialists suggest that punishment has a forward-looking impact on individuals, 
but I argue that individual deterrence is not attainable through international criminal justice. 
After all, it is quite unlikely that criminals would re-involve themselves in genocide or crimes 
against humanity after the termination of a war. Andrew Oldenquist explains that “[t]he pursuit 
of Adolph Eichmann, Josef Mengele, and other Nazis in their dotage, tending their rose gardens 
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in South America, makes no utilitarian sense whatever. They will not do their crimes again, nor 
would their punishment deter others.”276 While I agree with Oldenquist’s claim that such 
individuals are unlikely to repeat their crimes, I believe that punishment does have a general 
deterrent effect, although perhaps quite a limited one. Scholars’ views on the deterrent impact 
of international criminal punishment are highly consistent: if it ever deters, it seems to have a 
more general and less specific or individual deterrent impact.277 Therefore, the deterrent impact 
of international criminal justice is, for reasons argued above, feeble and ambiguous, and cannot 
stand alone as a justification for punishment. 
 RETRIBUTIVISM 
Retributivists, in contrast to consequentialists, take a backward-looking view to justify 
punishment. They believe that offenders deserve to be punished because of their wrongdoing. 
There is a vindicatory connection between past crime and current punishment. That connection 
is expressed by the concept of desert; “crimes make punishment appropriate.”278 Wrongdoers 
deserve to suffer pain because they are responsible for morally wrong acts and so they are 
deserving of blame. The responsibility stems from the clear intentional behaviour of 
committing crime.279 
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Punishment for retributivists must be morally “good” and proportional. While 
proportionality means that those who are wicked deserve to suffer pain that is proportional to 
their wickedness,280 retributivists understand the moral good to be that someone who merits 
punishment gets it. Hence, punishment of the blameworthy is “an intrinsic good, not the merely 
instrumental good that it may be to the utilitarian.”281 And, because it is morally acceptable to 
punish criminals, societies have a moral obligation to punish those who contravene its laws.282 
Retributivists establish the connection between punishment and morality, but there is 
some internal disagreement about what the justifications of punishment are.283 Michael S. 
Moore calls it “closet retributivism,” pointing to the fact that not all retributivists hold similar 
understandings of the values of punishment. In the following, I will use some of the retributivist 
theory’s accounts that justify punishment. 
Some retributivists think of punishment as the payback principle, which historically has 
its roots in the lex talionis of biblical times, which calls for an eye for an eye, a tooth for a 
tooth, and a life for a life. This idea can be linked to another account that justifies punishment, 
which is the claim that offenders should be made to suffer, but that suffering is not revenge. 
Defenders of this argument say that suffering might be good because of the positive 
psychological impact it can have on victims of crime. Moore rejects such thinking, claiming 
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that this is an inaccurate depiction of what retributivism stands for. Rather, a retributivist should 
advocate punishment of all criminals who merit it, regardless of whether victims desire it.284 
Similar to the consequentialists’ approach, some retributivists think that punishment has 
reformative value. Briefly, when offenders repent their crimes, they recognize the importance 
of reforming their conduct in the future.285 Another account used to justify punishment is the 
idea of fairness. The claim is that offenders have wrongfully acquired a favourable position 
and punishment offsets that unfair advantage. Punishment restores equality; it restores the 
equilibrium that was disturbed by the offence. Kant says: 
It is just the principle of equality, by which the pointer of the scale 
of justice is made to incline no more to the one side than the other. 
It may be rendered by saying that the underserved evil, which any 
one commits on another, is to be regarded as perpetrated on 
himself. Hence it maybe said: “if you slander another, you slander 
yourself; if you steal from another, you steal from yourself; if you 
strike another, you strike yourself; if you kill another, you kill 
yourself.” This is the right of retaliation.286 
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Herbert Morris advocates a similar approach. He is in favour of punishing those who take unjust 
advantage of the laws, which occurs when a “person who violates the rules has something 
others have – the benefits of the system – but by renouncing what others have assumed, the 
burdens of self-restraint, he has acquired an unfair advantage. Matters are not even until this 
advantage is in some way erased.”287 If offenders believe themselves to have impunity, they 
will be less prone to respect and accept the burdens of self-restraint. 
The question that follows is: to what degree do retributivist justifications obtain at the 
international level? Many believe that international criminal justice is deeply mirrored in 
retributivism improvisations. Mark A. Drumbl argues that the predominant objective for 
punishment of atrocity crimes – at both the international and national levels – is retribution.288 
However, for many reasons, it is difficult to reconcile the retributivist theory as it pertains to 
international punishment. For example, how would the principles of proportionality and the 
just deserts of punishment work at the international level? In the domestic system, the length 
and severity of a sentence varies, depending on the severity of the crime, but it is not possible 
to apply that same proportionality to international crimes, which are extraordinary in nature. 
Incarceration has, so far, been the only response to atrocity crimes at the ICC level – a response 
that is far less severe than the atrocity crimes to which this punishment responds. The 
conditions of imprisonment do not compensate for the severity of international crimes. In fact, 
it would be difficult to imagine a punishment that could respond proportionally to the 
viciousness of international crimes. For a sentence to be truly proportionate, it would have to 
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include acts of torture and annihilation. Proportional, in that sense, would indeed be terrifying; 
it would ultimately lead to punishers becoming as depraved as perpetrators.289 
Another challenge is to be able to understand the principle of “just deserts” at the 
international level. As mentioned, unfortunately justice often intertwines with politics when it 
comes to international criminal justice. The question of who deserves punishment and who 
does not is not always a matter of law; rather, sometimes, it is a matter of political interests. 
Drumbl points out that too few individuals and/or entities receive their just deserts: many 
powerful states, organizations, and not-so-innocent bystanders are exempted from criminal 
responsibility.290 Certain limitations to international criminal justice (such as its limited 
financial and human resources) make it difficult to argue that the retributivism theory’s goals 
can be fully attained, and certainly not to the extent that they can domestically. The 
circumstances surrounding international criminal institutions, particularly the ICC, might 
change with time, but it is still a new institution that needs time to develop, especially in the 
way it deals with political interference in its decisions. Although there are some institutional 
limits related to the ICC, international criminal justice maintains many of the retributivist 
justifications, such as just deserts, payback, fairness, and equality. 
 EXPRESSIVISM 
In the previous two theories, namely consequentialism and retributivism, I questioned 
whether and to what degrees do the justifications of these two theories pertain at the 
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international level. However, the expressivism theory is, in fact, understood as the main theory 
that justifies punishment on the international criminal justice level. The tendency among 
philosophers is to justify international punishment based on the value it expresses. Therefore, 
the following is not going to follow the methodology that has been conducted earlier in the past 
two theories. Instead, I will go through the roots of the theory itself and then its values as 
justified by scholars on both the criminal law philosophy and the international criminal law 
philosophy. So, how do expressivists justify punishment? 
While there is a tendency to think of punishment as a physical hardship, expressivists 
argue that it is more than a mere physical burden. Punishment expresses a message: it sends an 
emotional or oral censure that punishes. Punishment has a symbolic value, and that is what 
differentiates it from other kinds of penalties, say, fines. Punishment intends to condemn 
wrongdoings through the messages that it expresses. Joel Feinberg writes: 
[P]unishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of 
resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and 
reprobation, on the part either of the punishing authority himself or of those 
“in whose name” the punishment is inflicted. Punishment, in short, has a 
symbolic significance largely missing from other kinds of penalties.291 
Inflicting punishment involves two components: society’s denunciation, and the unpleasant 
outcomes of it. The unpleasant outcomes express society’s denunciation or condemnation, and 
 





this expression is the key element that distinguishes punishment from other hard treatment. 
Feinberg distinguishes hard treatment from its symbolic significance, arguing that there are two 
imaginary components of punishment, that is, its “hard treatment” and its symbolic 
significance. Authentic cases of punishment involve both characteristics. To claim that the 
physical burden is the component that expresses condemnation is basically to say that specific 
kinds of hard treatment are the standard symbols of societal reprobation. Hard treatment alone 
is not necessarily adequate for that symbolic condemnation. Feinberg asserts that: “(1) both the 
hard treatment aspect of punishment and its reprobative function must be part of the definition 
of legal punishment; and (2) each of these aspects raises its own kind of question about the 
justification of legal punishment as a general practice.”292 
Expressivism is not so different from the more traditional theories of punishment.293 It 
argues that punishment is right because it helps to ensure that the public maintains a sufficient 
faith in the rule of law, rather than because it serves as a deterrent or because wrongdoers 
deserve it.294 For expressivists, in punishment, there is an effort to publicly affirm a story of 
wrongdoing through trials and sanctions in order to quash the reverence of violence.295 Through 
punishment, expressivists aim to alter criminals’ behaviour, spread specific values, and educate 
offenders.296 
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Theorists, such as Duff and David Garland, explain that wrongdoing merits censure, and 
that censure sends both a backward-looking view of condemnation of the wrong that has been 
committed as well as a forward-looking view. They explain that the expressivist theory 
provides a foundation for a more realistic ideation of retributivism that can express the 
justifying relationship between punishment and crime or, in other words, the wrongdoing and 
condemnation that the wrongdoing deserves.297 However, retributivism holds that punishment 
combines morality and pain, while expressivism holds that the purpose of punishment is to 
express society’s disapproval. In Feinberg’s words: 
[C]ondemnation is expressed by hard treatment, and the degree of 
harshness of the latter expresses the degree of reprobation of the 
former; still this should not blind us to the fact that it is social 
disapproval and its appropriate expression that should fit the crime 
and not hard treatment (pain) as such. Pain should match guilt only 
insofar as its infliction is the symbolic vehicle of public 
condemnation.298 
This view is contrary to that of retributivists, who understand the principle of proportionality 
in the context of punishment, which means that the extent of disapproval conveyed by the act 
of punishment should be proportional to the crime, to the extent that more serious crimes are 
more strongly disapproved of than crimes less serious in nature.299 Therefore, the gravity of the 
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offence is determined by the total hurt it causes. Expressivists, in general, do not embrace the 
principle of proportionality. Expressivists believe that punishment is a moral educator; it deters, 
it corrects the equilibrium between victims and criminals, it communicates with criminals and 
others, it seeks apology, and it strengthens the rule of law. Let us examine each of these values. 
The value of the victim – recognition of the victim’s suffering and correcting the 
equilibrium. Jean Hampton does not believe in mere harsh treatment as a response to 
wrongdoing. Hampton develops her sophisticated ideas based on the understanding that both 
the crime and the punishment express messages. In committing their crimes, criminals are 
sending a message of degradation to victims. An action is wrong because it expresses 
something to the person who is harmed.300 Punishment, in return, expresses repentance for the 
crime. Punishment works to restore the equilibrium between victims and criminals that was 
upset by the wrongdoing. The physical component of punishment is not Hampton’s concern; 
for her, punishment does not necessarily mean that people must be treated harshly or 
incarcerated. Rather, punishment could be achieved through humiliation, and that is in itself a 
cause of suffering.301 Expressivists care about the messages that both crime and punishment 
send, as Jeffrie G. Murphy explains: 
One reason we so deeply resent moral injuries done to us is not 
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simply that they hurt us in some tangible or sensible way; it is 
because such injuries are also messages – symbolic 
communications. They are ways a wrongdoer has of saying to us, 
“I count but you do not,” “I can use you for my purposes,” or “I 
am here up high and you are there down below.” Intentional 
wrongdoing insults us and attempts (sometimes successfully) to 
degrade us – and thus it involves a kind of injury that is not merely 
tangible and sensible. It is moral injury, and we care about such 
injuries.302 
The idea of a person’s intrinsic worth (the Kantian approach) implies that we are 
beholden to respect one another, and in that sense, we are all equal.303 When offenders commit 
wrong, they are attempting to degrade or diminish their victims.304 Hampton argues that 
“diminishment is the normal result of an immoral action and that which constitutes the moral 
injury inflicted by a wrongdoing. Therefore, it is the damage or ‘loss of value’ that wrongdoing 
inflicts.”305 With this understanding, punishment restores the balance between victims and 
offenders; that is, it restores the equilibrium. Hampton views retributive punishment as the 
victim defeating the wrongdoer, which is symbolic of the “correct relative value of the 
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wrongdoer and victim.”306 Punishment symbolizes the process whereby the subjugator changes 
roles with the victim, and is now the one who is subjugated and dominated. Punishment sends 
a message that the two parties – victim and wrongdoer – are now equal; the victim can do to 
the wrongdoer what the wrongdoer did to the victim. This form of reciprocity is humbling for 
the wrongdoer and usurps the position of power the wrongdoer once had over the victim. Both 
the crime and the punishment have an expressive symbolic value; as the crime diminishes the 
victim, punishment diminishes the wrongdoer, thereby restoring the previous balance between 
them.307 In that sense, punishment is understood to be the recognition of the victim’s suffering 
and a correction or restoration of the equilibrium that the crime damaged. 
Seeking apology – communication. The expressivist value has a communicative aspect. 
Duff’s thesis is that the guilty commission generated by wrongdoing disregards society’s moral 
values and offends fellow citizens. It also undermines the wrongdoer’s normative connections 
to the victim.308 Punishment, according to this account, is: 
[A] communicative process between the offender and the polity: it 
aims to communicate to the offender the censure that his crime 
deserves; to bring him to recognize and repent that crime as a 
wrong for which he must make moral reparation; to bring him to 
make that reparation by undertaking or undergoing a burdensome 
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penalty which constitutes and communicates a forceful apology to 
those he has wronged; and thus to reconcile him with the 
community whose values he flouted.309 
Duff argues that punishment is an activity of moral communication, which conveys to 
wrongdoers the need to own up to and feel remorse for their wrongdoings, to change their 
behaviour, and to compensate and to seek forgiveness from those they have victimized.310 
Punishment then serves several goals: (1) to send a message to offenders regarding the 
magnitude of censure that their crimes warrant, (2) to convince wrongdoers that the censure is 
justifiable, (3) to convince wrongdoers to reform their future behaviour so as to prevent such 
wrongdoings in the future, and (4) to reconcile wrongdoers with their victims by providing 
restitution to those who have been harmed. Duff explains that an important distinction in the 
communicative theory is the emphasis on moral reparation for moral wrongdoing, in addition 
to material reparation. Integral to such moral reparation is an expression of remorse: the 
punishment that wrongdoers receive can be seen, to some degree, as a necessary public apology 
that is symbolic in nature. That statement of remorse is to be made to both victims and to the 
entire polity, whose values the wrongdoer has spurned and who partake in the evil that is 
inflicted on victims. 
Although the “hard treatment” aspect of punishment, for many expressivists, is less 
important than its censure aspect, Duff argues that both are essential components of the 
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communication between criminals and victims. The hard treatment aspect “should serve both 
to assist the process of repentance and reform, by focusing his attention on his crime and its 
implications, and as a way of making the apologetic reparation that he owes.”311 Of course, 
Duff’s view is not shared by all scholars; some criticize his account because they argue that it 
is unable to demonstrate why punitive hard treatment is an important aspect of his theory, which 
nonetheless regards wrongdoers as dependable, with most being released after completion of 
their sentences. 
Punishment as moral educator. In her 1984 essay, Hampton introduced the moral 
education theory, criticizing the retributivist understanding of punishment as deserved evil that 
must be inflicted upon wrongdoers. For Hampton, punishment is, in fact, good for whomever 
experiences it. In Hampton’s view, punishment has an educative value: societies punish 
criminals to educate them, i.e., “to improve a wayward person.”312 By way of example, 
Hampton likens punishment to electrified fences: through the utilization of a painful barrier, 
people are taught that there are barriers or limits to their actions.313 This is different from 
deterrence because the goal of punishment, in this account, is not to simply avert criminals 
from traversing that “barrier”; instead, the goal is to educate them about the rationale behind 
the barriers and what will happen if they attempt to cross them.314 The moral education account 
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is neither a rehabilitative nor reformative account; it simply argues that evil merits 
correction.315 Hence, correction is conceptually necessary in order to affirm victims’ equivalent 
value with respect to their wrongdoers. Hampton argues: 
[P]unishment is not intended as a way of conditioning a human 
being to do what society wants her to do (in the way that an animal 
is conditioned by an electrified fence to stay within a pasture); 
rather, the theory maintains that punishment is intended as a way 
of teaching the wrongdoer that the action she did (or wants to do) 
is forbidden because it is morally wrong and should not be done 
for that reason. The theory also regards that lesson as public, and 
thus as directed to the rest of society. When the state makes its 
criminal law and its enforcement practices known, it conveys an 
educative message not only to the convicted criminal but also to 
anyone else in the society who might be tempted to do what she 
did.316 
Hampton later came to see some flaws in her original argument for the moral educative theory, 
recognizing that teachers cannot force their students to listen and understand. Thus, she 
acknowledged that there are many criminals for whom an educative message would not be well 
received, including sociopaths, ideological radicals, and amoral risk-takers.317 
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However, the moral education theory has found support from many other theorists on 
both the domestic and international levels. Sloane argues that criminal law has a function to 
shape, strengthen, and instill values to foster the development of internal restraints that are 
habitual in nature.318 Punishment expresses a message that can change not only the attitude of 
the offender, but also that of society in general. Payam Akhavan underscores that international 
justice contributes “through the moral propaganda of international criminal justice.”319 With 
time, international justice will be able to work as an educator to change the attitude of society 
in general. Disapproval of genocidal crimes will assist in generating internal restraints against 
major human rights violations, and “[c]oncerns for justice, customarily at the periphery of 
decision making, will converge increasingly with mainstream pragmatism such that 
accountability for war crimes will become a matter of course.”320 According to this account, 
calls for punishment are important because they send strong messages of condemnation and 
stigmatization in an effort to change offenders’ behaviour. 
General deterrence. I previously provided some empirical studies that demonstrate that 
in international law the deterrent effect of punishment is ambiguous, and that punishment might 
deter only certain groups in society. Drumbl, however, suggests that expressivists go further 
than retributivists with respect to the traditional deterrent justification.321 For expressivism, 
deterrence is concerned with the hindering impact of the message that punishment expresses to 
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society, as opposed to deterrence of specific or potential perpetrators. Messages point to crimes, 
to legal rules that have been violated, to victims’ disapproval, and they communicate with the 
wider society. The message says, “[i]f the judicial body were to convict and punish an innocent 
or punish too severely, doing so would represent community values that would be very different 
than those represented by convicting the guilty and punishing her in a manner that could be 
deemed balanced.”322 The message fits the degree of disapproval that is expressed by society 
about the kind of crimes committed. According to Feinberg, “the degree of disapproval 
expressed by the punishment should ‘fit’ the crime only in the unproblematic sense that the 
more serious crimes should receive stronger disapproval than the less serious ones, the 
seriousness of the crime being determined by the amount of harm it generally causes and the 
degree to which people are disposed to commit it”323 The deterrent effect eliminates the 
impunity gap and rejects the violent behaviours behind it. In the words of Drumbl: 
Punishment can thereby impede the early indoctrination phases in 
which average citizens become assimilated into the machinery of 
mass violence. This objective of punishment differs from deterring 
individuals from killing after they have become habituated into 
killing by desire or desperation. Whereas it seems problematic to 
deter – through fear of distant and deferred punishment – violence 
once it is imminent or has already begun, it seems somewhat more 
plausible to inhibit the mainstreaming of hatemongering as politics 
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owing to the consolidation, through law and punishment, of a 
social consensus regarding the moral unacceptability of such 
politics.324 
Punishment as a deterrent tool expresses a message that is meant to fit the condemnation and 
the censure that the crime deserves. 
Strengthening the rule of law. Garland suggests that penalty, punishment, and 
institutional practices send a moral message that is far beyond physical hardship. It strengthens 
the rule of law and speaks to audiences. Garland argues that punishment conveys meaning not 
only about crime and sentencing, but similarly about “power, authority, legitimacy, normality, 
morality, personhood, social relations, and a host of other tangential matters. Penal signs and 
symbols are one part of an authoritative, institutional discourse which seeks to organize our 
moral and political understanding and to educate our sentiments and sensibilities.” These moral 
messages offer a consistent set of commands as to in what manner we should understand good 
and evil, and the legitimate and illegitimate. Condemnations help to convince us what to 
denounce and how to categorize wrongdoing. And, they provide a language with which to do 
so.325 Messages of condemnation help us to identify social authority, maintain order and a sense 
of community, locate social dangers, and they provide direction about how to feel regarding 
such matters. They open the door to a way of thinking about crimes as a set of broader debates 
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about the rule of law, politics, moral values, and social systems. They reinforce the power of 
law within society.  
 Trials 
Criminal justice is, of course, not entirely about punishment; while it is the end goal for those 
who have been found guilty, other components – namely, trials and fact-finding – come into 
play before there is any possibility of achieving that goal. Trials involve prosecution by an 
authority or public body whereby defendants are held to account. This is where the question of 
guilt is adjudicated, in the presence of all interested parties: offenders, victims, and society. 
Although the concept of a trial is not far removed from the idea of punishment, it is 
independent from it. There is more to be said about why we want to call people to account over 
and above the possibility of them being punished, which has value in itself. Societies utilize 
both trials and punishment to communicate disapproval and to have a moral discourse about 
wrongdoers’ conduct. In their “calling to account” theory, Duff, et al. question the meaning of 
the criminal trial. They argue that it is: 
[A] process through which defendants are called to answer a 
charge of criminal wrongdoing and, if they are proved to have 
committed the offence charged, to answer for their conduct. If the 
defendant is found not only to have committed the offence, but to 





holds him to account for his wrongdoing.326 
Duff et al. believe that trials are about communication between society, victims, and criminals. 
Thus, much knowledge is acquired through active participation in the trial process.327 A trial is 
about calling people to account so they can explain themselves to us, the polity. We think they 
have done something wrong that has hurt us and endangered our values, so we want wrongdoers 
to tell us why they did what they did, i.e., to justify their actions. In this sense, trials are 
opportunities for defendants to challenge how society defines criminal wrongs, “including the 
norms in the light of which those accusations are made.”328 It is wholly possible to imagine 
such challenges in cases of ongoing conflict when wrongs are sometimes committed to prevent 
greater wrongs. Trials are important because they give defendants the opportunity to consider 
their conduct and accept the charges. They allow defendants to participate in a dialogue 
regarding the fairness of the charges, and perhaps to have them accept society’s 
condemnation.329 
Criminal trials are public, except in rare circumstances when there is an extraordinary 
need for privacy. Trials have a value that is not only instrumental to punishment, but is also 
about calling wrongdoers to explain their wrongdoing and to tell society what happened, that 
is, to help society to find the truth. People are generally interested in knowing the truth, and 
sometimes trials do serve that purpose, even when punishment is not at issue. Duff et al. suggest 
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that, because victims need to be recognized, they need to know the truth.330 Consider the 
following scenarios: (1) If A dies without being tried, and possibly punished, people might 
understandably feel that A has escaped justice, especially if his wrongdoing was a grave one. 
(2) If A dies after being tried, but before being punished, it is less likely to be thought that A 
escaped justice, as at least he faced a criminal trial. In this manner, “even where there are 
significant effects to which we can point in explaining why the trial matters, their value depends 
on the value of the truth that the trial aims to establish.”331 Therefore, there is a rational reason 
that trials matter, over and above the punishment that may ensue. 
A trial, as Duff et al. suggest, should not be seen as merely a discreet procedure to seek 
the truth. There are reasons that trials and the trial procedure are important. Consider the 
following scenario: If A was wrongly convicted, A might want to clear his name and refurbish 
his reputation in the eyes of the public. A might not want the public to consider him to have 
done wrong. A may want others to consider his actions to have been lawful. So, reputation and 
public condemnation are also values to be found at trials. 
Calling to account involves calling defendants to participate in trials and to answer for 
the wrongs for which they are responsible. Duff et al. note four objectives that participation 
can provide: (1) It is a way to seriously consider the wrongdoing and classify it as a 
wrongdoing.332 It is a way to repair the damage or provide compensation for the damage. (2) It 
is a means through which wrongdoers are taken seriously, and at the same time, it ensures that 
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they are treated with respect.333 (3) It is a way to convince wrongdoers to accept the verdicts 
and their consequences.334 (4) It involves a shared language, whereby accusers can call to 
account and defendants are given the opportunity to answer. Imbedded in this shared language 
is an expression of the shared values and understandings through which wrongs can be 
discerned and characterized, as well as a means through which responsibility and liability can 
be argued and attributed.335 To call wrongdoers to answer is to call them to participate in a 
judgement procedure on the premise of an arrangement of values that society evidently shares 
with them. Without trials, we cannot demand explanations from wrongdoers for their actions. 
But, the polity must first define what constitutes a “wrong.”336 
Truth-telling is not exclusively the responsibility of defendants. The trial procedure must 
enable wrongdoers to confront their accusers and other parties of the polity who may be 
involved in the trial process, for example, witnesses; “there would be a clear contradiction in 
calling on you to answer in person to us, but refusing to face you ourselves.”337 Thus, trials 
entail a mutual responsibility, whereby both accusers and defendants must each prove 
themselves right.338 
A trial is a forum in which accusers, victims, witnesses, and society in general participate 
in the decision-making process. Accusers have specific tasks in calling wrongdoers to account: 
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they participate in decisions of whether or not to charge wrongdoers, and they are responsible 
for questioning defendants. As noted, trials involve prosecution by an authority or public body; 
defendants answer to that authority, and not directly to victims, who may or may not be 
merciful. It is society’s values that are at issue, not those of victims, given the unlikelihood that 
victims can be impartial. A fundamental basis of the criminal justice system is that trials are 
public. It is necessary that there be public concern, and that the concern regarding criminal 
conduct is not solely based on victims’ preferences.339 At the same time, trials provide the 
opportunity to hold not just defendants, but also accusers accountable, insofar as accusations 
might turn out to be unfounded. The purpose of the trial is not merely to establish the truth 
regarding the accused’s conduct; rather, the aim of establishing the truth is imbedded in a 
broader process of accountability that is applicable to all actors involved in the trial.340 Duff et 
al. argue that the calling to account theory “can provide a more plausible rationalisation in 
terms of the idea that the trial is a forum in which a citizen is formally called to answer to the 
polity for an alleged criminal wrong – to answer to the charge that she committed such a wrong, 
to answer for that wrong if it is proved against her.”341 That said, they do admit that their 
account is not always adequate.342 
A third component of the criminal justice system, quite apart from punishment and trials, 
is fact-finding. Fact-finding is the way the criminal justice system determines whether a wrong 
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has been committed. It should be understood as including investigation and documentation, 
and I turn to this next. 
 Fact-Finding 
Fact-finding is a major component of the criminal justice system, and it is as important as are 
trials and punishment – in fact, trials and punishment depend on fact-finding. Suspects cannot 
be called to trial or held to account without procuring evidence of their wrongdoing. Knowing 
the facts is important for many reasons, and those reasons go beyond trials and punishment.343 
It is important to secure and keep records of facts so that future generations can refer to them. 
Fact-finding delivers a moral message: it deters, educates, and condemns. Moreover, there are 
additional important justifications for fact-finding that I will explore in this section. 
The Declaration on Fact-Finding by the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance 
of International Peace and Security defines fact-finding as: “any activity designed to obtain 
detailed knowledge of the relevant facts of any dispute or situation which the competent United 
Nations organs need in order to exercise effectively their functions in relation to the 
maintenance of international peace and security.”344 The term “Fact-finding” is often used 
interchangeably with other terms, such as documentation, record-keeping, investigation, 
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inquiry, and examination, although not everyone agrees that the meanings are identical.345 Fact-
finding activities fall under the ambit of international human rights law and practices, but the 
field is under-theorized.346 Literature and scholarship are developing, but at this stage they are 
still descriptive and uncritical.347 For my purposes, when I use any of these terms, the meaning 
will be the same: “any activity designed to obtain detailed first-hand knowledge of the relevant 
facts of any dispute or situation.”348 
Domestically, it is the police that are tasked with investigating crimes. As part of the state 
criminal justice system, the police have their own policies, standards, and procedures that they 
use to respond to domestic crimes. This is also true at the international level where every 
international criminal institution conducts its own investigations. However, investigations can 
also be conducted by human rights commissions, intergovernmental organizations – whether 
international or domestic – state-run commissions, and international NGOs. Ordinary 
individuals, for example, citizens who may have witnessed wrongful conduct, can also conduct 
fact-finding activities.  
Fact-finding organizations can often be of assistance to both domestic and international 
investigators and if they do assist, they have to ensure that the results of their finding are of the 
same quality as the work carried out by those investigators. For facts to be accepted by courts, 
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the investigations must be conducted under certain conditions and with approved methodology. 
Documentation collection and investigation must be conducted according to established and 
accepted criteria. Not just anyone can do it. The most internationally credible body is the 
International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission (IHFFC), which carries out 
investigations of possible violations of IHL. The IHFFC was established in 1991 and stems 
from principles of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, established in 1977. 
The IHFFC is tasked to: 
i) [E]nquire into any facts alleged to be a grave breach as 
defined in the Conventions and this Protocol or other 
serious violation of the Conventions or of this Protocol; 
ii) [F]acilitate, through its good offices, the restoration of an 
attitude of respect for the Conventions and this Protocol.349 
The IHFFC has been fairly inactive since its inception; in fact, some call it “sleeping beauty.”350 
For that reason, many states rely on ad hoc commissions for their investigations and 
documentation, such as the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon, the International Commission 
of Inquiry in Guinea, and the International Commission of Inquiry on Côte d’Ivoire.351 These 
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commissions take several forms and go by various names, for example, fact-finding 
commissions, commissions of inquiry, and truth commissions. Some of these commissions – 
for example, the UNHRC, the Council of Europe’s Human Rights Commissioner, and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights – have become quite routinized,352 and may operate 
during both peace and conflict situations. 
Although there is no unified international methodology or codification of the process of 
fact-finding, international organizations endeavour to develop certain standards to respond to 
cases of human rights violations. Their officers often conduct site visits to ascertain evidence 
of human rights violations, and to check the validity of such allegations. They endeavour to 
collect credible testimony by interviewing witnesses and their families, as well as the heads of 
local councils, government personnel, and anyone else who can provide information that helps 
to get to the truth.353 Investigators then endeavour to substantiate the information collected, 
write reports that establish responsibility for violations, and finally make recommendations.354
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The primary purpose of fact-finding is to objectively ascertain the events that unfolded and to 
ensure that facts are substantiated.355 A determination of the facts will ultimately involve an 
evaluation of numerous sources of information, and it will serve the purpose of identifying and 
bringing to light the circumstances, causes, and repercussions of a particular incident.356 Fact-
finding provides society with the opportunity to know what happened during a conflict, to 
authenticate actions that constitute violations of international human rights law, and to weigh 
the truth behind contradictory allegations by different parties in the conflict. 
Fact-finding has an educational role.357 The documents we acquire help to educate the 
community. In the opinion of Steven R. Ratner, Jason S. Abrams, and James L. Bischoff, fact-
finding commissions are likely to produce a more comprehensive and truthful picture of abuses 
that have taken place; this picture will be more complete than that produced by a trial, which 
merely focuses on the possible guilt of a smaller subset of defendants.358 The acquired 
knowledge helps the public to condemn such oppressive behaviour. 
Fact-finding is also valuable for historical purposes. Documents provide an archive for 
future generations; we want them to know how vicious these crimes were in order to help 
prevent recurrences. “Leaving an honest account of the violence prevents history from being 
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lost or re-written, and allows a society to learn from its past in order to prevent a repetition of 
such violence in the future.”359 Telling the story of what has happened and sending the message 
that such abuses should not happen again is vital. However, some commenters, such as Marko 
Milanović, who looked at the case of the former Yugoslavia, argue that each side of the conflict 
will, in the end, stick to its own truth.360 
The process of fact-finding implies the right to knowledge. According to Article 19 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “everyone has the right … to seek, receive and impart 
information,”361 and the process of fact-finding is what allows people to obtain knowledge 
about what happened.362 Documentation enhances public credibility about the reported crimes 
and therefore it reinforces the rule of law.363 It advances justice by asserting moral censure, as 
well as the possibility of setting the foundation for other sanctions that may follow, particularly 
in situations where documentation ascribes responsibility for abuses that have taken place.364 
Documentation also promotes human rights and stresses the fact that breaching these rights 
should not go unnoted. Fact-finding also plays a deterrence role, as such missions help to 
prevent future crimes. False allegations that remain undisputed for a long period of time tend 
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to incite resentment between communities and hostile actors, which may in turn lead to acts of 
retaliation.365 
The fact-finding process has a therapeutic role. By giving victims and their families the 
opportunity to tell what happened, and involving them in the investigation process, we not only 
give them the sense that we care and accordingly acknowledge what happened to them and the 
suffering they faced, but we also provide therapeutic support for them, even if actual 
punishment of perpetrators does not take place.366 As Martha Mino argues, “the attempts to 
destroy groups of people cannot succeed in destroying their memory.”367 Thus, giving a full 
account of victims’ suffering potentially prevents their involvement in future abuses. However, 
as Shiri Krebs warns, fact-finding reports should be neutral, because emotional and cognitive 
biases have the ability to sway people’s reactions to data regarding war crimes carried out by 
people from their own countries.368 Inflammatory documents may lessen the credibility of the 
allegations about crimes, and eventually will be less effective in any accountability process. 
Fact-finding missions also play a useful part in civil society campaigns for change. Civil 
society groups keep records of human rights abuses to pressure and to generate public support 
against certain misbehaviour, as well as to call on the international community to react to 
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particular situations. Fact-finding missions help to name and shame,369 which Suzanne 
Katzenstein describes as “the process of exposing, publicizing, and condemning human rights 
abuses.”370 Naming and shaming is one of the central strategies that human rights defenders 
use to promote respect for human rights, and to discredit perpetrators and call for their 
accountability. Matthew Krain argues that naming and shaming is intended to put pressure on 
perpetrators in order to lessen the severity of atrocities, and, in turn, the spotlight will be shifted 
away from them, their identity will be re-framed, pressures from international actors will be 
alleviated, and they will be able to preserve their international and national legitimacy.371 
Naming and shaming uses information sourced from verifiable reports regarding the abuses 
committed, and it frames perpetrators as parties who cannot be trusted, and who have violated 
international standards.372 Naming and shaming campaigns deliver messages of condemnation 
to offenders and their supporters, and they damage offenders’ reputations. In addition, they 
pressure other states in the international community to take sides, change their strategies, and 
act upon the knowledge instead of being bystanders. Katzenstein asserts that naming and 
shaming accomplishes an additional task, i.e., a dynamic “rhetorical entrapment”373 that may 
encourage instrumental commitment to human rights standards. 
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However, some scholars see no reason to believe that the process is effective; instead, 
they argue that the impact of naming and shaming is exaggerated and perhaps even counter-
productive. Ironically, it may put repressive governments under the spotlight and push them to 
continue their atrocities; it could escalate the very abuses it attempts to stop, and indeed it might 
generate additional forms of abuse.374 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton supports this opinion, arguing 
that there is variance across types of violations, in terms of the capacities of governments to 
make human rights improvements. Additionally, “governments are strategically using some 
violations to offset other improvements they make in response to international pressure to stop 
violations.”375 Naming and shaming has had an insignificant impact on the improvement of 
human rights. For two reasons, Cullen S. Hendrix and Wendy H. Wong advise that, for naming 
and shaming messages to be effective in promoting human rights, they must be direct 
communications with offenders. First, “targeting violators bypasses Western policymakers, 
who have conflicting interests in violator states, and in doing so recognizing the legitimacy of 
target states even as specific practices and condemned.”376 Second, direct communication with 
violators creates common understandings of abuses, and it has ability to draw violators’ 
attention to the fact that their violations are no longer private and unobserved.377 Having a 
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dialogue with offenders could have a positive impact insofar as it may lead to a change in their 
abusive attitudes. 
In certain circumstances, fact-finding can foster peace or reconciliation. Fact-finding 
commissions provide recommendations pertaining to past abuses, which is usually the limit of 
their missions. But they do not punish; it is courts that hold suspects accountable.378 The parties 
to conflicts tend to make peace as a result of the work of fact-finding commissions; for 
example, this happened during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which at one point had a 
very limited chance of making peace. The UN peacekeeping forces established a human rights 
investigations unit, which made a critical contribution to peace efforts by putting pressure on 
the parties that moved the peace talks forward. The fact-finding process is essential so that key 
actors, such as the UN, can put pressure on the parties to comply with their obligations outlined 
in peace agreements. Fact-finding can be very effective in encouraging warring parties to enter 
into peace talks during conflict.379 
To this point, I have explained that the criminal justice system is comprised of three 
components: punishment, trials, and fact-finding. I have discussed several theories that justify 
and understand the value of each of those components. Understanding these theories and 
justifications is crucial insofar as it will help, in Chapter Three, to assess the justifications for 
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calls for criminal accountability in the midst of the Syrian conflict. However, before that 



















PART TWO: THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY 
 WHO HAS THE AUTHORITY TO CALL TO ACCOUNT? 
In this part, I consider the issue of who has the authority to call to account? Criminal justice 
institutions are one of the crucial characteristics of a stable society. When crimes take place, 
criminal institutions initiate investigations, collect evidence, document facts, hear from 
witnesses, and prepare cases. Upon completion the previous steps, suspects are called to trials 
and, if they are found guilty, they are punished. However, when a state lacks stability, crimes 
are ongoing, and criminal justice institutions are absent, the question of who has authority is 
triggered. As I explained in Chapter One, criminal justice institutions that could hold 
perpetrators accountable for crimes in Syria are absent. Domestic criminal institutions typically 
make calls for criminal accountability. But, in Syria, who has the authority – or more precisely, 
the standing – to hold perpetrators to account? Moreover, is the question important, i.e., does 
it matter who does the calling to account during an ongoing war? In stable societies, such a 
question would itself be surprising. Why would one even think of it if the criminal just system 
were doing its job properly? But, in cases where crimes are ongoing, the authority question will 
certainly arise. Should the principle of legitimacy in instable societies be measured similarly 
to ordinary justice in stable societies? Is there room for exception? Not asking the authority 
question will make any analysis of calls for criminal justice vague. Therefore, I address the 
question in an effort to understand how and in what way scholars have dealt with it. 
In his book, The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of 





that “justice would cease to be justice if it were bartered away for any consideration 
whatever.”380 Kant’s approach to justice is such that it prioritizes it even if a society decides to 
abolish itself. He says: “Even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of 
all its members – as might be supposed in the case of a People inhabiting an island resolving 
to separate and scatter themselves throughout the whole world – the last Murderer lying in the 
prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out.”381 For Kant, even if the 
society metaphorically dissolves itself, justice is required. Does a similar analysis apply to 
societies that are in the midst of ongoing conflict, societies that lack a criminal institution to 
call to account? Should citizens undertake the task if no authority exists? 
Let’s start by considering why only the state – not private entities or citizens – is 
permitted to handle criminal justice. In commercial, civil, and family arbitrations, the parties 
are free to choose their own arbitrators – arbitrators who settle disputes based on the evidence 
and arguments presented by the parties, and apart from the state courts. But this is not the case 
in criminal courts. Retributivists and consequentialists alike agree that criminal justice must be 
pursued by the state; it is the duty of the state to maintain criminal justice institutions that would 
call supposed wrongdoers to account, to try them, and to punish them if they are found guilty. 
This traditional conception of the state’s mission comes from John Locke, who argues that the 
state is indeed the proper actor. 
I easily grant that civil government is the proper remedy for the 
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inconveniences of the State of Nature, which must certainly be 
great where men may be judges in their own case, since it is easy 
to be imagined that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an 
injury will scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it.382 
John Rawls too agrees that it is the state’s duty to carry out criminal justice. “[A] person is said 
to suffer punishment whenever he is legally deprived of some of the normal rights of a citizen 
on the ground that he has violated a rule of law, the violation having been established by trial 
according to the due process of law, providing that the deprivation is carried out by the 
recognized legal authorities of the state.”383 There are several preconditions for wrongs to be 
corrected before a criminal justice institution, including that such correction must be conducted 
in accordance with the due process of law and carried out by the state (the recognized legal 
authority). Criminal justice is therefore part of the state’s activities and it is solely responsible 
for it for a number of reasons. First, there are instrumental justifications, i.e., the state is the 
right entity to criminalize wrongdoing because of its deliberative and impartial nature.384 The 
state is more capable than are other entities or actors to determine the just response to 
misconduct. The state strives to maintain proportionality between the severity of a crime and 
the severity of its punishment. Also, state justice is cost effective. Second, there is the normative 
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justification: although the state might not necessarily be successful in operating its criminal 
justice institutions, “it is a noncontingent normative precondition for the just infliction of 
criminal punishment.”385 Third, there is a state-centred justification: the state is the best entity 
to determine the objectives that should be achieved in a particular society.386 
All are rational reasons, but what if the legal authority is absent, i.e., unwilling or unable 
to handle this task? What if it is biased? Even scholars who insist that the state is the right entity 
to carry out the criminal justice function might find these questions challenging. Alon Harel 
suggests that the normative precondition usually associated with stable societies may not be 
the ideal justification in cases where the state is significantly unstable – say, in a state of change 
or transformation.387 Duff also suggests that the state has the moral standing to condemn 
criminals.388 However, in his political community account, he moves away from that idea to 
pose a question: “[W]ho has the standing to call her to answer for her alleged crime?”389 There 
must be a requirement, that is, a prerequisite that must be considered. He says, “to be 
answerable is also to be answerable to someone or something.”390 It might be family, friends, 
bosses, or co-workers who call a person who commits blameworthy behaviour to account, but 
strangers cannot require answers. For example, work-related matters are not the rightful 
business of those who are outside of the work sphere. So, whoever calls wrongdoers to account 
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must possess the standing to do so. Without such standing, it would not be possible to 
effectively try or judge defendants. Without standing, the state is unable to convict, acquit, or 
make decisions about whether defendants are deserving of the punishment.391 Duff argues the 
point thusly: X was called to trial to answer the court in relation to specific charges. The court 
represents the community of which X is a member, so it is the community that is trying him. 
But, what if the community has no standing? If parents ask one of their children not to hit his 
sibling, but the parents themselves sometimes hit their children, the child who the parents seek 
to hold accountable might claim that the parents “lack … moral standing.”392 They are not in a 
place to impose judgement or to punish their child, but not because hitting is permissible, rather 
because they themselves lack respect for the values they are asking their child to endorse. An 
analogous case would apply in relation to a community, Duff suggests. The legitimacy of the 
court (that represents the community or the state) is questionable if it does not respect the law 
or if it “lacks the standing”393 to hold defendants accountable. Therefore, based on Duff’s 
account, the state must not only have standing, but must also have the legitimacy to hold 
defendants to account. 
The other account comes from Victor Tadros, who argues that punishment is justified 
because of its general deterrent impact on society. The idea is that, because of their conduct, 
wrongdoers have a duty to protect victims from future intimidation by others – other possible 
wrongdoers. In Tadros’ opinion, victims have the right to hold wrongdoers accountable. His 
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question, then, is whether that means that the state should hold wrongdoers accountable in order 
to help victims. And what would happen if victims do not wish to punish wrongdoers? Can the 
state’s duty to punish perpetrators turn on the preferences of victims? Of course, many would 
claim that the state is the entity that must decide whether to punish, regardless of the victim’s 
wishes. Tadros suggests, “the victim may have a right that the offender is punished, and she 
may have a duty to authorize punishment of the offender.”394 Still, does that impose a duty to 
punish on the state? “Yes,” is Tadros’ straightforward answer. The state’s duty to punish is 
deduced from our rights and obligations as citizens of the state. We have a collective 
responsibility to face and eliminate serious threats against our society, and we are obliged to 
rescue each other from such threats. We grant that responsibility to the state so that it can 
maintain criminal justice institutions on our behalf in such a way that we meet our 
responsibility to protect each other. Tadros asserts that “[t]he duties of the state to punish are, 
in this way, simply grounded in the duties that each person has to protect: the duty to protect 
future potential victims of crime, but also the duty to protect offenders from being harmed more 
than necessary to avert these threats.”395 If so, does the state exclusively have the duty to 
punish? What if the state chooses not to punish wrongdoers? Is it permissible for victims to 
punish their wrongdoers? Based on Tadros’ claims, victims have the right to punish their 
wrongdoers, but should they carry that out themselves? Tadros argues that, unless the state is 
incapable of taking on that role, the state remains the sole institution that should punish. 
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So, the question is whether other entities – aside from the state – should be authorized to 
undertake the task of criminal accountability and, if so, under what conditions. For Tadros, the 
answer relies upon how just the state is and if it is in the position to undertake that task, in 
comparison to other bodies. In normal circumstances, states are best placed to handle justice; 
individual punishment and non-state punishment is not as effective as state punishment. For 
reasons already mentioned, and others on which Tadros relies, the state is the entity with the 
available resources, with greater capacity to identify offenders, and the entity most suitable to 
handle justice. State justice supports and develops social cohesion, which is a critical part of a 
state’s stability.396 However, if a state is unable or unwilling to punish, or if its punishment is 
ineffective or disproportionate, then, in Tadros’ opinion, private punishment is permissible: 
If individuals can protect themselves to an equal or greater extent 
by punishing the wrongdoer individually, without imposing any 
greater cost on the offender or others, she may be permitted to do 
that rather than authorizing the state to do so. Individual 
punishment will, in that case, be preferable to state punishment.397 
Of course, operationalizing private punishment would be difficult, and, as stated, undesirable 
for states that are stable, i.e., those states that have functioning criminal justice institutions. 
Private punishment might take the form of an international institution that may have the 
 






capacity to deal with the enormity of the task. But, as Tadros alludes, private punishment would 
be acceptable only in extraordinary cases, i.e., “where states are either ineffective or unjust.”398 
In international criminal justice, the questions of who may call wrongdoers to account 
and questions about the legitimacy of international criminal institutions are always under the 
spotlight. David Luban, assessing the principle of legality in international criminal law, argues 
that the legitimacy of international tribunals stems from their ability to practice fair procedures 
and punishments. In other words, it is the quality of justice that grounds the tribunal’s 
legitimacy,399 i.e., tribunals must embrace the principles of natural justice, which he eloquently 
lists as including: 
the right to a speedy, public trial before an impartial tribunal that 
bases its decision solely on the evidence, under rules designed to 
reach accurate verdicts; the right to offer a defence; the right to be 
informed of the charges, in a language that the accused 
understands, through a written indictment that specifies the 
charges and the conduct charged; the right of the accused to 
confront the witnesses against him; the right of the accused to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour; the right 
to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination; and the ban 
on double jeopardy (ne bis in idem). Natural justice also includes 
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the right to appeal; and it includes familiar duties of prosecutors: 
to pursue cases only when there is probable cause, to disclose 
exculpatory evidence to the accused, and more generally, to seek 
justice rather than victory. Finally, it includes humane conditions 
of confinement and reasonable punishments.400 
The legitimacy of criminal justice institutions comes from their fairness, not from the political 
authority that establishes them; in other words, justice should exist regardless of any political 
interests. Luban explains that, in the absence of a world governance structure that is in a 
position to authorize international tribunals, such as the ICC, international tribunals must 
impose their authority through a strict adherence to natural justice.401 If there are no specialized 
institutions to take on the role of imposing criminal accountability, international tribunals must 
take it on, even if they lack standing. 
Luban considers the principle of legality as it pertains to international as distinct from 
domestic criminal law. He argues that the issue of legality is a feature of domestic criminal law, 
but not one that is central in international criminal law; “the centre of gravity in international 
tribunals lies in the trial, not the punishment, punishment following conviction remains an 
essential part of any criminal process that aims to project a no-impunity norm.”402 International 
trials aim to send the message that mass atrocities are taking place and that we must respond to 
them – that is what provides international trials with their standing, their authority. Luban 
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argues that concern for the “despotic abuse of the power to punish,” and for fair notice – two 
arguments that inspire the principle of legitimacy – are less persuasive in international criminal 
law than they are in domestic criminal law. Regarding the argument about government abuse, 
Luban explains, “when a state with no political axe to grind against the defendant and whose 
jurists aren’t under the thumb of politicians prosecutes great crimes under a UCJ [universal 
criminal jurisdiction] statute, the Principle of Legality loses its central place in the pantheon of 
legal values.”403 As for the fair notice rationale, Luban believes that the law exists to guide 
people’s actions, so it would be mere mockery to try supposed perpetrators based on retroactive 
law – law that did not exist at the time of the “wrongdoing” – or based on hazy legal principles 
tailored to disfavour wrongdoers.404 For Luban, in cases where the state is absent, unable, or 
unwilling to take on the criminal justice role, the principles of natural justice justify other 
institutions stepping in. So, if the state cannot call wrongdoers to account, then whoever can 
do it, must do it, because justice demands it. 
Duff, however, criticizes Luban’s approach of grounding the legitimacy of international 
institutions in the principles of natural justice. Duff instead concentrates on the moral 
legitimacy and authority of international institutions. He asks who has the standing to call 
perpetrators to account. He says that suspects will legitimately ask, “who are you to call me to 
account?,” and moreover that it’s insufficient to reply that suspects have been called to account 
because of their conduct. Tribunals must have standing in order to make such calls; they must 
be able to show that they are acting on behalf of those to whom the accused is answerable. Duff 
 






suggests that international tribunals act “in the name of humanity.”405 Our “shared humanity”406 
provides the standing that tribunals need in order to call suspects to account for their crimes. 
When domestic criminal justice institutions fail, international criminal justice institutions must 
act in their names. 
 CONCLUSION 
In Chapter One, I described the question with which this dissertation deals, as well as the 
obstacles surrounding holding perpetrators to account for crimes in Syria. And, I have argued 
that human rights law does not function in the same way as does criminal law, and thus the 
former is insufficient in dealing with war crimes. Calls for criminal accountability direct our 
attention to punishment; it is often assumed that the criminal justice system is designed to 
penalize wrongdoers and to remedy specific wrongdoings. In other words, it is assumed that 
calls for criminal accountability are ultimately calls for punishment. Perhaps it is thought that 
wrongdoing must be punished because retribution has intrinsic value, or because punishment 
has a deterrent effect, or because punishment expresses society’s values. In the end, without 
justification, punishment is an unacceptable burden insofar as it entails harsh treatment. 
Therefore, in this chapter, I have discussed the values of the criminal justice system when its 
components – fact-finding, trials, and punishment – complement one another. I have addressed 
three different theories, each of which justifies punishment in its own way. I have referred to 
the literature on both domestic and international criminal law. 
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In the fact-finding process, the system adopts certain standards and procedures to find 
evidence about criminal wrongdoing. Using his or her discretion, the prosecutor then refers 
suspects to the court, which has jurisdiction. The court then examines the evidence, listens to 
victims and witnesses, and punishes perpetrators if they are found guilty. Each of three 
components to the system has its own values and justifications, and they complement one 
another. What distinguishes punishment is that it is the response that people expect when they 
call for criminal accountability, and it is what gives such special significance to the criminal 
justice system. It is the element that distinguishes the criminal law response from the responses 
of other kinds of law, for example, human rights law. As I have demonstrated in this chapter, 
punishment carries values that are defined differently by the different theories. 
Retributivists perceive punishment as the correct response to wrongdoing, in proportion 
to the seriousness of the wrongdoing. They argue that punishment is about desert; wrongdoers 
deserve the hard treatment of punishment. While retributivism is the predominant objective of 
international criminal punishment, I argue that there is also value in consequentialism and 
expressivism. Consequentialists believes that punishment must hinder the bad and promote the 
good in society in general and for perpetrators in particular; therefore, punishment’s main value 
is deterrence, whether general or specific. Expressivists advocate that punishment works well 
to correct the wrong that crimes cause by correcting the equilibrium between victims and 
perpetrators; punishment restores the pre-crime balance between victims and perpetrators. For 
expressivists, punishment has a communicative aspect that works to reconcile wrongdoers with 





While criminal accountability, as we know it, is tied to the idea of punishment as an 
appropriate remedy for wrongdoing, the criminal justice system has other important 
components that must be pursued before imposing punishment. These components are trials 
and fact-finding, and they embody values over and above punishment. Trials involve 
prosecuting wrongdoers before authoritative bodies that have jurisdiction, and that can 
adjudicate guilt. In trials, wrongdoers are called to account – to explain themselves – to the 
polity. Sometimes, trials are more meaningful to society than punishment itself. Trials have 
their own rationales because they seek to find the truth. People generally prefer to maintain 
their good reputations among their peers, and trials provide wrongdoers with the opportunity 
to explain themselves. Because defendants have done something that society thinks is wrong, 
society needs to hear their explanations. Trials are more than a process that seeks the truth; 
trials are a communicative process that involves defendants, victims, witnesses, and society.407 
Therefore, trials have a value that goes beyond punishment.  
The Fact-finding process is where the facts of a given case are objectively ascertained. 
Fact-finding informs the polity about what has happened during a certain conflict, and it 
provides an important record of events, one that is essential during the prosecution process. 
Facts provide a historical archive because they authenticate conduct that has violated the law. 
Fact-finding educates the community, which will then endeavour to prevent repetition of 
similar wrongdoing in the future. The fact-finding process promotes human rights law and its 
application, it reinforces the rule of law, and it deters future wrongdoing. Sociologically 
 





speaking, fact-finding is valuable insofar as it gives victims and families the opportunity to tell 
their stories; thus, it can provide therapeutic support for both victims and the polity. 
Furthermore, fact-finding allows for the naming and shaming of perpetrators, and thus 
generates public support for victims, and may even foster peace and reconciliation. Fact-
finding educates future generations so as to lessen inhumane and immoral wrongdoing from 
occurring in the future. 
In this chapter, I have dealt with the question of who may call to account in the absence 
of a credible domestic criminal justice system. In situations when there are ongoing war crimes 
against civilians, does it really matter who makes the call for criminal accountability? 
According to some scholars, if no state institution exists to ensure criminal justice, then the 
natural justice approach may justify alternative institutional practices. To be precise, if the state 
is unable or unwilling to call wrongdoers to account, then whoever can do it, must do it, because 
justice demands it. 
The theories presented in this chapter apply to fully functioning criminal justice systems; 
but, as we know from Chapter One, while the conflict in Syria rages, it does not have a 
functioning criminal justice system. Thus, punishment is unlikely to happen in this war-torn 
country. War crimes are ongoing and there is no credible domestic criminal justice system in 
place. Moreover, there is no clear non-domestic criminal justice system that has the jurisdiction 
and the standing to make enforceable legal decisions that could hold suspects of atrocity crimes 
accountable. The current Syrian circumstances that preclude punishment include: 1) the war is 





punishment; 3) international criminal institutions have no jurisdiction over crimes against 
civilians in Syria. Unless the political circumstances change, perpetrators are therefore unlikely 
to be punished. So, is there any value in making calls for criminal accountability? 
Building on the discussion in this chapter, the next chapter will answer the question of 
this dissertation: given the significant unlikelihood of institutional punishment, are there 
justifications for calls for criminal accountability in the midst of ongoing Syrian war? I will 
use the theories and the literature discussed in this chapter to assess the values that have been 
expressed by calls for criminal accountability. I will argue that, when we call for criminal 
accountability, we are referring to the possibility of punishment, and that possibility is valuable 













CHAPTER THREE: ASSESSMENT  
 Introduction 
In a perfect world, when the state is politically stable, and when its apparatuses are functioning 
as they should, calls for criminal accountability find their responses in the criminal justice 
system. The system provides fact-finding and investigation of crimes, it calls suspects to trials 
and, if suspects are found guilty, the system punishes them. In Chapter Two, I provided the 
justifications for each of three components of the criminal justice system in stable societies. 
However, as I explained, not all of the justifications that apply in the domestic criminal justice 
system apply internationally. Many scholars argue that international criminal law borrows its 
philosophy from domestic criminal law; in other words, it is something of an “afterthought.” 
What international criminal law lacks, significantly, is the third component – that of 
punishment.  
As is well-established, Syria is a war-torn county where crimes are ongoing and there is 
no jurisdiction for a credible criminal justice system to hold suspects of atrocity crimes 
accountable. As established in Chapter One, calls for criminal accountability during the 
ongoing war have been loud and insistent, coming from Syrian citizens, foreign governments, 
intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, international lawyers, scholars, politicians, human 
rights activists, and many others. But, given the significant unlikelihood of institutional 





The Syrian case reveals a lack of political will to refer the crimes to the UNSC, which 
could, in case of international atrocity crimes, draft a resolution to refer the case to the ICC or 
to establish a special international tribunal. But, since the Syrian government is not a signatory 
to the Rome Statute, the ICC does not have jurisdiction over crimes in Syria. Ideally, domestic 
courts would be the best place to investigate crimes within their territories, but in the case of 
Syria, the domestic criminal justice system is both unwilling and unable – it is not impartial, 
given that the Syrian government stands accused of war crimes. So, without standing for 
international courts to investigate, and without a willing and able domestic criminal justice 
system, there is an impasse. Given the impasse, what is the value of calls for criminal 
accountability?  
Fact-finding efforts are taking place internationally. Organizations such as the COI and 
the IIIM are investigating and documenting the crimes in order to provide the UNSC and the 
international community with enough evidence to call perpetrators to account. But courts tend 
not to call suspects to account unless they have jurisdiction to do so, even under the principle 
of universal jurisdiction. While some measures have been taken with respect to the principle 
of universal jurisdiction by states in Europe, these measures are not expected to go beyond 
issuing arrest warrants against suspects; in the Syrian case, suspects include high-ranking 
officials who reside in Syria and are unlikely to leave the country and thus expose themselves 





Omar al-Bashir, who was accused of war crimes. The ICC failed to seize him, although, at the 
time, he was travelling freely among the territories of state parties to the Rome Statute.408  
Given the unlikely possibility of punishing war criminals during the ongoing Syrian war, 
let’s try a thought experiment. Let’s imagine that the al-Assad government wins the war and 
that the political situation remains the same, meaning that the prospect of punishment is almost 
nil. The question remains: is there any value in issuing calls for criminal accountability? For 
such calls to be credible, they must have a normative connection to possible avenues of justice. 
But, in the absence of such avenues, what would be the point of these calls? Are they even 
justified?  
In this dissertation, I argue that calls, even in the absence of a criminal justice system 
with which to deal with them, are intrinsically valuable because they express a willingness to 
punish perpetrators. Calls open up the possibility of punishment. Although calls are not as 
strong as punishment, they carry similar values. Calls do not punish, but they aim to create the 
possibility of punishment. The language that is expressed by these calls for criminal 
accountability has value to societies. Moreover, calls have encouraged the process of pursuing 
criminal liability, which is another reason that they are important. 
As I stated in Chapter One, my overarching goal in this dissertation is to open the debate 
for a new way of thinking that can contribute to the philosophy of criminal law. Using the case 
of the ongoing conflict in Syria, I aim to establish an account of criminal accountability that 
 





merits the language of calls for criminality, even where physical punishment is unlikely. This 
proposed account is important because it opens the door to criminal law being able to respond 
to the era in which we are living. Our modern lifestyle is increasingly virtual, and punishment 
may too transform from its physical form to a more virtual one. During COVID-19, courts have 
started to take a virtual form, and it is conceivable that punishment might similarly transform. 
In situations where physical punishment is unlikely, its moral values remain. I argue that 
punishment is not only about its physical aspect. Although that aspect is important, there are 
moral values associated with calling someone as criminal; it is not punishment as we know it, 
but it delivers some of the same values. As the world shifts to become increasingly online, the 
philosophy of criminal law must adapt. 
In Section II, I provide what I argue are the justifications for calls for criminal 
accountability in the midst of the ongoing war. Also, I set out the reasons that the messages 
expressed by calls are valuable.  
In Section III, I suggest the kind of messages that calls send and I identify who has 
standing to call criminals to account for crimes in Syria in the absence of criminal institutions. 
I argue that using the proper message is essential. I argue for using the language of criminal 
law as opposed to the language of human rights; by labelling the violation a “crime” and the 
violator a “criminal,” we change the message from one that condemns human rights violations 
but that has undefined legal responses, to a message that expresses the willingness to punish 
perpetrators. Calls send the message – to criminals, victims, local societies, and to the 





behaviour, and, moreover, that the time will come when perpetrators of atrocity crimes in Syria 
will be held accountable. Crimes hurt us and they violate the values that we all share as human 
beings. Whoever violates these values, violates our humanity. Therefore, I argue that our shared 
humanity is what provides the standing for our calls for criminal accountability. 
In Section IV, I highlight what has been achieved as a result of calls for criminal 
accountability in Syria, and I argue that, even given the unlikelihood of physical punishment, 
the process of pursuing criminal liability is nonetheless valuable. Calls put pressure on the 
international community to advance the criminal justice file on Syria, as is evident by some 
states’ responses – such as the cases in Europe and the US’ Caesar Syria Civilian Protection 
Act.  
 Justifications of Calls for Criminal Accountability in Syria 
In the previous chapter, I pointed to the justification for the criminal justice system when all of 
its components complement one another. In this section, I will argue that, even if the system is 
unable to function as it should, there are nonetheless justifications for calls for criminal 
accountability in the midst of conflict. I suggest the following goals. 
Calls aim to send a message to criminals that they should be punished because of the 
wrongs they have committed, i.e., punishment is their just deserts. Calls inform them about the 
wrongs they have done, convince them to accept condemnation, and deter them from 
committing crimes in the future. Calls also send a message of acknowledgement to victims – 





society wants to alleviate their pain, and payback offenders for the suffering they have caused. 
Calls inform offenders that their wrongdoings are abhorrent, that they should feel remorse, that 
they should seek forgiveness from those they have wronged, and that they should compensate 
their victims and do what they can to correct their wrongdoings. Calls aim to send a message 
of apology to victims and to society. If calls are able to achieve these goals, they will help to 
bring about cohesion to the society in conflict. That itself has value during times of conflict. 
Calls serve as a moral communicator between victims, criminals, and society. They 
reveal the wrongs and open channels for communications and confrontations. They also send 
a strong message to the international society: never again! As David Luban states, “The 
fundamental message of international criminal norms is that the Great Game of politics, deeply 
embedded in the human condition, must never again cross moral lines that heretofore it has 
always crossed.”409 Calls for accountability embrace the moral message that there are lines that 
must not be crossed, and that message itself enhances trust in justice and the rule of law. 
Based on Kant’s notion that all human beings have intrinsic worth, and on Jean 
Hampton’s account, calls for criminal accountability aim to reinstate the value of the victim. 
They aim to correct the equilibrium that has been upset by atrocity crimes. When parties to the 
Syrian conflict commit their atrocity crimes – attacking victims with chemical weapons, and 
other heinous crimes – they send a message of degradation to those victims, telling them that 
they worth less than perpetrators, that perpetrators have a higher standard, and that their lives 
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are worth less. Calls to account respond with a message that wrongdoers should repent their 
crimes. Calls are symbols that aim to correct the pre-crime equilibrium; they are an effort to 
rebalance the relationship between perpetrators and victims. Despite the fact that the war in 
Syria continues, these calls have value. They convey the message that, despite the fact that 
punishment is not possible during the ongoing war, it will happen when the war is over. They 
send a message of condemnation. 
Calls for criminal accountability aim to serve as a long-term moral educator to 
perpetrators in particular, and to society in general. They aim to have a long-term role in 
influencing, improving, and teaching values, which aim to promote the advancement of 
habitual and internal limits. Although the Syrian war is ongoing, calls for criminal 
accountability express a message that attempts to change not only the attitudes of criminals, 
but also those of society in general. That change may not be immediate, but in the long run 
calls work as a moral educator because they send a strong message of condemnation and 
stigmatization to change the mainstream view of how we should react to heinous crimes and 
prevent them from recurring. 
Calls for criminal accountability have a historical justification that goes beyond 
punishment. Although Syrian war criminals may never be punished, the major goals of calls 
for accountability include producing chronological narratives, verifying those narratives as 
truth, and disseminating those narratives to the public.410 Calls aim to prevent future crimes. 
 





They aim to reduce undesirable behaviour, point out wrongdoing, and discredit perpetrators – 
even if they are never punished. They aim to promote morality, and to increase insight.411 
Calls uphold a cultural aspect or “a cultural performance – which communicates with a 
variety of social audiences and conveys an extended range of meanings.”412 Although audiences 
in the international community might disagree about who is responsible for crimes, calls point 
out the wrong. Calls make us aware of the conduct of war, they promote the rule of law, and, 
more importantly, they aim to avoid normalization of mass atrocities. They make it difficult 
for the audience to forget about the crimes. They encourage additional justice-like practices, 
looking to avoid legal gaps that might allow perpetrators to evade criminally accountability.413 
Calls for criminal accountability aim to investigate wrongful practices in order to prevent 
perpetrators from enjoying impunity. Calls aim to stamp red marks in the minds of the public, 
showing that in Syria there are grave crimes against humanity being committed, and if not 
immediately, one day when the political situation allows, perpetrators must be punished. 
During times of war, calls also aim to be sensible indicators about right and wrong. They 
aim to signal human moral values that have been violated by ongoing crimes. They open the 
door for humanity to take a stand against wrongdoing, they give us the opportunity to think 
about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the perpetrators’ conduct, and to make our own 
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judgements about it, all while the war is ongoing. Calls for criminal accountability “tell us 
where to locate social authority, how to preserve order and community, where to look for social 
dangers, and how to feel about these matters.”414 Calls open the door for us to think about 
crimes through broader debates about the rule of law, politics, moral values, and the social 
system. Calls aim to reinforce the power of law within society. 
Calls for criminal accountability aim to strengthen people’s faith in the rule of law that is 
diminished during war. Calls address the wrongs that have been committed and assist in ending 
perpetrators’ impunity. Physical punishment is important, but in the absence of criminal 
institutions that are willing and able to perform the tasks involved in criminal justice, calls 
express a message that aims to re-establish trust in the rule of law. While the existence of 
criminal justice institutions enhances the rule of law and makes laws genuine in the eyes of 
society, in the absence of such institutions, calls for criminal accountability encourage people 
not to be silent about the evil. Calls have generated some undeniable efforts toward preserving 
the rule of law during war; for example, in the absence of a criminal justice system, local 
councils in small liberated areas inside Syria have established their own justice systems, aiming 
to keep order and sustain faith in the rule of law inside their society. In major cities, judges and 
lawyers who have deserted the government have established an alternative court system and 
have guaranteed fair trials during the war. With the military advancement, these judges and 
lawyers were forced to flee to other countries, but their adherence to justice has not stopped. 
 





Rather, they continue to offer their legal efforts to hold perpetrators accountable, and their 
practices are significant examples of preserving the rule of law during the war. 
Earlier, I flagged the fact that deterrence is unlikely to be the major justification of 
international criminal justice, but calls for criminal accountability go beyond habituation of 
legal systems, and beyond the political considerations and institutional constraints that are 
faced during the process of holding war criminals to account. Calls point to wrongdoings as a 
fact, regardless of whether there is a criminal justice system to carry out the task of punishment. 
The implied message of these calls is one of deterrence. While they may not hinder specific 
individuals, their message tells society that there are values that have been violated and that we 
are committed to holding their perpetrators accountable. The deterrent impact that the message 
expresses might equate to the condemnation and censure expressed by calls for criminal 
accountability. Moreover, the stronger the calls, the more they deter, and during the war in 
Syria, calls have been strong. Although it is difficult to measure the deterrent effect during the 
ongoing war, some measures that have been taken by states seem to correspond to these calls. 
For example, the US enacted the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 to hold 
individuals of the Syrian regime accountable. 
Referring now to trail component of the criminal justice system, calls have pushed both 
Syrian civil society and the international community to investigate and document atrocity 
crimes. According to Martha Mino, destroying citizens does not destroy their memories; 
therefore, documentation and investigation have a positive impact on society during the war 





important because it makes them feel exposed. Documentation and investigation are the best 
ways to inform citizens about what has occurred during the war and they ensure that evidence 
of crimes is not eviscerated. Keeping records and evidence of what happened is essential so 
that, when circumstances allow for legal action, they can be presented in court. Society wants 
to ensure that the law is obeyed. Documentation and investigation sustain the rule of law, and 
they play an educational role; they tell society the truth and give it the opportunity to evaluate 
it. 
Investigation and documentation carry a communicative aspect; they provide additional 
ways to communicate with offenders, victims, and society as a whole. Documentation and 
investigation help society to avoid repetition of violence, they teach Syrians about the current 
regime’s wrongdoings, and they make society cautious when choosing future leaders. 
Documentation allows for naming and shaming because it records the names of perpetrators 
so, once the war is over, their actions will not go unknown and undocumented. Naming and 
shaming assists in the delivery of a message of condemnation and censure to perpetrators and 
their allies. In fact, one of the notable practices during the Syrian war is the intensive effort to 
document atrocity crimes. To briefly recap some of the many examples raised in Chapter One, 
55,000 photos of the corpses of detainees at the Syrian regime’s detention centres were 
smuggled out of Syria by a defected officer, referred to as “Caesar,” who compiled them as 
evidence of the regime’s crimes. Founder of the Commission for International Justice and 
Accountability, William Wiley collected and documented more than 600,000 official 
governmental documents that implicate al-Assad and 24 senior figures from his regime in war 





of war crimes. Moreover, calls have generated the international community’s interest in the 
situation in Syria, and they put pressure on it to investigate atrocity crimes. The international 
community has made certain efforts, such as establishing the COI, which focuses on fact-
finding violations of human rights, and establishing the IIIM, which is mandated with 
collecting data and preparing for future trials. 
Calls for criminal accountability have also encouraged many states in Europe to establish 
trials. Trials in absentia re-establish trust in the rule of law and justice, irrespective of the fact 
that the war is not over. Calls express censor, they open the door for people – whether 
perpetrators, victims, or witnesses – to tell the truth. During the trial process, defendants 
confront their victims, and they answer to the wrongs for which they are responsible. Calls 
express a message that says: “even though our efforts might not generate immediate results 
(arrests and holding perpetrators accountable), they will produce results when the political 
situation allows.” Calls for criminal accountability are, in fact, generating actions on the 
ground, and that is important because they put pressure on the international community to 
accept some justice-like practices that would not happen if people did not call to hold 
perpetrators of the Syrian war accountable. 
 What Kind of Message and Who May Call to Account? 
In the Syrian case, when suspects are called to account, it’s already quite clear that they will 
not be punished, at least not while the conflict continues. Accountability during conflict is 
difficult. Instead, calls during conflict are made so as to push for action to be taken toward 





those who are targeted by them cannot ignore, a message that generates punitive responses and 
not merely the moral condemnations like those associated with human rights law. It is for this 
reason that I argue that, for calls to be effective, they must use the language of the criminal law. 
In labelling wrongdoings as “crimes” and wrongdoers as “criminals,” these calls send a 
message that, if we could, we would punish those who commit war crimes against innocent 
civilians. The language of the criminal law by itself has values, even if there is no likelihood 
of physical punishment during the conflict. We must recognize that these wrongs are crimes, 
regardless of the lack of criminal justice institutions with which to deal with them. The values 
that will be generated by using the language of the criminal law in response to the Syrian war, 
I suggest, are the following: 
(1) Using the language of the criminal law might change or re-frame the public discourse by 
encouraging people or groups who deal with criminals to think twice about their 
relationships with them, to recognize that they are dealing with criminals. In our case, 
calls to hold A (a party on the battlefield) criminally accountable might change the way 
A’s allies behave. It might hinder others who have not yet determined to support A. The 
language might obstruct those who supply A with weapons and other tools that allow him 
to perpetuate crimes. Calls for accountability would force governments to stop selling 
weapons to A, because it makes them aware that they will be involved in illegal actions. 
By calling A a criminal, we point to the fact that A has done something gravely wrong 
that violates the values that all humanity share. That might cause allies to recognize that 
they are, in fact, aiding and abetting perpetrators of atrocity, and one day – when legal 





criminal justice institution. With calls for accountability, while A may go unpunished, 
there will be no forgetting that A is a criminal; while A may escape justice, the general 
public will nonetheless know about A’s crimes. When people think of A, they will think 
of a person who has done wrong, and of someone who should be apprehended, removed 
from office, tried, and punished as an example to others. It is here that the general public 
begins to recognize the values that punishment can bring. The message that is expressed 
by calls for accountability might change the way people come to think of the parties to 
the conflict, even while the war continues. 
(2) Using the language of the criminal law may put pressure on the international community 
to take immediate action to stop the ongoing crimes. While the UNSC was unsuccessful 
in referring crimes in Syria to the ICC, they nonetheless sent the COI to investigate war 
crimes. The UNSC might, with time, take more comprehensive punitive measures. 
Individual states in Europe have already taken some steps toward criminal trials, which 
I will discuss in the next section. 
(3) Calls for criminal accountability might provide legitimacy to other criminal justice 
institutions that would otherwise lack it. As explained, in the absence of criminal justice 
institutions that have standing to call criminals to account, our shared humanity provides 
that standing. In the Syrian case, criminals are answerable to humanity, and in the absence 
of a legitimate domestic criminal institution, efforts to hold criminals accountable by 
criminal institutions of states in Europe might be acceptable, because these institutions 
are responding to human suffering. The suffering that Syrians citizens are enduring goes 





(4) Calls might satisfy citizens, victims, groups, and NGOs who are working toward 
unveiling crimes in Syria. They might provide vindication for their position in the 
absence of prosecutorial avenues. The general public often doubts the position of those 
who work on uncovering the truth. Therefore, investigation and documentation invite 
society to take seriously the work of those working to unveil crimes. Calls would lend 
support to their work. 
The question is: who has standing to call perpetrators to account? In the case of the Syrian 
conflict, where atrocity crimes are ongoing and where there is no credible domestic criminal 
justice institution in place, I argue that foreign institutions have the authority, the standing, 
based on the shared values of all humanity – values of care and respect. 
Canada recognizes the suffering of refugees who have fled Syria seeking a safe refuge. 
Canada, as do other nations around the world, does so because crimes in Syria violate the values 
that are common to all humanity qua their humanity. Antony Duff says, “the existence of a 
community is often a matter more of aspiration than of achieved fact, and a recognition of 
human community could be a recognition of what we should aspire to create.”415 I am not 
claiming that the world is one society; rather, I am suggesting that, in cases of disasters, we 
often feel as if we belong to one community – our response is defined by our humanity. 
Perpetrators of the war in Syria are answerable to the whole of humanity, because their crimes 
have violated the values of all human beings, not only those of Syrians. In fact, there is a virtual 
human community that has the standing to call perpetrators to account in the absence of 
 





legitimate institutions. According to Victor Tadros, in the absence of a credible domestic 
criminal justice system, whoever can punish, should do so. Similarly, in the absence of a 
domestic criminal justice system in Syria, calls for criminal accountability might provide 
legitimacy to some international institutions or bodies to whom perpetrators must answer. 
It is important, however, to concentrate on both the message and on who expresses it, and 
to distinguish between domestic and international messages. Because suspects may deny the 
truth of calls for their accountability, calls may have a negative effect and may be perceived 
incorrectly by the public. In other words, if the message comes from the wrong source, it might 
have the opposite effect to that intended. Suspects of crimes might say, “who are you to call 
me to account?” For example, US President Donald Trump called for al-Assad’s accountability 
when he signed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019, which sanctions 
the Syrian government and implies a coercive measure that “means should be utilized to 
compel the government of Bashar al-Assad to halt its murderous attacks on the Syrian people 
and to support a transition to a government in Syria that respects the rule of law, human rights, 
and peaceful co-existence with its neighbors.”416 Although the Act has been well received by 
many activists and jurists, as it is said to provide a glimmer of hope in the midst of an impasse 
with respect to the international community’s ability to provide a legal response, the Syrian 
government’s proponents loudly demanded to know what right Trump had to sanction it. The 
Syrian government further claimed that the US has interests in Syria and that calls for justice 
are merely strategic and political. al-Assad may argue that such a call would be an instance of 
 





a foreign country intervening in Syrian affairs and impinging on its sovereignty. Moreover, 
some members of the public have become concerned about the negative impact of the Act on 
civilians in Syria.417 To avoid a similar situation, and for calls to be credible, they are best 
initiated by the Syrian people, with the international community and individual states 
supporting their efforts for criminal justice. 
 What Have the Calls Achieved? 
In 2020, three important justice-like efforts are taking place internationally, in relation to the 
crimes committed in Syria. Neither of these efforts is expected to generate punishment, but 
these efforts might mean that calls for criminal accountability are pushing for some kind of 
response.  
A. Claim at the ICC 
As explained in Chapter One, the ICC has no authority over crimes in Syria, but it could initiate 
a preliminary examination based on information provided to it by individuals or groups. 
Preliminary examinations include “analyses [of] whether or not the ICC has jurisdiction; … 
whether an investigation would be admissible (a national court is not already dealing with it); 
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and whether or not an investigation would be in the interests of justice and of the victims.”418 
According to the procedures of the ICC, if its prosecutors receive information about serious 
crimes in any state, they can initiate a preliminary examination. The prosecutor can obtain 
information from trustworthy international organizations to help in the examination process, 
and if a reasonable basis is found, the prosecutor may start proprio motu investigations, after 
obtaining the authorization of the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber. For example, in 2016, the ICC 
conducted a preliminary examination of alleged crimes committed by the US army in 
Afghanistan, despite the fact that the US refused the investigation, claiming that the ICC had 
no jurisdiction over these crimes.419 The prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, found credible 
evidence of the alleged crimes, and in November 2017 requested the permission of the Pre-
Trial Chamber to start investigation of those alleged crimes committed by the US army.420 
In September 2018, the ICC opened a preliminary investigation against leaders of the 
Republic of the Union of Myanmar, to investigate alleged crimes against humanity and the 
forced displacement of 1.6 million Rohingya Muslim citizens who were forced to migrate from 
Myanmar to the neighbouring People’s Republic of Bangladesh. Myanmar is not party to the 
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Rome Statute, but Bangladesh has ratified it, and because some of the alleged crimes happened 
on the territory of Bangladesh, the ICC prosecutor announced its jurisdiction to conduct a 
preliminary investigation.421 In November 2019, and as a result of the information found during 
the preliminary investigation, Pre-Trial Chamber III of the ICC authorized the prosecutor “to 
proceed with an investigation for the alleged crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction in the 
Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar.”422 
Syrians found, in the case of Myanmar, a legal precedent to request that the ICC initiate 
a preliminary investigation of alleged crimes in Syria.423 In March 2019, a claim was submitted 
to the prosecutor of the ICC on behalf of 28 Syrian citizens who were deported or forcibly 
displaced to Jordan.424 The ICC confirmed receiving the claim, announcing that they “will 
analyse the materials submitted, as appropriate, in accordance with the Rome Statute and with 
full independence and impartiality. As soon as we reach a decision on the appropriate next step, 
we will inform the sender and provide reasons for our decision.”425 At the end of September 
2020, the ICC has still not reached its decision; when I met Bensouda at the 18th Assembly of 
State Party in November 2019, she said that she is unlikely to take any decision on the claim 
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during her term, which ends in 2020. Nonetheless, for the Court to even accept the submission 
of the claim is a step forward and an indicator that, given the lack of legitimacy of domestic 
criminal justice institutions, international institutions are making alternative efforts to find 
ways to achieve justice in Syria. I argue that these efforts have only succeeded because of calls 
for criminal accountability. Calls bring hope to victims, they aim to deter perpetrators and their 
allies, and they help to bring perpetrators to account. 
B. The International Court of Justice 
The CAT was adopted by UNGA Resolution Nr. 39/462 of 10 December 1984. The CAT aims 
to prevent conduct of torture in any territory within its jurisdiction, and regardless of whether 
a state is in war or in a stable situation.426 Article 30 declares that: 
Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be 
settled through negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be 
submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the 
request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the 
organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer 
the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in 
conformity with the Statute of the Court.427 
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The ICJ, the exclusive judicial institution of the UN, rules over legal disputes that emerge 
among countries in accordance with international law. Notwithstanding the fact that Syria 
ratified the CAT in 2004, evidence shows that the Syrian government has, since 2011, 
committed crimes of torture against its citizens; torture is, in fact, the distinct mark of the 
government’s crimes. Because Syria is a state party to the CAT, any state can refer the Syrian 
file to the ICJ. While the ICJ is not a criminal court, there are benefits to pursuing this option: 
it will allow an exceptional forum for keeping evidence of heinous crimes in a trustworthy 
judicial process; it may put pressure to allow access to the government’s detention centres; and 
it could help in the process of naming and shaming, as it might identify names of some 
criminals who should not be part of the future transition in Syria.428 Moreover, the ICJ’s 
involvement might bring a glimmer of hope to victims. It might help to rebalance the 
equilibrium between perpetrators and victims that has been upset as a result of crimes. 
Consider, for example, the ICJ’s decision to accept the case filed by Gambia against Myanmar. 
Gambia accused Myanmar of committing crimes against humanity related to the Rohingya 
Muslims, as well as of violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (1948). The Court decided that Myanmar must take “temporary measures” to stop 
genocide against the Rohingya. The Court did not criminalize perpetrators, but its involvement 
was symbolic and moved efforts toward justice.429 It is possible for any state, such as Gambia 
in the case of Myanmar, to ask for the opening of an investigation of such crimes. As Syria is 
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a state party of the CAT, any country can refer the case to the ICJ, naming the Syrian 
government as a violator of the CAT because of its continuous acts of violence and torture 
against civilians. The main advantage of referring the Syrian file to the ICJ is the pressure that 
would be exerted on the international community to force the Syrian government to allow 
access to its detention centres for investigation and documentation of the situation. 
C. National Proceedings in Europe 
Another outcome of calls for criminal accountability find its responses in Europe. Between 
May and October 2018, the national criminal justice systems have launched investigations of 
16 criminal cases submitted against President Bashar al-Assad.430 It as well issued three arrest 
warrants by French judges against three high-ranking officials in the al-Assad regime, namely:  
Ali Mamlouk, Jamil Hassan, and Abdel Salah Mahmoud. Notably, Mamlouk is the special 
security adviser to al-Assad and one of his most trusted men. He is also head of the National 
Security Bureau of the Ba’ath Party, and there are rumours that he has been nominated by 
Russia for presidency following al-Assad. Hassan is the head of the Syrian Air Force 
Intelligence Directorate and a close adviser to al-Assad and Mahmoud is the Director of 
Investigation at the Air Force Intelligence Branch in Damascus. It is not clear yet how the 
French judicial criminal system plans to arrest these notable figures of the al-Assad regime 
while they are located in Syria, and unlikely to leave.431 These cases are not expected to go 
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beyond investigations, and at most, courts may issue arrest warrants, but such initiatives should 
be considered to be an advancement on the previous impasse of the UNSC. These initiatives 
provide some hope to victims, they sustain the general public’s believe in the rule of law, and 




















TREATIES AND COVNETIONS 
American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969.  
Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, (1973) 892 U.N.T.S. 1. 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, 2005. 
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949. 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, UNGA RS. 39/46 of 10 December 1984, entry into force 26 June 1987.  
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 1954 
and its Protocol of 1999. 
Convention on Conventional Weapons of 1980 and its four Additional Protocols. 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979. 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-





Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989. 
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 1994.  
Geneva Conventions of 1949, (1950) 75 U.N.T.S. 85. 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965.  
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. 
Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, (1977) 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.  
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9. 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, 24 October 1945, 832 U.S.T.D. 993. 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp No. 
13, UN Doc A/180 (1948), online: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>. 
INTERNATIONAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS 








Emergency Law, Legislative Act no. 15 dated 22 December 1962. Online: 
<http://www.shrc.org/en/?p=19812>.  
Law for Protecting the Revolution, Syria, issued through Legislative Decree No. (6) dated 17 
January 1965. 
Legislative Decree No. 69 dated 30 September 2008, Syria. (immunity against prosecution to 
political security). 
United Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties, Signed at Vienna 23 May 1969, Entry 
into Force: 27 January 1980 Online: 
<https://www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.law.of.treaties.convention.1969/53.html>. 
JURISPRUDENCE  
Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 97-19-AR72, 1 38 (Appeals Chamber, ICTR, 
(March, 2000). Online: 
<http://www.worldcourts.com/ictr/eng/decisions/1999.11.03_Barayagwiza_v_Prosecu
tor.pdf>. 
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), U.S. Supreme Court. 
ICTY, The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for 






ICTY, The Prosecutor v Fatmir Limaj and others, Trial Chamber, Judgment, IT-03-66-T, (30 
November 2005) at 90, online: <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/tjug/en/lim-
tj051130-e.pdf>. 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, The Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Judgment, SSL-
04-15-T, (2 March 2009). 
International Criminal Court, The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Pre-Trial Chamber, 
Decision of Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/04-01/06, (29 January 2007). 
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS 
The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 2011, 
online:<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/IndependentIntern
ationalCommission.aspx>.  
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (Ottawa, ON: International Development Research Centre, 2001), online: 
<http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>. 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary Volume to the Report of 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa, ON: 






International Law Commission, Summaries of the Work of the International Law 
Commission, Draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind (Part II) 
– including the draft Statute for an international criminal court. Online: 
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/summaries/7_4.shtml>. 
The Commission of Experts for the former Yugoslavia, 1992, online: 
<http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/un_commission_of_experts_report1994_en.pd
f>. International Commission of Inquiry for Darfur, 2004, online: 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/darfur.htm>. 
The Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon, 2006, online: <http://reliefweb.int/node/417831>. 
International Commission of Inquiry in Guinea, 2009, online: 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b4f49ea2.html>.  
The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, 2008, online: 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ac45cd22.html>. 
The International Commission of Inquiry on Côte d’Ivoire, 2010, online: 
<http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5134912d2.pdf>.  







The United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict, online: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIGazaConflict/Pages/ReportCoIGaza.a
spx>.  
The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, About 
the Commission of Inquiry, online: 
<https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/iicisyria/pages/independentinternationalcom
mission.aspx>.  




UN RESOLUTIONS AND DECLARATIONS 
UNGA-UNSC, Report of the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of 
Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic on the alleged use of chemical 
weapons in the Ghouta area of Damascus on 21 August 2013, 67th Sess, UN Doc 
A/67/997-S/2013/553 (September 2013), online: 
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/553>.  
UNGA, Declaration on Fact-Finding by the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of 






UNGA, Formulation of The Principles Of International Law Recognized In The Charter Of 
The Nuremburg Tribunal And In The Judgment Of The Tribunal, A/CN.4/W.12 dated: 
31/May/1949, online: <https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0d1ffe/pdf/>.  
UNGA, International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation 
and Prosecution of Those Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under 
International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, 71st 
Sess, UN Doc A/71/L.48 (19 December 2016), online: 
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/71/L.48>. 
UNGA, Question of the punishment of war criminals and of persons who have committed 
crimes against humanity, 18 December 1971, A/RES/2840, online:< 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f04b28.html>. 
UNHCR, “Internally Displaced People,” Syria, (7 July 2016), online: 
<http://www.unhcr.org/sy/29-internally-displaced-people.html>. 
UNHRC, “Statement by Mr. Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro Chair of the Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” (17 March 2015), online: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15843&L
angID=E>. 
UNHRC, Human rights situation the required the council’s attention: Report of the 
independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 21st 







UNHRC, Report of the Fact-Finding Mission on Syria pursuant to Human Rights Council, resolution 
S-16/1 (August 2011), at 18. Online: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4e4e2ba72.html>. 
UNHRC, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic, 24th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/24/46 (16 September 2013), online: 
<http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/a_hrc_24_46_encoisept2013.pdf>. 
UNHRC, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic: Rule of Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria, 27th Sess, UN Doc 




UNHRC, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic, 21st Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/21/50 (16 August 2012). Online: 
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21
/A-HRC-21-50_en.pdf>. 
UNHRC, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 







UNHRC, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic, 27th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/28/69 (5 February 2015), at 16. Online: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session28/Documents/A
.HRC.28.69_E.doc>. 
UNHRC, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of 
human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, 18th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/18/53, (15 September 
2011). Online: <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/countries/SY/Syria_Report_2011-08-
17.pdf>. 
UNHRC, Human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories, Report of 
the independent commission of inquiry established pursuant to Human Rights Council 
resolution S-21/1, 29 Sess, UN Doc A/ HRC/29/52 (24 June 2015). Online: 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIGazaConflict/Pages/ReportCoIGaza.
aspx>. 
UNHRC, OMNUSCO, Report Of The United Nations Joint Human Rights Office On 
International Humanitarian Law Violations Committed By Allied Democratic Forces 
(Adf) Combatants In The Territory Of Beni, North Kivu Province, Between 1 October 







UNHRC, Human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories, Report of 
the independent commission of inquiry established pursuant to Human Rights Council 
resolution S-21/1, 29 Sess, UN Doc A/ HRC/29/52 (24 June 2015), online: 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIGazaConflict/Pages/ReportCoIGaza.
asp>. 
UNHRC, OMNUSCO, Report Of The United Nations Joint Human Rights Office On 
International Humanitarian Law Violations Committed By Allied Democratic Forces 
(Adf) Combatants In The Territory Of Beni, North Kivu Province, Between 1 October 
And 31 December 2014, (May 2015). 
United Nations Economic and Social Council, Information Concerning Human Rights 
Arising from Trials of War Criminals, Report Prepared by the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission, UN Doc. E/CN.4/W.19, 15 May 1948, p. 11. Online: 
<http://www.unwcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/UNWCCUN-HRs-Report.pdf>. 
UNSC, 7116th Meeting, SC/11292 (22 February 2014), online: 
<https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11292.doc.htm>. 
UNSC, 7180th Meeting, UN DOC S/PV. 7180 Provisional (22 May 2014), online: 
<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7180.pdf>. 
UNSC, Adopted by the Security Council at its 6491st meeting, on 26 February 2011, UN Doc 







UNSC, Albania [et al]: draft resolution, UN Doc S/2014/348, (22 May 2014), online: 
<https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/348>. 
UNSC, Albania [et al]: draft resolution, UN Doc S/2017/172, (28 February 2017), online: 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/172>. 
UNSC, Andorra [et al]: draft resolution, UN Doc S/2016/846, (8 October 2016), online: 
<https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/846>. 
UNSC, Bahrain [et al]: draft resolution, UN Doc S/2012/77, (4 February 2012), online: 
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20S2012%2077.pdf>. 
UNSC, Egypt [et al]: draft resolution, UN Doc S/2016/1026, (5 December 2016), online: 
<https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/1026>.  
UNSC, France [et al]: draft resolution, UN Doc S/2011/612, (4 October 2011), online: 
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20S2011%20612.pdf>. 







UNSC, France [et al]: draft resolution, UN Doc S/2017/315, (12 April 2017), online: 
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2017_315.pdf>. 
UNSC, France [et al]: draft resolution, UN Doc S/2017/962, (16 November 2017), online: 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/962>. 
UNSC, UN DOC S/2018/462, 14 May 2018 Report of the Secretary-General, “Protection of 
civilians in armed conflict.” Online: 
<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1812444.pdf>. 
UNSC, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies: Report 
of the Secretary-General, 23 August 2004, S/2004/616, online: 
<https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/2004%20report.pdf>.  
OTHER REPORTS 
UNHRC, Human Rights Committee, General comment no. 31 [80], The nature of the general 
legal obligation imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 26 May 
2004, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/478b26ae2.html [accessed 21 June 2019], 
online<https://www.refworld.org/docid/478b26ae2.html>. 
 “A report into the credibility of certain evidence with regard to torture and execution of 





Solicitors of London, (20 January 2014), at 4. Online: <https://www.carter-
ruck.com/images/uploads/documents/Syria_Report-January_2014.pdf>. 
Human Rights Watch, “Far from Justice, Syria’s Supreme State Security Court,” (24 February 
2009), online: Human Rights Watch Publications: 
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/02/24/far-justice/syrias-supreme-state-security-
court>.  
Human Rights Watch, “North Korea: UN Should Act on Atrocities Report – New Video 
Shows Horrors of North Korea Through Eyewitness Testimony” (17 February 2014), 
online: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/17/north-korea-un-should-act-atrocities-
report>. 
Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2016 – Events of 2015,” at 554, online: 
<https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2016_web.pdf>. 
Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2019 – Events of 2018,” online: 
<https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/syria>. 
Human Rights Watch, A Wasted Decade: Human Rights in Syria during Bashar al-Assad’s First Ten 
Years in Power, (16 July 2010) at 2, Human Rights Watch Publications, online: 
<http://www.hrw.org/node/91580/section/2>. 
Human Rights Watch, No Room to Breathe: State Repression of Human Rights Activism in 







Human Rights Watch, Syria’s Tadmor Prison: Dissent Still Hostage to a Legacy of Terror, 
Vol. 8, No. 2 (E) (April 1996). Human Rights Watch Publications, online: 
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Syria2.htm>. 
Human Rights Watch, “Torture Archipelago – Arbitrary Arrests, Torture and Enforced 
Disappearances in Syria’s Underground Prisons since March 2011.” Online: 
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/07/03/torture-archipelago/arbitrary-arrests-torture-
and-enforced-disappearances-syrias>.  
International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion. 8 July 1996. Online: 
<https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/95/095-19960708-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf>. 
The opinion was also used in the case of the wall in Palestine: <https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/131/131-20040709-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf>. 
International Center for Transitional Justice, “Transitional Justice and Development” (2009), 







International Center of Transitional Justice, “What is Transitional Justice?” (2009) Online: 
International Center of Transitional Justice <https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-
justice>.  
JOURNAL ARTICLES 
Akhavan, Payam, “Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia – A Commentary on 
the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal” (1998) 20:4 Hum Rts Q. 
Arthur, Paige, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of 
Transitional Justice” (2009) 31:2 Hum Rts Q. 
Bassiouni, M. Cherif, “Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing Accountability Over 
Realpolitik” (2003) 35:2 Case W Res J Int’l L. 
Bassiouni, M. Cherif, “The history of universal jurisdiction and its place in international 
law.” in Stephen Macedo, ed. Universal jurisdiction: national courts and the 
prosecution of serious crimes under international law. (University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2006). 
Bassiouni. M. Cherif, “Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for 
Accountability” (1996) 59:4 Law & Contemp Probs 9. 
Bell, Christine & Catherine O’Rourke, “Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional 





Bell, Christine, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-
Field’” (2009) 3:1 Int’l J Transit Justice. 
Benoist, Alain de, “What is Sovereignty?” (1999) 1999:116 Telos 99, 
online<http://telospressonline.com/content/ 
1999/116/99.short>.  
Bensouda, Fatou, “Reflections from the International Criminal Court Prosecutor” (2012) 45:1 
Case W Res J Int’l L. 
Binningsbø, Helga Malmin, et al. “Armed Conflict and Post-Conflict Justice, 1946-2006: A 
Dataset” (2012) 49:5 J Peace Research. 
Boutruche, Théo, “Credible Fact-Finding and Allegations of International Humanitarian Law 
Violations: Challenges in Theory and Practice” (2011) 16:1 J Confl & Sec L. 
Cassese, Antonio, “Clemency Versus Retribution in Post-Conflict Situations” (2007) 46:1 
Colum J of Transnat’l L. 
Clapham, Andrew, “Human rights and international criminal law” in William A Schabas, 
ed, The Cambridge Companion to International Criminal Law, Cambridge 
Companions to Law, ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).  
Clapham, Andrew, “The Complex Relationship Between the Geneva Conventions and 
International Human rights Law” in Andrew Clapham, et al., eds. The 1949 Geneva 





Cohen, David & Leigh-Ashley Lipscomb, “When More May be Less: Transitional Justice in 
East Timor” in Melissa S William, Rosemary Nagy & Jon Elster, eds. Transitional 
Justice: NOMOS (New York: NYU Press, 2012). 
DeFrancia, Cristian, “Due Process in International Criminal Courts: Why Procedure Matters” 
(November 2001) Vol. 87 No. 7. Virginia Law Review.  
Duff, R.A. & David Garland, “Introduction: Thinking about Punishment,” in R.A. Duff and 
David Garland (eds.), A Reader on Punishment, (NY: Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1994). 
Duff, R.A., “Good and Evil and the Criminal Law” in Christopher Cordner, ed, Philosophy, 
Ethics and a Common Humanity: Essays in Honour of Raimond Gaita (Taylor & 
Francis, Routledge, 2011). 
Duff, R.A., “In Defence of One Type of Retributivism: A Reply to Bagaric and Amarasekara” 
(2000) 24: 2 Melb UL Rev. 
Duff, R.A., “Legal Punishment,” (summer 2013 edition) The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed, online: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/legal-
punishment>. 






Engstrom, Par, “Transitional Justice and Ongoing Conflict” in Chandra Lekha Sriram et al., 
eds., Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and Ex-
Combatants (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
El Zeidy, Mohamed, “Universal Jurisdiction In Absentia: Is It A Legally Valid Option for 
Repressing Heinous Crimes?” (2003) Oxford U Comparative L Forum 4, 
online:<ouclf.law.ox.ac.uk>.  
Feinberg, Joel, “The Expressive Function of Punishment” (1965) 49:3 The Monist. 
Frits Kalshoven, “The International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission: A Sleeping 
Beauty?” (2002) HV (Humanitäres Völkerrecht). 
Goldsmith, Jack & Stephen D. Krasner, “The Limits of Idealism” (2003) 132:1 Daedalus 47. 
Gray, David C., “Extraordinary Justice” (2010) 62:1 Ala L Rev 55. 
Gready, Paul & Simon Robins, “From Transitional to Transformative Justice: A New Agenda 
for Practice” (2014) 8:3 Int J Transit Justice.  
Greenwood, Christopher, “Human rights and humanitarian law-conflict or 
convergence.” Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 43 (2010). 
Greenwood, Christopher, “Humanitarian Intervention: the Case of Kosovo” in Jarna Petman 
& Martti Koskenniemi, eds, Finnish Yearbook of International Law (The Hague, the 





 Hafner-Burton, Emilie M & James Ron, “Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact through 
Qualitative and Quantitative Eyes” (2009) 61: 2 World Politics 360. 
Hampton, Jean, “The retributive idea,” in Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton, Forgiveness 
and Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
Hampton, Jean, “An Expressive Theory of Retribution” in Wesley Cragg, ed, Retributivism 
and Its Critics, Canadian Section of the International Society for Philosophy of Law 
and Social Philosophy (CS,IVR), Papers for the Special NORDIC Conference 
University of Toronto, 25-27 June 1990 (Germany: Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart, 
1992). 
Hampton, Jean, “The Moral Education Theory of Punishment” (1984) 13:3 Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 208. 
Hampton, Jean. “Correction Harms versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution.” 
(1991)39 Ucla L. Rev. 
Hans-Joachim Heintze, “On the relationship between human rights law protection and 
international humanitarian law,” IRRC, Vol. 86 No 856, December 2004. 
Hart, HLA “Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment” in Punishment and 






Harel, Alon, “Why Only the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions: The Case Against 
Privately Inflicted Sanctions” (2008) 14 Legal Theory. 
Hayner, B. Priscilla, “Fifteen Truth Commissions – 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study” 
(1994)16 Hum Rts Q 597. 
Hays, A. Butler, “The doctrine of universal jurisdiction: a review of the literature.” (2000) 
Criminal Law Forum. Vol. 11. No. 3. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Hendrix, Cullen S & Wendy H Wong, “The Pen Is Truly Mighty: Direct Communication, 
Amnesty International’s Urgent Action Campaigns, and Human Rights Practices in 
Target States” (Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual 
Meeting, New Orleans, 17-20 February 2010). 
Jones, Annika, “Seeking International Criminal Justice in Syria” (2013) 89 International Law 
Studies. 
Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing 
World Politics (NY and London: WW Norton & Company, 2011). 
Katzenstein, Suzanne, “Reverse-Rhetorical Entrapment: Naming and Shaming as a Two-Way 
Street” (2013) 46 Vand J Transnat’l L 1079. 
Kant, Immanuel, “Justice and Punishment,” translated by W Hastie, in Gertrude Ezorsky, ed, 






Kersten, Mark, “Targeting Justice: Targets, Non-Targets and the Prospects for Peace with 
Justice” (2017) 23, 3 Canadian Foreign Policy J. 
Krain, Matthew, “J’accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the Severity of 
Genocides or Politicides?” (2012) 56:3 Int’l Stud Q 574. 
Kramer, H. Matthew, “Moral and Legal Obligation,” in Martin P. Golding and William A. 
Edmundson, eds., Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2005). 
Krebs, Shiri, “The Legalization of Truth in International Fact-Finding” (2017) 17 Chicago J 
Intl L. 
Kristen J. Fisher, “The expressive Value of judgment and punishment,” in Kristen J. Fisher. 
Moral Accountability and the international criminal law (NY, Routledge, 2012). 
Lambourne, Wendy, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding After Mass Violence” (2009) 3:1 
Int J Transit Justice. 
Leebaw, Bronwyn Anne, “The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice” (2008) 30:1 Hum 
Rts Q. 
Luban, David, “Fairness To Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of 
International Criminal law” in Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas, eds, The 





Luban, David, “State Criminality and the Ambition of International Criminal Law” in Tracy 
Isaacs & Richard Vernon, eds, Accountability for Collective Wrongdoing (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
Luis Moreno Ocampo, “Transitional Justice in Ongoing Conflicts” (2007) 1:1 Int J Transit 
Justice 8. 
Macedo, Stephen, ed. Universal jurisdiction: national courts and the prosecution of serious 
crimes under international law. (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). 
Michael J. Mattler, “The Distinction between Civil Wars and International Wars and its Legal 
Implications” (1994) 26:4 NYU J Int’l L & Pol. 
Michael Wenzel et al., “Retributive and Restorative Justice” (2008) 32:5 Law &Hum 
Behavior. 
Milanović, Marko, “The Impact of the ICTY on the Former Yugoslavia: An Anticipatory Postmortem” 
(2016) 110:2 AJIL 233. 
Minow, Martha, “The Hope for Healing: WHAT CAN TRUTH COMMISSIONS DO?” in 
Robert I Rotberg & Dennis Thompson, eds, Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth 
Commissions (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
Moniquet, Claude, “The Involvement of Salafism/Wahhabism in the Support and Supply of 
Arms to Rebel Groups Around the World,” (2013) Directorate – General for External 





Murphy, Colleen, “Transitional Justice and Transnational Wrongdoing” (Paper delivered at 
the Wrongs Across Borders conference – Robina Institute of Criminal Law, March 
2015) [unpublished paper]. 
Murphy, Jeffrie, “Forgiveness and Resentment” in Jeffrie Murphy & Jean Hampton, eds, 
Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
Morris, Herbert, “Persons and Punishment” (1968) 52:4 The Monist 475. 
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “The New Landscape of Transitional Justice” in Naomi Roht-Arriaza & 
Javier Meriezcurrena, eds., Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond 
Truth versus Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
Ni Aolain, Fionnuala & Colm Campbell, “The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted 
Democracies” (2005) 27:1 Hum Rts Q.  
Nino, Carlos S., “The Duty to Punish Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime: The Case 
of Argentina” (1991) 100:8 Yale LJ. 
Nsereko, Daniel D. Ntanda, “The International Criminal Court: Jurisdictional and Related 
Issues” (1999) 10:1 Criminal Law Forum. 
Obel Hansen, Thomas, “Transitional Justice: Toward a Differentiated Theory” (2011) 13:1 Or 
Rev Intl L. 





Orentlicher, Diane F., “Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of 
a Prior Regime” (1991) 100:8: Yale LJ 2539.  
Pablo de Greiff, “A Normative Conception of Transitional Justice” (2010) 50:3 Politorbis. 
Pablo de Greiff, “Theorizing Transitional Justice” in Melissa S. Williams, Rosemary Nagy & 
Jon Elster, eds., Transitional Justice: NOMOS LI (NY: NYU Press, 2012). 
Philippe, Xavier, “The principles of universal jurisdiction and complementarity: how do the 
two principles intermesh?” (2006) International Review of the Red Cross, No. 862. 
Posner, Eric A. & Adrian Vermeule, “Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice” (2004) 117.3 
Harv L Rev. 
Quinn, Joanna R., “Whither the ‘Transition’ of Transitional Justice” (2014-2015) 8 
Interdisciplinary J Hum Rts L. 
Ramcharan, Bertrand G, “The Human Rights Field Operation in Partnership for Peace” in 
Michael O’Flaherty, ed, Human Rights Field Operation in Partnership for Peace – 
Law, Theory, and Practice (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007). 
Randall, C. Kenneth, “Universal Jurisdiction under International Law” (1988) 66 Tex. L. 
Rev. 
Rawls, John, & Samuel Freeman, “Two Concepts of Rules” in Collected Papers (Cambridge: 





Raz, Joseph, “Human rights in the emerging world order.” (2010) 1 Transnational Legal 
Theory. 
Raz, Joseph, “Human Rights without Foundations,” in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas 
(eds.), The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
Reiter, Andrew G., Tricia D. Olsen & Leigh A. Payne, “Transitional Justice and Civil War: 
Exploring New Pathways, Challenging Old Guideposts” (2012) 1:1 Transitional 
Justice Rev 137. 
Reydams, Luc, “Prosecuting Crimes Under International Law on the Basis of Universal 
Jurisdiction: The Experience of Belgium,” in: Horst Fischer et al. eds., International 
and National Prosecution of Crimes Under International Law: Current Developments 
(Berline: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2001). 
Sanders, Barrie, “Justifying International Criminal Punishment: A Critical Perspective.” In 
Bergsmo, Morten and Emiliano J. Buis, ed, Philosophical Foundations of 
International Criminal Law: Foundational Concepts (TOAEP, 2019). 
Schabas, William, “From Leipzig (1923) to Arusha (1996)” in M Cherif Bassiouni (ed), 
International Criminal Law Vol 3 (Transnational Publishers 1999).  
Sharp, Dustin N., “Interrogating the Peripheries: The Preoccupations of Fourth Generation 





Simmons, A. Beth &, Hyeran Jo, “Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?” 
(2015) Social Science Research Network Working Paper, online: 
SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2552820 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2552820
>. 
Sloane, D. Robert, “The expressive capacity of international punishment: The limits of the 
national law analogy and the potential of international criminal law.” (2007) 43 Stan. 
J. Int’l L.  
Snyder, Jack & Leslie Vinjamuri, “Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies 
of International Justice” (2003) 28:3 Intl Security. 
Susan Dwyer, “Reconciliation for Realists” (1999) 13:1 Ethics & Intl Affairs. 
Stern, Brigitte, “International Decision, Universal Jurisdiction over Crimes Against Humanity 
Under French Law,” (1999) 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 
Tallgren, Immi, “The sensibility and sense of international criminal law.” European Journal of 
International Law 13.3 (2002). 
Tanguay-Renaud, François, “State Crimes,” in Michelle Dempsey and François Tanguay-
Renaud (eds), From Morality to Law and Back Again: Liber Amicorum for John 
Gardner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
Vinjamuri, Leslie, “Deterrence, Democracy, and the Pursuit of International Justice” (2010) 





Wellman, Christopher Heath, “Taking Human Rights Seriously” (2012) 20:1 Journal of 
Political Philosophy. 
Zegveld, L. “The Importance of Fact-Finding Missions Under International Humanitarian 
Law” in Meloni, Chantel. & GIanni Tognoni, eds, Is There a Court for Gaza? (The 
Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2011). 
MONOGRAPHS AND COLLECTIONS OF ESSAYS 
 Alston, Philip & Sarah Knuckey, The Transformation of Human Rights Fact-Finding (NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2016). 
Andrew Clapham, et al., eds. The 1949 Geneva conventions: a commentary. (NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2015). 
Beitz, R. Charles, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
Bentham, Jeremy, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislations, 1789 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), online: 
<http://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML13.html>. 
Bergsmo, Morten. & Emiliano J. Buis (eds), Philosophical Foundations of International 
Criminal Law: Foundational Concepts (TOAEP 2019). 
Besson, Samantha & John Tasioulas, eds, The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford 





Blum, Gabriella, “The Crime and Punishment of States,” (2013) 38(1) Yale Journal of 
International Law. 
Broache, Michael Patrick, Evaluating the Effects of International Criminal Court 
Prosecutions on Atrocities During Ongoing Armed Conflict (PhD Thesis, Columbia 
University, 2015). 
Bassiouni, M. Cherif. Crimes against humanity: historical evolution and contemporary 
application (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
Cassese, Antonio International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
Chandra Lekha Sriram et al., eds., Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: 
Victims and Ex-Combatants (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
Christopher Cordner, ed, Philosophy, Ethics and a Common Humanity: Essays in Honour of 
Raimond Gaita (Taylor & Francis, Routledge, 2011). 
Clapham, Andrew, et al., eds. The 1949 Geneva conventions: a commentary. (NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2015). 
Clapham, Andrew, Human rights: a very short introduction (OUP Oxford, 2015). 
Cragg, Wesley, (ed), Retributivism and Its Critics, Canadian Section of the International 
Society for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (Germany: Franz Steiner Verlag 





Drumbl, A. Mark, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 
Duff, R.A. & David Garland (eds.), A Reader on Punishment, (NY: Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1994). 
Duff, R.A. et al., The Trial on Trial, vol 3: Towards a Normative Theory of the Criminal 
Trial (Portland: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2007). 
Duff, R.A., Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall, and Victor Tadros, The Trial on Trial, vol 3: 
Towards a Normative Theory of the Criminal Trial (Portland: Bloomsbury Publishing, 
2007). 
Duff, R.A., Trials & Punishment (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
Duff, R.A., Punishment, Communication, and Community (NY: Oxford University Press, 
USA, 2001). 
Elster, Jon, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
Fisher, J. Kirsten, Moral accountability and international criminal law: holding agents of 
atrocity accountable to the world. (NY: Routledge, 2012). 
 Garland, David, Punishment and modern society: A study in social theory (University of 





Golding, P. Martin & William A. Edmundson, eds., Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law 
and Legal Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005). 
H Victor Condé, A Handbook of International Human Rights Terminology, 2nd ed, vol 8 
(Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2004). 
HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law, 2nd ed (NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2008). 
House, Syrian Expert. Syria Transition Roadmap, Washington: Syrian Center for Political and 
Strategic Studies (2013). 
Hudson, Barbara, Understanding Justice: An Introduction to Ideas, Perspectives and 
Controversies in Modern Penal Theory (Buckingham, England: Open University 
Press, 1996). 
Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993). 
Isaacs, Tracy & Richard Vernon, eds, Accountability for Collective Wrongdoing (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
Kant, Immanuel, translated by W Hastie, Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1972). 
Kerr, Rachel & Eirin Mobekk, Peace and Justice: Seeking Accountability After War 





Keith, Sir Kenneth “Declaration on Fact-Finding by the United Nations in the Field of the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security” (9 December 1991) UNGA, online: 
<https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ga_46-59/ga_46-59.html>. 
Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Roger Woolhouse (ed) (London: 
Penguin Classics 1997).  
Locke, John, Second Treatise of Government, Peter Laslett (ed) 3rd edn (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1988). 
Locke, John, Two Treaties of the Government, Ten vols, vol V (London: Printed for Thomas 
Tegg; W Sharpe & Son; G Offor; G and J Robinson; J Evans and Co.: Also R Griffin 
and Co. Glasgow; and J Gumming, Dublin, 1823). 
Luban, David, Accountability for Collective Wrongdoing (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011). 
M Cherif Bassiouni (ed), International Criminal Law Vol 3 (Transnational Publishers 1999).  
Macedo, Stephen, Mary Robinson, ed, The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, 
(Princeton University, 2001). 
Macedo, Stephen, ed. Universal jurisdiction: national courts and the prosecution of serious 
crimes under international law. (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). 
May, Larry & Shannon Fyfe, International Criminal Tribunals: A Normative Defense 





Meloni, Chantel. & GIanni Tognoni, eds, Is There a Court for Gaza? (The Hague: TMC 
Asser Press, 2011). 
Michael O’Flaherty, ed, Human Rights Field Operation in Partnership for Peace – Law, 
Theory, and Practice (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007). 
Michael S Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of the Criminal Law (NY: Oxford University 
Press, Clarendon Press, 1997). 
Minow, Martha, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and 
Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998).  
Murphy, Jeffrie, & Jean Hampton, eds, Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988). 
O’Flaherty, Michael, ed, Human Rights Field Operation in Partnership for Peace – Law, 
Theory, and Practice (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007). 
Petman, Jarna & Martti Koskenniemi, eds, Finnish Yearbook of International Law (The 
Hague, the Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2002). 
Pictet, Jean & International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary, The Geneva 
conventions. 





Provost, René, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
Ratner, R. Steven & Jason S Abrams & James L Bischoff, Accountability for Human Rights 
Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy (NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2009).  
Rawls, John, & Samuel Freeman, Collected Papers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1999). 
Rawls, John, The Law of People (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
Roht-Arriaza, Naomi & Javier Meriezcurrena, eds., Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First 
Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006). 
Rotberg, I. Robert & Dennis Thompson, eds, Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth 
Commissions (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
Ruti G. Teitel, Globalizing Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
Schabas, A. William ed, The Cambridge Companion to International Criminal Law, 
Cambridge Companions to Law, ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).  
Seils, Paul, Handbook on Complementarity, An Introduction to the Role of National Courts 
and the ICC in Prosecuting International Crimes, online: The International Center of 





Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Human Rights, online: 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/>. 
Tadros, Victor, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
Teitel, Ruti G., Globalizing Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
Ten, CL, Crime, Guilt, and Punishment (NY: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East. (LA, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1989).  
Wegner, S. Patrick, The International Criminal Court in Ongoing Intrastate Conflicts: 
Navigating the Peace-Justice Divide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
William A Schabas, ed, The Cambridge Companion to International Criminal Law, 
Cambridge Companions to Law, ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
William, Melissa S, Rosemary Nagy & Jon Elster, eds. Transitional Justice: NOMOS (New 
York: NYU Press, 2012). 
ELECTRONIC MEDIA 
“About 430 thousands were killed since the beginning of the Syrian revolution,” The Syrian 






“About 4500 persons executed by ISIS during 27 months since declaring its alleged 
caliphate,” (29 September 2016), The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, online: 
<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=51519>. 
“Assad blames conspirators for Syrian protests,” The Guardian (30 March 2011), online: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/30/syrian-protests-assad-blames-
conspirators>. 
“Bashar al-Assad implicated in Syria war crimes, says UN,” The Guardian, (2 December 
2013), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/syrian-officials-
involved-war-crimes-bashar-al-assad-un-investigators>.  
“Country Information and Guidance Syria: The Syrian Civil War,” The Independent Advisory 




Customary Law, The International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 87 Number 857 (March 
2005), online: <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0860.pdf>. 
Ghuna Bdiwi, “Promise of Conflict in Syria: Is There Any Hope for Justice for Victims of 
War?” (22 April 2020) Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy. 
Ghuna Bdiwi, “The R2P Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: Analyzing Canada’s Response to the Syrian 
Conflict: Accountability for Responsibility,” (2019) 1 The Canadian Journal on the 






Ghuna Bdiwi, “Attempting Justice Within Conflict: How Has Syria Influenced the Contemporary 





General Intelligence Agency: Library: The World Factbook, Syria, online: 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html>. 
World Population Review, Syria Population 2020, online: 
<http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/syria-population/>. 
Howard S. Levie, Documents on prisoners of war, International Law Studies, Volume 60 
(Newport, R.I., Naval War College Press; Washington, D.C1979).
<https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/48000/ior530052009en.pdf>. 
“Engel & Royce Syria Sanctions Bill Passes House, Legislation Cracks Down on Assad 
Supporters & Pushes Negotiations” Foreign Affairs Committee, online: <https://gop-
foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-release/engel-royce-syria-sanctions-bill-passes-
house/>. 




“Interview With Syrian President Bashar al-Assad” The Wall Street Journal (31 January 
2011), online: 
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870383320457611471244112289>. 
“Joint Statement Issued by Partners at the Counter-ISIL Coalition Ministerial Meeting,” 





Action (3 December 2014), online: <https://2009-
2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/12/234627.htm>. 
“PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER III Before: Presiding Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua, Judge 
Chang-ho Chung Judge Raul C. Pangalangan – SITUATION IN THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN” No. ICC-02/17 (20 November 2017), online: 
<https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_06891.PDF>. 
“Putin’s Syrian strategy: Not following playbook of American exceptionalism,” Russia 
Today, (19 March 2016), online: <https://www.rt.com/op-ed/336259-putins-syrian-
strategy-american/>. 
“Omar al-Bashir Fast Facts,” CNN Editorial Research, (11 February 2020) 
<https://www.cnn.com/2012/12/10/world/africa/omar-al-bashir---fast-facts/index.html>. 
“16 Torture Survivors From Syria File Criminal Complaint In Austria Against Senior Officials 
In Assad Government,” (29 May 2018) ECCHR, online: 
<https://www.ecchr.eu/en/press-release/16-torture-survivors-from-syria-file-criminal-
complaint-in-austria-against-senior-officials-in-assad-government/>. 
 “Q&A on the Dabbagh Case: French judges issue 3 international arrest warrants against top 







“Russia’s military action in Syria – timeline,” (14 March 2016), The Guardian, online: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/14/russias-military-action-in-syria-
timeline>. 
“Smuggled Syrian documents enough to indict Bashar al-Assad, say investigators: 
Prosecution cases have been prepared against president and senior members of his 
regime for possible war crimes tribunal,” The Guardian, (12 May 2015), online: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/12/smuggled-syrian-documents-
indict-assad-investigators>.  
“Special Report – Repressive Laws in Syria,” The Syrian Human Rights Committee (21 July 
2003), online: 
<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:viunlfLsbIQJ:www.shrc.org
/en/%3Fp%3 D19753+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ca>.  
“Statement by Adama Dieng, Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, on the situation 
of civilians in the Syrian Arab Republic,” United Nations Press Release, (9 May 
2016), online: <http://www.un.org/ar/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/2016-05-
09%20OSAPG%20statement%20on%20the%20situation%20in%20Syria>.  
“Statement by the President on ISIL,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, (10 






“Statement of Support: H.R. 1677 – Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2018,” The White 
House, Statements & Releases, Foreign Policy, 30 November 2018. Online: 
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-support-h-r-1677-
caesar-syria-civilian-protection-act-2018/>. 
 “States ‘failing to seize Sudan’s dictator despite genocide charge’” The Guardian (21 
October 2018) Online: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2018/oct/21/omar-bashir-travels-world-despite-war-crime-arrest-
warrant>. 
“Syria Amnesty International submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review 12th session 




“Syria is in state of war, says Bashar al-Assad” BBC News, (27 June 2012), Online: 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18598533>. 
“Syria protests: Assad to lift state of emergency,” BBC News (20 April 2011), online: 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13134322>. 






“Syria: Thousands suffering neurotoxic symptoms treated in hospitals supported by MSF,” 
Médecins Sans Frontières, (24 August 2013), online: 
<http://www.msf.org/article/syria-thousands- suffering-neurotoxic-symptoms-treated-
hospitals-supported-msf>. 
“Syrian regime and Isis carried out chemical attacks, say UN investigators,” The Guardian, 
(25 August 2016), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/25/assad-
regime-isis-chemical-attacks-syria-un-investigators>. 
“The Chautauqua BluePrint for a Statute for a Syrian Extraordinary Tribunal to Prosecute 
Atrocity Crimes” (27 August 2013) Public International Law & Policy Group, online: 
<https://securitypolicylaw.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Chautauqua-
Blueprint1.pdf>. 
“The Monthly Statistical Report on Victims, September 2016: Violations Documentation 
Center in Syria – VDC,” (September 2016), online: <http://vdc-sy.net/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/September-report-Eng.pdf>. 
 “The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, requests judicial 
authorisation to commence an investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic 






“The US army and CIA may be guilty of war crimes in Afghanistan, says ICC” The Guardian 
(15 November 2016), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/nov/15/us-
army-and-cia-may-be-guilty-of-war-crimes-afghanistan-says-icc>. 
“The Islamic State,” Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford University, online: 
<http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-
bin/groups/view/1?highlight=Islamic+State>. 
“U.S. slams Russian ‘barbarism’ in Syria, Moscow says peace almost impossible,” Reuters 
(25 September 2016), online: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-
un-us-idUSKCN11V0NN>. 
“US airstrikes allegedly kill at least 73 civilians in northern Syria,” (20 July 2016), The 
Guardian, online: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/20/us-airstrike-
allegedly-kills-56-civilians-in-northern-syria>. 
“War crimes against journalists in Homs: FIDH and victims’ families call for charges to be 
brought” (12 March 2018), online: FIDH <https://www.fidh.org/en/region/north-
africa-middle-east/syria/war-crimes-against-journalists-in-homs-fidh-and-victims-
families-call>. 
“‘WHO WANTS TO FORGET?’ Truth and Access to Information about past Human Rights 







Adama Dieng, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide, 
has called the UNSC to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC. 
Annie Sparrow, “Syria’s Polio Epidemic: The Suppressed Truth,” New York Reviews of 
Books, (20 February 2014), online: 
<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/02/20/syrias-polio-epidemic- suppressed-
truth/?insrc=hpma>. 
Assad tops list of Syria war crimes suspects handed to ICC: Former prosecutor, Reuters, (10 
June 2014), online: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-warcrimes-
idUSKBN0EL25020140610>. 
BBC News, “Syria war: Lawyers submit first war crimes cases against Assad” (7 March 
2019), BBC News, online: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
47483714>. 
 Ben Taub, “The Assad Files: Capturing the top-secret documents that tie the Syrian regime to 
mass torture and killings,” The New Yorker, (18 April 2016), online: 
<http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/04/18/bashar-al-assads-war-crimes-
exposed>. 







Dietrich Schindler, “The International Committee of the Red Cross and human rights,” 
International Review of the Red Cross, No. 208 date 28 February 1979. Online: 
<https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/other/57jm9z.htm>.  
Edith M. Lederer, UN chief asks security council to refer Syria to International Criminal 
Court, (26 January 2018), CTV News, online: <https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/un-
chief-asks-security-council-to-refer-syria-to-international-criminal-court-1.3778007>. 
Elizabeth O’Bagy, “The free Syrian Army,” Middle East Security Report 9 (March 2013) the 
Institute for the Study of War, online: 
<http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The-Free-Syrian-Army-
24MAR.pdf>. 
General Intelligence Agency: Library: The World Factbook, Syria, online: 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html>. 
Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, Diplomatic Conference for the establishment 
of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War. (1952).  
Piya Chattopadhyay, “A group of Syrian refugees is attempting to bring President Bashar al-
Assad to the International Criminal Court, but some experts say the case is too weak 
to succeed – Ghuna Bdiwi a lawyer and a PhD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law 
School discusses the legal implication of the ICC decision,” The CBC (13 March 
2019). Online: <https://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-march-13-2019-





Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019, 20 December 2019, The Senate Of The United 
States, online: <https://www.state.gov/caesar-syria-civilian-protection-act/>.  
ICRC, Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, Syrian Arab Republic, online: <https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByCountrySelected.xsp?xp_countrySel
ected=SY>. 
ICRC, Working Paper, 29 June 1999, online: 
<http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ICRCWorkPaperArticle8Para2e.pdf>. 
John Heilprin, “UN says it can no longer keep track of Syria death toll,” The Associated 
Press, (7 January 2014), CTV News, online: <http://www.ctvnews.ca/world/un-says-
it-can-no-longer-keep-track-of-syria-death-toll-1.1626828>. 
Joseph Holliday, “The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil war,” Institute for the 
Study of War – Middle East Security Report 8 (March 2013), at 18. Online at: 
<http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/TheAssadRegime-web.pdf>. 
Joseph V. Micallef, “The Crowded Syrian Battlefield: Is a Turkish Invasion Next?” HuffPost 
– The World Post (19 January 2018), online: 
<https://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-v-micallef/the-crowded-syrian-
battle_b_9045794.html>. 
Josie Ensor, “Assad accused of crimes against humanity in ‘breakthrough’ case at The Hague 







“ICC judges authorise opening of an investigation into the situation in 
Bangladesh/Myanmar,” ICC, online: <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1495>. 
Owen Bowcott, “Syrian refugees launch legal bid to try Assad for crimes against humanity, 
International criminal court asked to rule in case brought by 28 people who fled civil 
war.” (7 March 2019) The Guardian, online: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/mar/07/syrian-refugees-launch-legal-bid-to-
try-assad-for-crimes-against-humanity>. 
RULAC – Geneva Academy online: <http://www.rulac.org/classification/non-international-
armed-conflicts>. 
RULAC, Non-international armed conflicts in Syria, Geneva Academy, online: 
<http://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/non-international-armed-conflicts-in-
syria#collapse4accord>. 







Siege Watch, “First Quarterly Report on Besieged Areas in Syria,” (February 2016) The Syria 
Institute, online: <https://siegewatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/PAX-
RAPPORT-SIEGE-WATCH-FINAL-SINGLE-PAGES-DEF.pdf>. 
Sniderman, Andrew Stobo & Payam Akhavan, “Akhavan and Sniderman: Here’s how we can 
hold Syria responsible for its crimes” (3 September 2017) Ottawa Citizen, Online: 
<http://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/columnists/akhavan-and-sniderman-heres-how-we-
can-hold-syria-responsible-for-its-crimes>. 
Syrian center for free expression and media, online: <https://scm.bz/en/>. 
Syrian Network for Human Rights (1 January 2019). 
The Center for Justice & Accountability (CJA) for providing this list. CJA website: 
<https://cja.org/>. 
Thomas Grove, “Syria Will Sign Chemical Weapons Convention, Declare Arsenal, Foreign 
Ministry Says,” Reuters (10 September 2013), online: The World Post 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/10/syria-chemical-weapons-
convention_n_3901417.html>. 
Trials International, Make way for Justice #4, Momentum towards accountability Universal 
Jurisdiction, Annual Review 2018 #U. 
Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, & Sam Wyer, “Iranian Strategy in Syria – A Joint Report by 
AEI’s Critical Threats Project & Institute for the Study of War,” (May 2013), online: 
253 
 
 
 
<http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IranianStrategyinSyria-
1MAY.pdf>. 
